SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. The war between Spain and the United States in 1898. After more than a century of unrest, in the island of Cuba. and intermittent struggles between the Cubans and their home- Government, when the in crease of bloodshed, starvation, and general de vastation had attracted world-wide attention, and when the rights of American citizens had been systematically disregarded by the Spanish an tho•ities, the United States decided to interpose its friendly offices. After the 'Ten Years' War' (1868-78) in Cuba, there had been a period of comparative peace (see CUBA ) , but in Feb ruary, 1895, the Cubans again rebelled, and the Spanish Government resorted to repressive meas ures of unusual severity and cruelty. The island was devastated, famine and death were every where, American interests suffered greatly, and the condition of affairs fast became intolerable. On April 6, 1896, Secretary of State Olney repre sented to Spain that American commerce was being greatly damaged, and that the Cubans were threatened with 'absolute impoverishment.' and vaguely offered the friendly offices of the United States, his 'offer,' however, falling short in definiteness to that of a resolution passed, on April 4th, by the American Congress. Othey's offer was immediately declined by Spain, and in De cember, 1896. President Cleveland, in his annual message, spoke of 'higher obligations' than those due to Spain, which would devolve upon the United States if conditions should grow worse in the island and if Spain's inability to deal successfully with the insurrection should become manifest. In Congress feeling was much more radical, and the President's 'timidity' was vigor ously criticised. President McKinley, at the out set of his administration, devoted special atten tion to the situation in Cuba. lu May, 1897, Congress appropriated $50,000 for the relief of the Cubans, and on Nay 20, 1897, the Senate passed a resolution recogniling the belligerency of Cuba, which, however, was never acted upon by the llouse. Meanwhile, the activity of Cuban agents in the United States caused almost con stant diplomatic friction between the two gov ernments. A new Ministry under Sagasta in Spain made an effort to ameliorate conditions, and on October 6, 1897, recalled Captain-General Weyler, who had been held responsible for much of the Spanish cruelty to the Cubans, General Blanco being sent out in his stead. Stewart L. Woodford, of New York. had been sent as United States Minister to Spain, with special instruc tions to urge that country to establish civil order in Cuba, and to announce that the United States could not view with indifference the in definite prolongation of the existing conditions. The representations of the American Minister were met with promises from Spain to give Cuba local autonomy and to ameliorate the conditions which the war methods had created. In view of these assurances, the President, in his annual message of December, 1897. recommended to Con gress the postponement of action until Spain had been given ample opportunity to redeem her prom ises. On December 24th an appeal was issued by Secretary Sherman in the President's name, calling for contributions for the relief of the Cuban rccoaccatrados. This appeal met with a hearty response. At the opening of 1898 the Government began to concentrate its naval forces, and to accumulate war supplies. The tone of the press and the expressions of public opinion gen erally showed that the nation was ready for war. The relations with Spain were further strained on February Sth, when a Cuban sympathizer pur loined from the mail a letter from the Spanish Minister at Washington, Seilor Dupuy de Lome, addressed to a Spanish editor. and containing severe strictures on President McKinley and his policy. The Minister at once admitted that lie
had written the letter and resigned. The prompt disavowal on the part of Spain of any sympathy with the Minister's conduct closed the incident so far as official circles were concerned. On the evening of February 15th the battleship Maine (Captain Charles D. Sigsbee). which had been sent to Cuba on the representation of Fitzhugh Lee, the American Consul at Havana, but not for unfriendly purposes. according to official an nouncement, was blown up in Havana harbor and 266 of the crew killed. The United States and Spain at once appointed separate boards of investigation. Congress immediately appropri ated $50,000.000 for national defense. On March 28th the American commission reported. It at tributed the catastrophe to the explosion of a sub marine mine in the harbor, but in view of the lack of evidence declined to fix responsibility. Public opinion, however, at once decided that the Span ish officials in Cuba were responsible for the dis aster. On the day before the report of the Moine commission, the President made overtures to Spain for a cessation of hostilities and a peace able settlement of difficulties. He tendered his good offices in the negotiation of peace and pro posed a dissolution of the concentration camps and the relief of the suffering Cubans by the United States through the mediation of Spanish officers. In reply, Spain offered to leave the peace negotiations to the Cuban Parliament ap pointed to meet on May 4th, and to cease hostili ties when the Cuban insurgents asked for it. Spain added that the concentration orders had been revoked, agreed to a joint relief of distress, voted $600,000 for that purpose, and offered to arbitrate the Maine ease. The President re garded this reply as unsatisfactory and an nounced his intention of submitting the whole matter to Congress in the forthcoming message. Meanwhile. in anticipation of the war, American left Cuba, the Cuban Government de dared against interference on the part of the United States. the Cuban 'junta' demanded recog nition of independence before intervention, and Spain on 10th declared a general armistice. On the following day the President's message, describing the situation in Cuba and giving an account of the state of diplomatic relations with Spain. was laid before Congress. The President did not favor the recognition of Cuban belliger ency or independence, but advocated intervention` as a neutral. At all events, he declared, the war in Cuba must be ended, and he accordingly asked Congress for authority to use the army and navy to secure the formation of a Cuban government capable of discharging its international obliga tions and maintaining internal order. Congress promptly replied by a joint resolution declaring the people of Cuba free and independent, demand ing the surrender of all Spanish authority ever the island, and directing as well as empowering the President to enforce the resolutkoi the army and navy. Congress further declared that the United States was not "to exercise sover eignty. jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof." The Presi dent signed the measure, and on April 20th sent the ultimatum to Spain, the hour of noon. April 23d, as the last date for a satisfactory reply. This was a practical declaration of war, for the Spanish Government had already an nounced its intention to oppose the policy out lined in the President's message. Both Powers at once defined their attitude on questions of in ternational law, and preparations that had been going on in both countries were quickened, the United States devoting special attention to the equipment of the navy.