4. Words spoken cannot vary the terms of a written agreement; they may overthrow it. Words spoken at the time of the making of a written agreement are merged in the writ ing. 5 Coke, 26; 2 Barnew. & C. 634; 4 Taunt. 779. But there are exceptions to this rule, as in a case of fraud. 1 Serg. & R. Penn. 464 ; 10 id. 292. Where there is a latent ambiguity which arises only in the application and does not appear upon the face of the instrument, it may be supplied by other proof ; ambiguitas verborum Wens verificatione suppletur. 1 Dall. Penn. 426; 4 id. 340 ; 3 Serg. & R. Penn. 609. The rule that an agreement is to be construed most strongly against the party benefited can only .ie applied in doubtful cases. The more the text partakes of a solemn compact, the stricter should be its construction. Penal statutes must be strictly interpreted; reme dial ones liberally, 1 Blackstone, Comm. 88 ; 6 Watts & S. Penn. 276 ; 3 Taunt. 377 ; and generally, in regard to statutes, the constre tion given them in the country where they were enacted will be adopted elsewhere. The general expressions used in a contract are controlled by the special provisions therein. In agreements relating to real property, the lex rei site prevails, in personal contracts the lea loci contractus, except when they are to be performed in another country, and then the law of the latter place governs. 2 Mass. 88; 1 Pet. 317; Story, Confl. of Laws, 242 ; 4 Cow. N. Y. 410, note ; 2 Kent, Comm. 39, 457, notes; 3 Conn. 253, 472 ; 4 id. 517 ; I Wash. C. C. 253. See 12 Mass. 4. When there are two repugnant clauses in a deed, which cannot stand together, the first pre vails. With a will the reverse is the case. In all instruments the written part controls the printed.
5. In addition to the above rules, there are many presumptions of law relating to agree ments, such as, that the parties to a simple contract intend to bind their personal repre sentatives; that where several parties con tract without words of severalty, they are presumed to bind themselves jointly; that every grant carries with it whatever is ne cessary to its enjoyment; when no time is mentioned, a reasonable time is meant; and other presumptions arising out of the nature of' the case. It is the duty of the court to interpret all written instruments, see 3 Binn. Penn. 337; 4 Serg. & R. Penn. 279; 7 id. 372; 15 id. 100 ; 10 Mass. 384 ; 3 Cranch, 180 ; 3 Rand. 586 ; written evidence, 2 Watts, Penn.. 347; and foreign laws. 1 Penn. 388. For the rules respecting interpretation and construction in general, see 1 Blackstone, Comm. 59 ; 2 Kent, Comm. 552 ; 4 id. 419 ; Pothier, Obl.; 1 Bouvier, Inst. n. 4419 el seq.; Lieber, Leg. & Pol. Hermeneutics; Eng c. Amer. ad verbum Law, appendix of vol. vii.; 2 Comyns, Contr. 23-28 ; 2 Story, Contr. 1; 2 Parsons, Contr. 3; Long, Sales, 106 ; Story, Sales; Story, Const. 397-459; 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, 51-59; Barrington, Stat. ; 1 Bell, Comm. 5th ed. 431 ; CONSTRUCTION. INTERPRETER. One employed to make a translation.
An interpreter should be sworn before he translates the testimonyof a witness. 4 Mass. 81 ; 5 id. 219 ; 2 Caines, N. Y. 155.
A person employed between an attorney and client to act as interpreter is considered merely as the organ between them, and is not bound to testify as to what he has acquired in those confidential communications. 1 Pet. C. C. 356 ; 4 Munf. Va. 273 ; 3 Wend. N. Y. 337. •