The possibility of the evolution of morality out of non-moral eonditions was some years ago seriously contested on metaphysical and theolog ical grounds. The theological grounds do not concern us. The metaphysical grounds of objec tion are invalid. The strongest argument of the opponents of evolutionistic ethics is based on the necessity of self-consciousness for morality, and on the alleged impossibility of the evolution of self-consciousness. The fallacy of this argu ment has been often pointed out, The 'timeless ness' of self-consciousness does not consist in the fact that the self has not a place in tine• as an event, but in the fact that the objects of that self's knowledge arc not confined to the periph erally aroused sensations of the present mo ment. The assertion that a consciousness in timo cannot know time is an unfounded dogmatic dic tum, and yet only on the supposition that this statement is true can it be maintained that con sciousness and self-consciousness are in their na ture incapable of explanation by evolution. The exact course taken in the evolution of morality from the non-moral is still an open question; but the truth of the statement that morality is an evolved product stands or falls with the gen eral truth of the evolution of man from the non moral animals.
The only other question that can he discussed here is that of free will in its bearing on moral ity. Can there be moral responsibility if the will is determined, that is, if the volitions of man are events which find their complete causal explana tions in previous events? In the light of what has been said it must he maintained that unless the human volitions were determined, responsibil ity would be impossible. Ethical responsibility is the liability of a person to answer for his conduct before the bar of reason. A commits an act and is held responsible. This means that A is amenable to the demand to prove that his act is in accord with the supreme plan of life, or that his supreme plan is the right plan. Given a supreme plan, intelligent experience can determine the relation of an act to the realization of that plan. A reasonable person who adopts that plan may be constantly called upon to justify the means he takes to realize that end. Condem nation of an act in such a ease means that it is recognized as not conducive to that end, and that it is disliked as having that tendency. Ap
proval means that it is recognized as conducive to that end and is liked as having that tendency. Or again, instead of raising a question of means to an end, there may be a question about the end. We have seen that though the actual supreme end pursued is not imposed by reason, yet knowledge of the bearing of the attained end upon actual desires may lead to change of ends. Moral re sponsibility may mean the liability of a person to justify his supreme end—that is, to show that it is desirable as well as desired. Approval or condemnation of the end is a recognition of its desirableness or undesirableness, and the result ing affeetional tone. It of course carries with it approval or disapproval of the means leading up to it. In ordinary life the supreme end is unre flectively pursued, and the means to it taken for granted as presented in moral code. The only function of conscience in such cases is the approval or disapproval of an act as conforming to the moral code. In any case the whole activity of conscience is useless unless the judgments and feelings involved determine future conduct. Not only so, but also the past conduct judged, if con ceived as wholly or in part the pure chance product of some blind arbit racy agent called is not a means to any end, and therefore neither a pprovable IMF as such. sow, tree will, either in the sense of a liberty of indifference or a liberty of alternative choice, in so far as it is undetermined, is pure chanee, as is conceded by Professor James, one of the most prominent sup porters of indeterminism. Responsibility does not, therefore, presuppose indeterminism of the will, but it does presuppose that the will (.an be determined either by the knowledge of the conduciveness of a means to an end, or by the knowledge of the adaptedness of an end to satisfy a desire. A person who ean by rational means be brought to see the inadequacy of his acts to the supreme moral -nil, or the inadequacy of his supreme moral end to his whole nature as a being with definite needs, is responsible; that is, in case his acts or his ends arc undesirable, he can be convinced of their undesirability and be led to condemn them. In other words, he has a conscience.