QUASI (Lat., as if, as it were) CONTRACT. This is a generic term in law, of modern origin, invented to denote all those obligations to pay money which do not ari*e from either true con tract or tort. (See CONTRACT.) The distinction between true contracts and quasi contracts lies in the source of the two classes of obligations. All true contracts are founded upon intention, there being no true contract which does not result from the intention and meeting of the minds of the parties to it. Quasi contracts, on the other hand, do not depend upon the intention of the parties; but they are obligations to pay money imposed by law• without reference to the intent or consent of the party whose legal duty it is to perform the obligation.
The term 'implied contract' as used in earlier elalsifications of contracts was applicable either to a real contract, that is one flowing from intent, which might be inferred from the acts of the par ties, the term 'implied' being used as a mere term of evidence: or it might signify a so-called contract implied in law, which was not a true con tract, but a quasi contract.
Quasi-contract obligations resemble torts in that both are obligations imposed by law; but, while in general the duty imposed by the law of tort is to forbear, a quasi-contract obligation im poses the duty of action, namely, the payment of a definite sum of money. A tort also is in gen eral the violation of a right in- rein, for which the wrongdoer must respond in damages; but the defendant who is liable in quasi contract has either not acted at all, as in case of one who is required to pay a tax or penalty, or if ho has acted has done so with the consent and coopera tion of the plaintiff, as one who has received money paid by mistake. There is a still further distinction between tort and quasi contract, which has some value, although not of universal application. While the liability of the tort feasor is to pay damages for the injury which the plaintiff has suffered from his tortious act, the liability in quasi contracts is generally the restoration to the plaintiff of money or the money value of property which the defendant has se cured at the plaintiff's expense and which upon legal or equitable grounds should be returned to him. Thus the remedy for negligent injury of the plaintiff's property is a tort action. The remedy for appropriation of the plaintiff's prop erty by the defendant may be an action in quasi contract to recover the value of the property. or.
as will appear, the plaintiff may seek his remedy in tort to recover damages for its con version, the same act giving rise to an action either in quasi contract or tort it the election of the plaintiff.
As will appear, also, many quasi-contract ac tions which are based on the plaintiff's right to compel the restitution of money or the money value of property rest upon purely equitable doc trines, although the remedy is pursued at law. The reason for this is historical. Inasmuch as the relief sought in a quasi-contract action was always a money judgment, and as by the exten sion of the use of indebitatus assumpsit the plaintiff using that form of action might show any state of facts entitling him to recover, the machinery of the law courts was, or rather be came, perfectly adapted in preference to equitable doctrines when the only relief sought was the re covery of money.
The following is a classification of quasi-con tractual obligations which has been followed to some extent, and which, although not free from criticism, is perhaps as satisfactory as any which has been suggested: Quasi contracts may be said to be founded: ( 1 ) upon a record; (2) upon statutory or official or common-law duty; (3) upon the doctrine that no one shall be enriched at the expense of an other.
( ) It is clear that record obligations or judg ments are not true contracts, since they are im posed without the consent of the judgment debtor and properly form one distinct class of quasi contracts.
(2) The second class includes all obligations to pay money imposed by some positive rule of law, whether by statute or common law. It in cludes the obligation to pay penalties imposed by statute, the obligation of a sheriff to pay the proceeds of a levy to the judgment creditor, the obligation of an infant or lunatic to pay for necessaries, the obligation of a husband to pay for necessaries supplied to his wife—being ex amples of true quasi 'contract.
(3) The third class embraces all other recog nized quasi contracts, and in all there is present the element of unjust enrichment of the defend ant at the plaintiff's expense. It cannot be said, however, that unjust enrichment is a definite rule or principle of decision such that a plaintiff is entitled to recover in every case of unjust en richment at his expense. The scope of this sub division of quasi contracts will be best under stood by referring briefly to more important groups of quasi contracts included within it.