OF POLITICAL ECONONIY TO ETn IC•S, LAW, AND POLITICS. In dismissing this ques tion attention mat• he confined largely to the rela tionship between ethics and politieuil eeonomy, since the decisive arguments apply to all three re lationships. Substantial unanimity exists upon the following points; (o) flout ethics and economies are, for purposes of invest igation at least., two dis tinct sciences; their fields are not coextensive; ((I) in applied political economy we must take ac count of ethical requirements; no economist would maintain that in actual life num are "freed from the ordinary obligations of justice and (c•) in so far as ethical forces affect economic activity. economie science must take account of these forces. 'flue point at issue is the question whether the scientist, as scientist, is permitted or compelled to set up ideals and pass ethical judgments. The following reasons may be given for the emielusion that it is prae tieally impossible for the scientist to ;Abstain from passing ethical judgments.: In the first place, every rational adult imderstands and ac cepts certain axionnutic ethical canons w•Icich in their practical application are universally ac cepted (e.g. that the satisfaetion of hunger is a good thing). In the investigation of actual economic phenomena. such as the housing and food of the laboring classes, conditions are con stantly met with that violate these ethical canons. It would be the sheerest pedantry under these conditions to refrain from passing ethical judgments. Secondly• au essential part of eco nomic science is that subdivision which treats of eeonomie progress. In eemminie life what ought to be done is intimately dependent upon what can be done; in other words, the law of economic growth is a powerful, if not the most powerful, factor in determining economic aims and ideals. If the fully equipped economist is forced to study economic growth and to explain economic move ments and tendencies, it follows that he is forced to express opinions upon approximate economic ideals, and after having furnished the decisive arguments for ethical judgments, he must either apply his results or have some less qualified person apply them for him. Additional reasons appear when we examine such subjects as taxa tion o• those public• prices which the law &claws must be just and reasonable. In the considera tion of railroad rates, for instance, the economist is nut only compelled to pass judgment upon what is just and reasonable, he discovers upon investigation that evonomic considerations supply the most important factors in determin ing this judgment. There is, then, a broad zone
of territory between ethics and economics whidi the moralist has not worked—an 1 which for the science of ethics is probably unimportant—but which the economist must clean• up before he can go on with his work. The assertion that the science of political economy may and should refrain from passing ethical judgments rests upon two misapprehensions: I I ) the failure to grasp the fact that society is like an organism in that it is subject to a law of ordered change, which to a certain extent is under the control of the or ganism itself; (2) an illogical conclusion from the recognized truth that certain subdivisions of economic investigation (e.g. fixation of prices in wholesale markets) may be exploited quite thor oughly without determining economic ideals• and without introducing ethical considerations. From this it is logical to conclude that certain minor subdivisions of political economy may be inves tigated "without passing ethical judgments," but illogical to conclude that the whole science may be so investigated and formulated. Tice above conclusions, are strengthened when we consider the illation of economies to law or politics. In describing the progress of the past or the condi tions of the present we are forced to pass judg ment upon the economic success or failure of many laws and policies (e.g. tariff laws) which are still in force or under active consideration. and which will be indorsed or repudiated solely or largely upon economic grounds. Because of this fact the economist cannot refrain from judgment upon laws and political policies. Nor without being ridiculous can he refrain on occa sion from laying down precepts. (iresham's law, for instance, is at once a law aini a precept Whell a proposition to maintain a more valuable and a less valuable money side by side in cir culation is under consideration. In conclusion it imuy be said that while political economy does not undertake the complete study of law•, ethics, polities, etc.. it must consider systemat ically the parts of those sciences which materially affect economic phenomena. It is neither pos sible no• desirable that the line of demarcation should be rigidly drawn, particularly in the applied science or art of political economy, which may he defined as the application of economic laws to the solution of those practical problems in which economic considerations are of predominent importance.