INTERPRETATION. The discovery and representation of the true meaning of any signs used to convey ideas. Lieber, Leg. and Pol. Hermeneutics.
The "true meaning" of any signs is that meaning which those who used them were desirous of ex pressing. A person adopting or sanctioning them "uses" them as well as their immediate author. Both parties to an agreement equally make use of the signs declaratory' of that agreement, though one only is the originator, and the other may be entirely passive. The most common signs used to convey are words. When there is a contra diction in signs intended to agree, resort must be had to construction,—that is, the drawing of con clusions from the given signs, reepeCting ideas which they do not express. Construction is usually confounded with interpretation. A distinction between the two, first made in the Leg. and Pol. hermeneutics, has been adopted by Greenleaf and other American and European jurists. Hermetieu tics includes both.
:Close interpretation (interpretatio restricla) is adopted if just reasons, connected with the formation and character of the text, induce ' us to take the words in their narrowest meaning. This species of interpretation has generally been called literal, but the term is inadmissible. Lieber, Herm. 66.
Extensive interpretation (iuterpretatio ex tensiva, called, also, liberal interpretation) adopts a more comprehensive signification of the word.
Extravagant interpretation (interpretatie ex cedens) is that which substitutes a meaning evidently beyond the true one: it is, there fore, not genuine interpretation.
Free or. unrestricted interpretation (inter pretatio soluta) proceeds simply on the general principles of interpretation in good faith, not bound by any specific or superior principle.
Limited or restricted interpretation (inter pretatia limitata) is when we are influenced by other principles than the strictly herme neutic ones. Ernesti, lnstitutio Interpretis. Predestined interpretation (interpretatio pre destinata) takes place if the interpreter, laboring under a strong 'bias of mind, makes the text subservient to his preconceived" views or desires. This includes artful inter interpreter seeks to give a meaning to the text other than the one he knows to have been intended.
2. The civilians divide interpretation into:— .Authentic (interpretatio authentica), which pro ceeds from the author himself.
Usual (interpretatio when the interpreta tion is on the ground of usage.
Doctrinal (interpretatio doctrinalis), when made agreeably to rules of soienoe. Doctrinal interpret
ation is subdivided into extensive, restrictive, and declaratory : extensive, whenever the reason of a proposition has a broader sense than its terms, and it is ponseqnently applied to a case which had not been explained: restrictive, when the expressions have a greater latitude than the reasons; and de claratory, when the reasons and terms agree, hut it is necessary to settle the meaning of some term• or terms to make the sense complete.
3. The following are the elementary prin ciples and rules of interpretation and con struction, which are here given together on account of their intimate connection and the difficulty of separating them.
There can be no sound interpretation with out good faith and common sense. The ob ject of all interpretation and construction is to ascertain the intention of the authors, even so far as to control the literal significa tion of the words; for verba ita cunt intelli genda ut res magic valeat guam pereat. Words are, therefore, to be taken as those who used them intended, which must be presumed to be in their popular and ordinary signification, unless there is some gtiod reason for supposing otherwise, as where technical terms are used: guoties in, verbis nulla est ambiguitas ibi nulla expositio contra verba fienda est. When words have two senses, of which one only is agreeable to the law, that one must prevail, Cowp. 714; when they are inconsistent with the evident inten tion, they will be rejected, 2 Atk. Ch. 32; when words are inadvertently omitted, and the meaning is obvious, they will be supplied by inference from the context. Impossible things cannot be required. The subject. matter and nature of the context, or its ob jects, causes, effects, consequences, or pre cedents, or the situation of the parties, must often be consulted in order to arrive at their intention, as when words have, when lite rally construed, either no meaning at all or a very absurd one. The whole of an instru ment must be viewed together, and not each part taken separately ; and effect must be given to every part, if possible. Assistance must be sought from the more near before proceeding to the remote. When one part is totally repugnant to the rest, it will be stricken out ; but if it is only explanatory it will operate as a limitation. Reference to the 'lek loci or the usage of a particular place or trade is frequently necessary in order to explain the meaning. 4 East, 135; 2 Bos. & P. 164; 3 Starkie, Ev. 1036; 6 Term, 320; 16 Scrg. & R. Penn. 126.