APPEARANCE. (For derivation, see .AP PARENT.) A term used in its most general meaning to signify what is presented ill con sciousness. It is that of which consciousness is cognizant as an object distinct from itself. For ,instance, in a perception I may have of a piece of money, its yellowness, its weight, its hard ness, are all appearances to me. Now, the fact that appearance is always related to conscious ness raises a metaphysical problem; namely, Is there anything more ultimate, more real. than appearance? And, if so, are the yellowness. the weight, the hardness, and other appearances of the coin really a revelation of what the coin is in its deepest nature.or are they merely the form in which that ultimate nature, whatever it may be, is disguised when it comes into my consciousness? Different schools of philosophy have given dif ferent answers to these questions, but a careful examination of the answers shows that they are all determined by the view taken of the nature, of reality.
(1) Assume that there is a reality different from appearance, that what a thing really is. is what it is in absolute independence of all its relations; assume that "we must everywhere dis tinguish between the intrinsic being of a thing and its relations," adding that knowledge is al ways a relation, and it becomes clear that the reality of the thing. its intrinsic being. need not be revealed in the appearance it presents to con sciousness. In fact, the question arises whether appearances must not be always deceptive. An affirmative answer to this question is the funda mental tenet of dogmatic skepticism (q.v.) and of critical philosophy (see KAyr). A suspense
of judgment on the problem is the attitude of the ancient Skeptics. A negative answer given without giving a reason for it, is the attitude of dogmatism. A negative answer can be justified only by showing how consciousness can be in a cognitive relation with reality without truly transforming reality from what it is in its ulti mate character. This is what some conceive to be the problem set by the science of epistemology, or theory of knowledge. See KNOWLEDGE, THEORY OF.
(2) Assume we do not and cannot know whether there is a reality distinct from appearance, but that at least we have the conception of its pos sibility; and the result of this confession is a critical skepticism.
(3) Assume that there is no reality apart from appearance. and we have on the one hand Positivism (q.v.). and on the other the idealistic systems of philosophy.
Thus the attitude taken toward appearance may form the basis for one of the most conve nient classifications of the different systems of philosophy.
Consult: Bradley, Appearance and Reality (London. 1R971: Royce. Concept ion of God (New York, 1898). and The it and the lndiridnal (New York. 1900 ) ; Lutz, •S'ystein der Philosophic (Leipzig. ISS41; translated by Rosamtet. 2 vols. (Oxford, 1SSS) : Hegel. Eneyelopiidir der philosophisehrn 11;issenschaften in? Grundrisse (Heidelberg, 1'430). in part translated into Eng lish by Wallace, under the titles, llrgrl's Logic (Oxford, 1892-94) and Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, 1894).