ACCORD' AND SAT'ISFAC'TION. In the law of contracts, a mutual agreement entered into by the parties to a contract. by which one party agrees to discharge the other from his obligation under the contract, in return for the other party's promise to do or give something. The satisfaction is the performance of the prom ise to do or give something. The agreement for the discharge of the contract may he unilat eral, that is, the promise is given on the one side in return for an act on the part of the promisee, in which ease the accord a ml satisfac tion come into existence simultaneously. At common law it was early held that au accord with satisfaction was a good defense to an action founded upon simple contract, hut that a mutual agreement to discharge a pre-existing contract, being mere promise given for promise, was an accord only and not it valid defense at law. This vas either because mutual promises, not being good consideration for each other, were not regarded as binding, or because the law would not enforce an agreement which merely substituted one cause of action for another, or for both reasons. The first, owing to the changed conception of consideration, has ceased to exist, and the second is now generally disre garded, most jurisdictions holding that a mere accord without satisfaction is a valid discharge of a simple contract, though the decided cases are not altogether harmonious on this point. Agreements never to sue on the earlier contract were regarded as a good accord or accord and satisfaction and a valid defense, but agreements not to sue for a limited time were not admitted as a defense at common law; but equity might enforce them by enjoining action on the earlier contract. In the case of contracts under seal, before breach, accord and accord and satisfaction were not admitted as valid defenses at common law, but after breach of the obligation under seal, it was regarded as a mere right of action for damages, of no higher nature than a simple contract and subject to the same defenses. Equity
under proper conditions would enforce the accord even when entered into before breach of the con tract under seal by enjoining all action upon the latter; and in most jurisdictions where equitable defenses may be pleaded at law, accord or accord and satisfaction may now be set up as a defense to an action on the instrument under seal. An accord must always be an agreement founded on good consideration. Thus, a mere agreement founded upon a promise to do or give something which the promisee was already bound to do (for example, an agreement to pay a lesser sum in lieu of a debt for a greater) is not valid as an accord. An apparent exception to this rule exists in eases where the precise amount or character of the obligation under the earlier contract was uncertain, in which case an accord by way of a compromise agreement is regarded as made upon valid consideration. A real excep tion to the rule was allowed in case of compro mise agreements in which a debtor agreed to pay a smaller sum ill lien of a greater to his creditors in return for their promise to release him from his debts th them. In a number of the States, notably New York, a written receipt given by the creditor to a debtor without consid eration and with intent to release the debts is allowed to be a. valid discharge of the debts. This is anomalous. See the authorities referred to under CoxYnmyr.