Napoleon had again pushed troops to the South of Italy in another attempt to reach Egypt, but the attempt was again vain, for Britain still had command of the sea. Even Napoleon was desirous of peace. The pre liminaries were signed in October 1801, and the Treaty of Amiens in March 1802, but Napoleon still thought that " England alone cannot contend against France," and his obvious intention to disregard the terms of the treaty led to a renewal of the war in 1803.
(iii) Since the attacks on Egypt and on British trade in the North of Europe had been unsuccessful, Napoleon resolved to strike direct at the heart of Britain. This was really the only elective attack, but the ques tion was whether or no it was possible. While pre parations were being made for this invasion, the older methods of attack were attempted. Troops were again pushed to the south of Italy. This was futile, as Britain still had control over the sea. Hanover was occupied by troops, and the mouths of the rivers Ems, Weser and Elbe closed. Even Cuxhaven was occupied by troops to stop the trade of Britain with the Elbe. This was done without the consent of the states through which these troops went. Napoleon knew now that his one foe was Britain ; the others did not really matter, and the strength of Britain lay in the fact that he was com pelled to make the peoples of these other states his enemies in order to reach Britain.
As regards the invasion itself, a great army of 100,000 men was to be carried across to Britain. For this, ordinary transports were out of the question. There were not enough in the whole of France ; the commerce of France had been destroyed. Nor could they be built ; the supplies of timber, etc., were stopped. There was no harbour space if they were built, and if they could be used troops could only slowly be disembarked from them on the English side. The projected invasion had perforce to be made in an enormous number of small boats, which could be beached quickly together, so that troops might land at once in sufficient force to over come any army that could be brought against them. These might cross in a fog or calm, when battleships could not move—and Napoleon took care to emphasize this fact—yet it made success much more likely if, for a comparatively few hours, the French could hold the Straits, and in his own mind he determined that it was necessary to have the support of an adequate fleet.
But this attempted blow at Britain also came to nothing, because the different detachments of the new French fleet, built with much labour in the different protected harbours of France, were never given a chance to unite into a compact body powerful enough to protect the flotilla of small boats collected with much difficulty at Boulogne. For by this time Britain had made a
further advance in knowledge of naval warfare, and had found that the best, i. e. the cheapest, defence of her shores and her trade lay in preventing the French fleets from coming out of their harbours, where, in the " saving " French way they tended to be kept, prevent ing the men becoming accustomed to the sea ; while the British seamen, scarcely leaving their ships for years —Nelson never left his flagship for two whole years— were hardened, toughened, and so trained in the manage ment of ships that, when it came to be a question of handling ships in battle, they were easily superior.
Thus from the very beginning of the war in 1803 the French harbours were blockaded. Some squadrons did escape, but these escapes could never be timed so that there could be any union in sufficient numbers to hold the Straits, nor with sufficient secrecy to elude the British ships, which immediately followed. The key to the whole situation was, however, at Brest, where Napoleon's main fleet was shut up by Cornwallis, who never for a moment gave it a chance to escape. The advantage of thus blockading the ports depended from a strategic point of view on another difference which then existed between the sea and the land. On the land, except in impassable deserts, there are men almost everywhere, and an army cannot move for any distance without its presence being known, while on the sea, and especially on the ocean, a fleet may sail long distances without anyone being able to find out what its move ments are. We have had an example of this, even in the Mediterranean, when Napoleon sailed for Egypt. The West Indies, then, because of their being across the ocean, were at first chosen to be the scene of the union of the detached squadrons of the French fleet, but the holding of the detachments within their harbours forced Napoleon to attempt to unite his vessels in the Bay of Biscay, where the union would be known and suitable disposition of the British ships made. Villeneuve, indeed, did escape from Toulon with one of the squadrons, and reached the West Indies, but he was joined by none of the other divisions. Instead he was followed at once by Nelson, who knew so well what the effect of such a pursuit would be, that he not only divined that Villeneuve would at once return, but even the route by which he would return. Choosing another route by which he utilized the westerly winds to greater advantage, Nelson was in European waters with his fleet to await the French. Villeneuve made one last attempt to unite with the Brest fleet, but his heart failed him, and he sailed south to Cadiz. Then Napoleon saw that an invasion of Britain was hopeless, and moved his long-waiting troops from Boulogne.