JUDGMENT (OF., Fr. jugcmcnt, from ML. judicanientum, judgment, from Lat. judienrc, to judge. from jude.r. judge. from juts, right, law ± dicere, to say) (in logic). The act of distin guishing an element within the unity of an object of thought, and of recognizing the function of that element as giving character to that. object. In the above definition the term 'act' means func tion, without any metaphysical connotation, and the term 'object of thought' is not used to exclude objects of perception or of emotion. We may think about what we perceive or about what we feel. When we thus think about our perceptions or our emotions they become objects of thought, while they may still remain objects of perception or of emotion. We may thus pass judgment upon any objects whatever, objects perceived, remembered, imagined, hared. hoped for, willed, etc.; and the element distinguished within the unity of such an object may be of any descrip tion whatever, a sense-quality, a sense-intensity, an affective tone, or what not. Traditional 'logic distinguishes within the judgment three parts—subject, predicate, and copula. Not all of these, however. are really parts of a judg ment. The predicate is the element within the unity of the object of thought or the judgment, recognized as giving character to the object of thought. Thus, in the judgment is sweet," sweetness forms the predicate of the judgment. What the subject of a judgment is has been a moot question. Traditional logic gives only a for mal definition. saying that it is that of which the predicate is asserted. But the question arises, Of what is the predicate asserted? In the judg ment `man is an animal.' there would be no ques tion. perhaps, that the subject is the complex object of thought called man. which an element, viz. animality, within the complex, is recognized as qualifying. But how about such a judgment as is expressed by saying, 'The house I saw yes terday was burned down this morning? Tradi tional logic would answer by saying that the sub ject in this case is completely expressed in the phrase 'the house I saw yesterday.' If this is true, then the subject in this judgment does not perform the same logical function as was per formed by the subject in the judgment last dis cussed. The subject here would not be the com plex object of thought which an element within the complex is recognized as qualifying. It would be a complex which an element outside of the complex is recognized as qualifying. Total com bustion this morning is not a feature of the complex object of thought which is adequately expressed by the phrase 'the house I saw yester day.' It is a feature of the object of thought adequately expressed by the phrase 'the house which I saw yesterday and which burned down this morning.' Therefore. if the subject performs the same function in this judgment as in the judgment, 'Man is an animal,' then the subject is the total object of thought which is expressed by the phrase given in tire lastsentence. This view of the case reduces all judgments. so far as con cerns the relation between subject and predi cate, to one type which since Kant's day has been called analytical. (See AxAmic JUDG MENT.) It does not deny the synthetical char acter of thought in judgment, but holds that the synthesis is all represented in the cal subject, while the analysis is represented, at least in part. in the logical predicate. Ac cording to this view, therefore, all judgments may be expressed in the following formula: A certain object of thought, which may be identified by a certain characteristic or complex of charac teristics, is further qualified by the mark or marks signalized in the predicate. According to another interpretation of the function of the subject in such judgments. the subject is not the total complex within which the predicate is an element, but it is an object of thought of smaller connotation (q.v.), which the predicate ex tends by adding to its content. According to this view. sonic judgments may be expressed in the following formula A certain object of thought which is expressed by a certain term is in synthesis with another object of thought expressed by another term. This view makes the relation between subject and predicate one of synthesis, and therefore classifies all judg. meats of this sort as synthetical. If concepts were fixed and immutable things, as many thinkers regard them, then the latter view alone would be tenable. But concepts are constantly changing, hence it is perfectly permissible to maintain as the former view does that in what are called synthetical judgments the predicate redefines and requalifies the subject. In other words, `the syn thetical judgment, a posteriori,' is a recognition of a modification of the object of thought. The judgment does not give to the subject new fea tures, but recognizes them as having already appeared in the subject, and as therefore necessi tating a new analysis. This is true even of
Kant's 'a priori synthetical judgments.' i.e. judg ments which. it is alleged. combine different con ceptions independently of experience. It is a misrepresentation to say that the combination is independent of experience. Peripherally origi nated experience (= experience due to sense stimuli acting upon the outer and not the brain end of sensory nerves) may indeed have never presented certain elements in certain counua tinny, yet We IIlay think t110111 as so combined. 1411 we must remember that all experien•e is not peripherally originated. We have many experi ences, e.g. of memory aid of fantasy, which are centrally originated. In many such experiences combinations of objects take place pa ri pass with acts of judgment, but it is important to dis tinguish between the formation, i.e. the conscious appearance, of such combinations and the anal ysis of them in judgment. NOW. Sine(' we can thus distinguish between the formation and the analysis of combinations, we ought in the interests of clear thinking to avoid calling the formation by a name that historically has been the specific term to designate only this analysis. The word judgment therefore is improperly applied to the so-called acts of synthesis. Judgment, strictly so called, never synthesizes. but ;11WayS 1111Illyzcs; but that analysis always presupposes a synthesis, i.e. an appearance of a complex in consciousness. however, by synthesis is meant an net of combining what at first appears out of combina tion—a meaning which seems to prevail in Kant's works—Ilien analysis does not presuppose syn thesis. Sometimes. it is true. elements appear temporarily apart from each other and then sub sequently appear in vombination ; but this is not always the ease, and it is convenient to use the word synthesis in the sense, not of a subse quent combination of elements at first separate, lint a conscious apprehension of elements in combina I ion. Now tile Itrkes : If syn thesis thus defined does not always involve judg ment, does it not always involve thought ? The answer depends upon the meaning of the word thought. If one defines the term as Ilegel did, viz. as the consciousness of °Noels in relation, then of course by the very definition the question is answered affirmatively. lf, on the contrary, one thought as Lotze did, viz, as a comparing and judging activity, then the question must be answered negatively. polemic against Hegel on this point was due to an entire mis understanding of llegers position. We may gather up the results of this discussion of the nature of the logical subject by saying that it is the complex object of thought recognized in the act of judgment as eontaining within its com plexity the element functioning as predicate. The logical copula is the recognition of the fact that the element functioning is predicate is included within the complex functioning as subject. In other words, the copula of any judgment is that element in the act of judgment which differen tiates it from a mere envisaging of a complex without analysis of it: it is the act of analysis of a recognized synthesis. An objection which at first sight seems to hear hard against this descrip tion of the function of judgment and of the ele ments of judgment is that it reduces judgment to tautology. If we judge of 'the house which I saw' yesterday and which was burned down this morning' that it did burn down this morning, we have made no advance, it is claimed. The objection. however. confuses logien] thought with the verbal expression of it. Unless there is some exeeptional reason for repetition of the expres sion of smite distinct element in the complex objeet of thought, such repetition is idle. lint when one imlyeR of a complex object of thought that its eomplexity is constituted of certain features. this is not tautology. An identity be tween the meaning of an assertion and the actual state of facts is not a tautology, hut a truth. It will be observed that so far nothing has been said to the effect that the subject is always a nonn sub stantive with its qualifiers; the predicate. aiii adjective or some adjectival word or phrase; while the copula is always some part of the verb to be. The reason for this omission is that such a statement so far as it is true is a unatter of language, not of logic. Rut not all of it is trite. Not to speak of languages in winch there are no adjcctir es 115 distinct from verbs or from sub stantives, the copula is always expressed by the zentenee, not. by some part of the verb to be or its equivalents in other languages, except in those few cases where sonic- part of that verb is the whole sentence; e.g. est in Latin.