The relation between judgments and concepts (q.v.) may be stated thus: No concept can be formed without an net of judgment. Such a con cept as that of 'eat,' for instance, is the result of previous judgments whieli recognized within certain complex objects of thought certain con stant elements. The first objeets of thought that appear in the history of :my thinker are with• out doubt individual percepts. Subsequently We have individual objects of memory, of imagi nation, etc. The compariscm of such objects with each other results, when they are alike, in a judgment which predicates of these objects simi lar qualities. Our concepts arc such similar qualities or complexes of qualities as are thought to characterize various individual objects. Thus the concept `cat' is that emliplcx of qualities which, it. is judged, characterize in common the various individual cats. These conceptual ele ments do not exist in consciousness in separation from other qualities which go to make the individual percepts. remembered objects. etc. They are merely distinguished from these other qualities. A concept once formed by an net of judgment may he Made the basis upon which further judgment al opera I ions a re eond net ed. Thus once (-quipped with the concept 'eat," a scien tist may proceed to various zoillogical judgments. about feline which the ordinary man knows nothing about. Thus we see that con cepts always result from judgments, but many judgments result from the fact that we have pre viously formed concepts. Judgment is related to reasoning in the following manner: Every jmIg lima has some reason for itself, although the reason may not he slated in the expression of the judgment. As thought heconies more developed, judgments are made which are recognized as being true because other judgments are ble. This complex intellectual proeeSs in Which a judgment is made and is likewise judged to rest npon the truth of some other judgment is called reasoning.. Thus though every judgment Ices a reason, not every judgment is an element in the complex process of reasoning.
Judgments are usually divided into three classes, singular, particular. and universal. Sin gular. or better individual, judgments are those in which the subject is some single object of thought, e.g. 'this cat.' Universal judgments are those in which the predicate is asserted to qualify not only the single obje•t or the several similar objects which psychologieally function as sub jects, hut all similar objects. though not pres ent in e011Sei011SIlesS at the time of judgment. Thus in the judgment 'All material bodies gravi tate,' I may have in mind only the image of two individual objects moving toward each other, and may in the judgment be actually analyzing out of the complex image this movement toward each other and recognizing it as characterizing the complex. But this is not the whole of the matter. I recognize this analysis as good not only for this particular complex, but for all other com plexes in which material objects are component elements. Such universal judgments are always the result of induction (q.v.). Particular judg ments are either summaries of the results of several individual judgments or they are uni versal judgments in disguise. Thus when we say, 'Some vertebrates are mammals,' we may mean merely that in past experience we have had some individual percepts in which the character of mammalianism was a fetiture of vertebrate animals. Or we may mean that beyond the bounds of our past experience likewise there are some mammalian vertebrates to be found. In the latter case we are making an induction, and if we expressed ourselves adequately we should say all cats. dogs. horses, monkeys, etc., are mammals. The connection between the qualities of verte hrateness and manunalianism is not uncondi tional. but is conditioned upon the presence of other qualities which are found only in dogs, etc., and not in fishes and the like. Either be cause we do not know the qualities or do not care to name them. we say 'some vertebrates.' Consult the authorities referred to under LOGIC.