It is to be borne in mind that the object of interpretation is not to discover the intention of parties to a transaction by the use of any and every legitimate means. Its purpose is much less ambitious; its scope much narrower. The problem for the interpreter is this: given certain language in which persons to state their intention in a partienlor matter, what is the intention thus stated? It may be that the parties have used language so en relessly that it fails to express any definite intention. In such a case interpretation is fruitless. it must stop short of accomplishing its object for want of materials. "All latitude of f C011F4111V t ion," said Chief Baron Eyre in an oft-quoted decision. "must submit to this restriction; name ly, that the words nut y bcar the sense by construction is put upon them. If we step be yond this law, we no longer construe men'; deeds, but make deeds for them." It is not the offiee of interpretation, then, to add anything to the text of a writing. Its function is only to dis cover and set forth what is in it. But a quest ion arises at this point, upon which the authorities are not entirely in accord: What is to be deemed within and what without the text? it is some times said that judges and writers in answering this question range themselves in two schools of interpreters: a liberal and a literal seluool. The former declare that everything is in the text which a mind fully informed as to the cireum stances in which the writing was made, "and doing no violence to the rules of language arcl the rules of construction. may reasonably find there." The latter insist upon limiting inter pretation to the meaning of the text itself. Perhaps no better statement of the prevailing view on this point has been made than the fol lowing: "Interpretation is a process of reason ing from probabilities, a process of remedying by a sort of equitable jurisdiction the imperfections of human language and powers of using lan guage, a process whose limits are necessarily indefinite. and yet continually requiring to be practically determined. It is net a mere opera tion requiring the use of grammar and dic tionaries. a more inquiry into the meaning of words." So far as legal interpretation does make use of the riles of grammar and the laws of lan guage, it does not differ from the process em ployed by every educated and intelligent listener or reader when engaged in discovering the mean ing of a speaker or writer. Any legal rules, however, are peculiar to judieial interpretation. Some of them owe their existence to peculiarities of legal procedure; but most of them have been evolved by the courts with a view to producing greater uniformity in the terms of legal writings, or to lessening and shortening litigation, or to seetiring consistency in the judicial process of cunst ruct ion.
Souse (of the most important of these rules nniv be stated loriodly as folloows: (1) \•iten the language of a writing is plain and unequivo cal, there is no opportunity tor interpretation. 1•:%(-11 though the court may believe that the language does not express the intent of the writer, it will not force upon at Meaning tthich they ea11110t fairly bear. \\lien words admit of lout one meaning. to put another upon them is not to construe a writing, lout to alter it. In east- of a statute, it is not to interpret a law, but to make one. (2) The grammatical and ordinary sense of words is to be adhered to. unless that would lead to some absurdity, or ,11111e repag• mance or inconsistency N11111 the rest of the instrument. in which case the grammatical and ordinary somse of the words as to avoid that absurdity or inconsistency, but no further. Eminent English judges have called this the golden rule of construction. It is it (-corollary from this rule that when it appears, either from the instrument itself or from the cirennistances attending its origin, that certain Nvords are used in an abnormal, or peculiar, or technical sense, they shall be interpreted in such sense. .Many modern statutes contain an inter
pretation clause in which the legislature carefully explains the (-Nowt meaning which is to be ascribed to certain important terms of the text. It is a helpful expedient for remedying to some extent the ambiguity of ordinary language. In England a general Interpretation Act was passed in I8s0 ( ) with a view to clearing up obseurities in existing and future statutes. I3) In construing any part of at writ ing,. regard be had to the entire instru ment. tither portions may throw much light upon the one under special investigation. and greatly modify the meaning which it would bear as an independent clause. Every part of a writ ing should be brought into action in order to collect from the whole one uniform and con sistent purpose, if that. is possible. _Accordingly, if one construction will give reasonable effect to every part of an instrument, while another require the rejection of a part, the former will le preferred, (4) In the case of private writ ings, such as contracts and deeds, the language is to be construed laud strongly against the party who is responsible for its lase. Of (-must-, this applies only to eases of ambiguity either in the words themselves or in Hoek legal ell'eet. Even then it will be enforced only when other rules of coast root ion fail, for it is deemed some, what harsh and rigorous. (5) .\s between con structions otherwise copially balanced. prefer 1•11VP ivto to t hat wIHeli renders Hie instrument most fair and just and reasonable. (GI In construing doubtful language. the court is entitled to consider all the (-in-most:ince: con eted with the origin of the instrument. Proof of these eirennistances is not excluded by any rule of evidence (q.v.). It is not otTereol to contradict or vary an incitIllilent. hut to put the court. as nearly as possible, in the place of the parties at the time they 'upon this as the formal expression of their intentions. (7) The construction put upon an ambiguous instrument by the acts of the parties is entitled to great weight..
The literature upon this subject, is quite ex tensive, although far from satisfactory. Most of the treatises aro- limited to specidl topics, such as constitlitioons and statutes, eontracts, deeds, Mills. and are confined mainly to an ex position of the art lather than to the science of interpretation; tiny state the practical rides for the construction of Nation, of Writingv, lather than discuss the iorinciples ou which the process of interpretation should rest. The hest theoretical treatment of the subject is found in Lieber. /Agfa and Political Ili con to utics (Ilani mond (41., Saint Louis, ltitiu) ; Hawkins, Prim (Ip1ns of I., gal Int, run lotion, Juridical So ciety Papers (London, ltioin) ; lorry 7'rcutisc, on Erio/ruco. chapters v. and N. Villa C Is98). .\ mong the latest allot !most valuable practical treatises nte the Heal, Cardinal s I HUT pri.tat ion (London, 1S91i) ; Black, Construction um/ I ntcrprcta t ion of Lairs (Saint l'auL is96( ; L'itles which Gorr and Eltret Of P.:tail:tory Laic (London. ; Intrrprt tat ion of Statutes (London, ltit)(;) ; Sedgwirk, Nta tutor!, and Constitutional Lute ( New Yolk, Is7t ) ; Sutherland, Statut••1 and Ntatutory Construction (Chicago, 1891) ; l Construction of torn nircrial and 'Trade contrarts ;New York, I5:46) : 1•7,1111;in,..tone.
ton and Clark. I:ales for the Into ria:, lotion of Deeds ( Philadelphia, 18s0 ) ; 11 wkins, Jul. r prctation of Wills (Philadelphia, ; \ igra in and t 1'1 la ra, intur/.ctut ion of 11 ills (New York. I57•).