If the question is now asked whether ethicists have as yet come to any agreement as to the na ture of the summum bonum, the answer must be No. However, the following description of the &minim bonum is given, because it seems to do justice to all the determining factors of the prob lem. The sum m um bone m of any moral man is not any one single object, whether attainable at R stroke or altogether unattainable, which if at tained would continue to satisfy him. It is rather a progression of objects. The summum bonito: is a serial system of ends which are. each in its turn, the most desirable ends capable of pursuit. An element in its desirability is that it shall fix favorable conditions for further pur suit of further similar ends, as well as give pleasure in the ends already attained. Again, because the normal man is a social man and thus interested in seeing the good of at least some of his fellows, there is found among the ends included in the sum mu in bon um the welfare of these fellow-men. By wel fare is meant the progressive realization of the progressivd summum bonum of each of these fel low-men. Now the fact that the summum bonum of each normal man includes within itself the welfare of some other men constitutes a com munity of welfare. The question how many per sons shall be included in the community of wel fare is determined partly by objective conditions and partly by the actual reach of the benevolent emotions: by objective conditions, because no matter what may be my affectional attitude toward another man, it may be the case that unless he has his welfare he will be an impedi ment to my obtaining my welfare: by the actual reach of the benevolent emotions, as is proved by history, which shows that as men have become larger-hearted, the community of interests is shared in by a larger number of individuals. It must he borne in mind that the sum mum bon urn thus described is not imposed upon any individual by any obligation. Unless an individual is so constituted that he finds such an end the most desirable of all ends, it is not his sem et unt. bonnet. All that has been attempted is to describe in very general terms an end that it is believed will be found to he most desirable by normal human be ings. Abnormal human beings, who have no liking for their kind, or who are rabidly mono maniacal, or who in some other features vary from the kindly race of men, are not taken into account. Their minima bone are radically different, and because this is so there is ap parently no possibility of welfare for them con sistent with welfare for normal men. They are not included directly in the community of human interests. All that can be demanded for them is so much of welfare as is consistent with the welfare of mankind in general.
Ent though ethics as a science cannot impose. an end on man. man individually and collectively can impose ends upon man to a certain extent. It is a fact, as we have already seen. that what a person shall desire is to a large extent deter mined by what other persons desire. A emu nmnity or an individual with a definite eoneep of a supreme end can do much to influence a child or even an adult to desire that same end; and this makes moral training possible. Moral training and the teaching of ethieal seienee are two pile distinct operations. although they may. and often do, go hand in hand. Moral training consists in an attempt to habituate a person to actions and dispositions such as are desired by the trainer. It is the process of inducting a per
son into a communion of ends with another per son or with a group of persons. Ethical teaching is the process of bringing a person to see and understand the facts of the moral life. The for mer is an attempt to develop appreciations, the latter to develop insight. An appreciation with out insight is blind; insight without appreciation is ineffective.
Moral training, however. is a fact in the moral life, and as such has a place in ethics as a science of the moral life. Ethics studies the facts of moral training and discovers what its purpose is, and what the realization of that purpose does in the way of meeting human needs. It may ascer tain e.g. the fact that the actual end pursued in any particular species of punishment is of an evil nature; that is, that men being what they arc, society is injured rather than benefited by a realization of the end. it may discover that other ends if realized would avert these evil con sequences and produce advantageous results, and it may discover the best means to the securing of these ends. All this is a matter of descriptive science, not in the least directly prescriptive. The beneficial ends and the expeditious means to the ends are prescribed to men by their desire for the advantages described. A study of moral training shows that it is a very complex affair, and into its complexities we cannot here enter. Example and precept, admonition and chastise meat, reward and 'pious fraud.' threats, actual infliction of pain, appeals to nascent desires and aversions, are all employed more or less frequent ly. All these instruments of moral training have their characteristic effect, and these must be experimentally ascertained. And again, not only moral training, but vengeance, is a phenomenon of the moral life. It aims at the infliction of pain on an offender to appease by his suffering the suffering of his victim or of the sympathizers of his victim. It has its characteristic results. These are studied by ethics. The results of this study may, as a fact do, secure general condem-• nation of such vengeful punishment ; but this, again, is because the outcome of a vengeful policy is undesirable.
Another question must now be taken up. Is it not possible that ethical insight may tend to dis countenance morality ? When it is seen that morality is reasonably obligatory only because imposed by a supreme plan of life, and that the supremacy of this plan is given to it by the vol untary adoption of it on the part of the inai vidual, may he not decide voluntarily to adopt some (Alm plan? This would be possible if one's choices were not determined by one's character, and one's character by one's desires, instinct, habits, and expression in general. If scientific knowledge of conduct could radically change a person's character, then scientific ethics might profoundly change morality. But while some change is possible and actual under the influence of new ideals gained by new knowledge, this change has its limits, and within these limits it is desirable. ntrality is not a thing of yester day and to-day, hut Nvill continue so long as man is a rat ional being with wants and desires, among which his social needs are of paramount urgency.