And, again, the land frontier of France on the east controlled the external policy. The desire of the new government was at first not so much land for dominion as the spread of the new ideas of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity; but the aim was more and more lost in the method, so that land expansion, at first the method by which ideas were to be materialized, became in the end the aim itself. " The French system," said the govern ment, " is to be extended to all countries occupied by her armies " ; but the idea of the extension of the French system was lost in the attempt to occupy the countries by her armies. In this attempt the old conditions con trolled the issue, for the countries most easily occupied lay beyond the eastern border of France.
At first under the driving force of the whole French people, and later under the magnificent leadership of the greatest general of modern times, France bade fair to subdue the continent entirely, and, had there been no ocean power, it is almost certain that France would have dominated the world for many years, but always the ocean power of Britain met and checked her. By means of her fleet and the old method of paying to her allies money amassed by commerce, Britain hindered the expansion of France, and Napoleon, on whom the direction of affairs gradually fell, came to see clearly that Britain and British commerce were his real enemies.
In the further struggle four distinct phases are clearly marked, and in each the importance of Britain's ocean commerce, the result of her ocean power, is obvious.
(i) Napoleon at first thought that India was the source of British commercial supremacy, of her wealth and resistance. Thus after, with consurantate skill in diplo macy and war, subduing separately between 1795 and 1797 many little minor states in Italy and on the Adriatic shores, and establishing little republics on the French model, he made in 1798 a descent on Egypt, while yet some French ships of war were left him. He thoroughly subdued and organized that old land, and attempted even to reach and conquer the other old land of Chaldea. By these conquests he hoped to set up stepping-stones from which to advance on India. Meantime, Britain had apparently, and to some extent actually, lost much by the French conquests on the southern shores of Europe, by which she was cut off from bases for her fleet. Now, however, she sent a fleet back under Nelson,
who after a six weeks' hunt through the whole Eastern Mediterranean, in absolute ignorance of Napoleon's plans and movements, found the French fleet in Aboukir Bay, and in an hour or two Napoleon was cut off effec tually from Europe. Between September 9, 1798 and February 5, 1799, he did not receive even a dispatch. His plans of conquest eastward were fruitless, because he could not leave Acre in his rear unsubdued, and, aided by no more than two ships of the line, it withstood his attacks. He himself escaped secretly, but his army was shut away from all military movements till allowed to leave just before the temporary peace of 1801.
(ii) Then Napoleon endeavoured to strike British commerce in the North of Europe. Commerce with Holland and with the Rhine had been, of course, checked before this,' but farther east the Weser, the Elbe and the Baltic had remained open, as the states which used these waterways were far removed from France, and had remained neutral. As neutrals their ships were safe, and there was a tendency on that account for trade to go in their ships, but in the attempt to prevent France from accumulating any resources, Britain claimed that neutral states should not aid France by carrying her trade for her, nor by bringing to France such things as would help her to rebuild her navy—most of these, such as timber and hemp, coming from the Baltic. Thus there was a source of discontent, and Napoleon, on his return from Egypt, and after defeating with masterly strategy the armies opposed to him in Central Europe, so worked on this discontent as to rouse these northern powers of Europe—Prussia, Denmark, Russia and Sweden—to unite, in December 1800, in an Armed Neu trality, to oppose Britain's claims by force if need be. Britain was thus left alone in Europe to face France. But the destruction of the Danish fleet at Copenhagen and the murder of the Czar, attempted because of the restriction of the Russian trade, brought about the break up of the Armed Neutrality; each of the states saw that, notwithstanding restrictions, its interest was better served in the circumstances, e. more energy was ac cumulated, by acceding to British claims and continuing their trade. Thus by the end of 1801 Britain was again friendly with all the states of Europe except France.