INTERPRETATION (Lilt. interpretatios ex planation. from interprrfori, to explain. from in agent. interpreter), or CONSTRVCTIoN. The process of ascertaining. subjeet to the rules of law. the meaning of a speaker or a writer. or of parties to a legal instrument, as expressed in the spoken or written terms. Some authorities coast ruetion from interpretation: using the latter term to describe the process of finding out the true sense of any form of words, and applying the former to the process of ascer taining the legal effect of those words. According to these authorities, "the office of interpretation is analytic, that of construction is synthetic; the office of the one is to get at facts, that of the other to group these facts and determine their legal meaning; interpretation is exploration, con struction is induction." Or to poi the distinc tion in another way, interpretation gives us the grammatical and logical signification of the words and sentences under consideration; while construction gives us their legal effect. by "the familiar judicial process of applying the law to the facts of the ease." This distinction has not generally commended itself to the courts either of England or of this country, and is ignored or deliberately discarded by most systematic writers upon law. It will not be observed in the further discussion of this topic. The terms will be used interchangeably, as denoting the process of ascertaining the true import of a doeunient having legal consequences. Interpreta tion, as a separate branch of law, has its origin in the imperfections of language and the limita tions of human thought and understanding. How imperfectly and even bunglingly the average man expresses himself, not only in hurried memoranda, but in formal documents as \ VC] I, is evidenced by the vast number of lawsuits brought to settle the meaning of such documents.
The legal process of interpretation is required, not only because of confused thinking and obscure language on the part of speakers and writers, but because of the frequent misapprehensions of hearers or readers, due to mental limitations. If a writing has legal consequences; for example, if it is a constitution, or treaty, or statute, a will, a deed, or a cool pact, or if it contains an attack upon reputatinn or a right of property, provision is needed and has been made for deter mining which of various interpretations shall prevail. Speaking generally. that determination
rests with a court of justice, in a legal action properly brought before it for bearing and de cision. if the form of words whose meaning is in doubt is a public writing, such as a provision of a statute, treaty, or constitution, the question of construction belongs exclusively to the judge. If it is a private writing, such as a contract, will, or deed, having peculiar expressions in it which have, in particular places or trades, a known meaning attached to them, it is for the jury to say what the meaning of those expres sions is; but it is the function of the court to construe the instrument after this ascertainment by the jury of the true meaning of such peculiar expressions. This legal rule is due in part to the fact that in olden times, when law was in its formative stage, jurors were frequently unable to read or write; but in part. also, and perhaps more largely, to considerations of policy. A learned English judge once declared that unless this rule was followed "there would be no cer tainty in the law; for a misconstruction by the court is the proper subject, by means of n bill of exceptions, of redress in a court of errors; hut a misconstruction by the jury cannot, be set right at all effectually." The rule has been supported by a distinguished legal writer upon other grounds of good sense and expediency. It is important, he remarks. that "most writings brought under judicial consideration should have a fixed meaning; should not he subject to varying interpretations; should be construed 1.)3, the tribunal which is most permanent, best in structed, most likely to adhere to precedents." While the construction of a writing is ordinarily for the judge, and not for the jury, libel cases form an exception to the rule. 'Whether a par ticular writing is such an attack upon reputation es to amount to a libel is for the jury to decide. In other words, the jury, and not the court, construe a writing which is alleged to be defamatory. Such at least is the doctrine in England in all eases of defamation. and in this country in all criminal proseeutions for libel.