SOPHISTS (Lat. sophista, from Gk. corpLarhs, sophistCs, wise man, teacher of arts and sciences for motley, sophist, from crootTetr, sophizcin, to make wise, from crook sophos, wise). A class of thinkers and teachers who appeared in the fifth century c.c. in Greece. and especially at Athens. Unfortunately, we have little informa tion concerning them except such as has come to us from their opponents. We can perhaps form a fair estimate of the character and significance of their work if we keep in mind the fact that much of what is said of them in extant Greek writings is extravagant satire. The change of political in stitutions following upon the Persian and Cartha ginian wars, the growth of democracy with an increasing opportunity for the orator, the inevit able distrust in the inviolable character of social rules which were now seen to differ in various countries, all conspired to create a demand for up-to-date instruction which should qualify men for life under the new conditions. The Sophists arose to meet this demand. They popularized the results of the investigations of previous phil osophers. Of the earlier SophiSts some were Elea tic, some Heraclitean, some Pythagorean, and some atomistic in their views, but they laid more emphasis on equipping their pupils for the tasks of public life than for philosophic or scientific work. Philological studies, rhetoric, and argil mentation by which the worse could be made to appear the better reason, were their leading inter ests. In the history of philosophy their signifi cance, apart from the fact that their activity called forth the philosophical activity of Socra tes, and through him that of Plato and Aristotle, is mainly epistemological and ethical. The readi ness with which all their arguments were re ceived (my their listeners made them distrustful of human knowledge. They came to believe that any propo,itioa could be proved as satisfactorily as any other. When every statement is demon strable none can command absolute credence, and skepticism (q.v.) is the foregone conclu sion. This skepticism found a theoretical con firmation in views then becoming current as to the origin of knowledge. Against the older ra tionalism (q.v.), which distinguished between sense and thought, Protagoras, the leading Soph ist. maintained that sensations were the sole con tent of consciousness. But if this is true and if sense impressions of one and the same object vary, there is no court to which appeal can be made to ad-just the disputes of sense. One sensa tion is as good as another ; everything is just what it appears to be at the moment. There is no ascertainable identity underlying the differ ences of appearance. The unity of phenomena in their laws is lost sight of, and each individual man becomes the measure of the universe. Op posite conclusions have been drawn from this sensationalism. Gorgias argued that nothing is, inasmuch as everything is full of contradictions. Euthydemus, on the contrary, denied that there can be contradiction. If subject and predicate
mean different things, then what seems to be contradiction is mere difference. Lycophon went so far as to advise the omission of the copula in propositions, presumably because all judgments are supposed to be mere unrelated sequences of words. In ethics the upshot of the sophistic teaching was an ultra-individualism with con sequent license in practical life. But this re sult was only gradually reached. At first the distinction was made between the natural and *he conventional in human usages; but when the distinction was once made gradually everything institutional and social came to be regarded as conventional, with nothing natural left except unscrupulous self-seeking. Protagoras recognized the rationality of justice and of regard for so cial approval (cie5is ). But other Sophists were not so conservative. Callicles, in Plato, is made to say that all laws are created by the strong and enforced on the weak, while Thrasy machus contends that no man but a fool is will ingly just. It is obvious that where the whole of amorality is brushed aside as a trick whereby the strong make the weak do their will. religion can not stand untouched. Protagoras prudently claimed that he knew nothing about the gods, while his successors ran the whole gamut from skepticism to avowed atheism.
It is interesting to note the unanimity with which Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle condemned the Sophists for accepting pay for their teaching. The reason for this is no doubt the same reason which nowadays makes some conservative educa tors look with apprehension upon large endow ments given by living benefactors to colleges and universities. Fear is expressed that in such in stitutions not what is true, but what is pleasing to the donor, will be taught. In like manner, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle doubtless had ap prehension for the cause of what, to use a mod ern phrase, we may call academic freedom. And it was with them in many cases something more than a mere apprehension. The truth was that by many of the Sophists learning was prosti tuted; and yet no universal condemnation may properly be passed on the Sophists as a class, as was done by modern historians till the appear ance of Hegel's History of Philosophy. On the other hand, Grote in his History of Greece, vol. viii., has gone to the other extreme and has failed to appreciate the subversive tendency of much of the sophistic activity. Among the Sophists are to he mentioned Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodi cus, Hippias, Polus. Thrasymachus, Futhydemuc, Dionysodorus, Callicles, and Antiphon. Consult: Grote, History of Greece; Sid wick, Journal of Philology, vols. iv. and v.; and the histories of philosophy by LreberwegHeinze, Windelband, Erdmann, Zeller, Gomperz. Henn, and Schwegler (for titles and dates of these works, see article on Pumosoeuv) ; also Schanz, Die Sophisten. (Gi)ttingen, 1867).