A city ordinance providing that only rock dressed within the state should be used in any city public works was held valid ; Allen v. Labsap, 188 Mo. 692, 87 S. W. 926, 3 Ann. Cas. 306, considered as sound in 19 Harv. L. Rev. 70 ; and criticized in 61 Cent. L. J. 65. Railroad cars engaged in interstate com merce may be attached under an execution issued out of a state court ; Davis v. Ry. Co., 217 U. S. 157, 30 Sup. Ct. 463, 54 L. Ed. 708, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 823, 18 Ann. Cas. 907. In -Stone v. Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307, 6 Sup. Ct. 334, 388, 1191, 29 L. Ed. 636, it was held that the right of the state to limit charges of a railroad company could not be granted away by giving to the company the right from time to time to fix and regulate their charges, and that a state was not foreclosed of its right to act upon the reasonableness of the charges and to regulate them for business within the state. A state statute requiring a carrier to settle within a specified time claims for loss or damages is not, in the absence of legisla tion by congress, an unwarrantable interfer ence with interstate commerce, and is consti tutional ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ma zursky, 216 U. S. 122, 30 Sup. Ct. 378, 54 L. Ed. 411. See Morris v. Express Co., 146 N. C. 167, 59 S. E. 667, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 983. And so is one providing that a railroad is lia ble for damages from fire ; McCandless v. R. Co., 38 S. C. 103, 16 S. E. 429, 18 L. R. A. 440. See FIRE. So also are municipal ordi nances, in the exercise of police power, pro hibiting the sale of a commodity, otherwise than in original packages, as intoxicating liquor ; Duluth Brewing & Malting Co. v. Superior, 123 Fed. 853, 59 C. C. A. 481; or perishable market produce sold in railroad depots ; State v. Davidson, 50 La. Ann. 1297, 24 South. 324, 69 Am. St. Rep. 478.
The principles regulating the police power of the states in its relation to the commerce clause are well defined in Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 Sup. Ct. 92, 47 L. Ed. 108, where it was said in substance that the United States constitution gives no one a right to introduce into a state, against Its will, live stock affected by a contagious dis ease. Congress not having assumed charge of the matter as involved in interstate com merce, a state may protect its people, but it must not go beyond the necessities of the case nor unreasonably burden the exercise of privileges secured by the constitution.
State Action Valid in Case of Non-Action by Congress. There is a class of cases in which the state may act so long as congress does not, as detailed in County of Mobile v. Kimball, supra. The question whether non action by congress "is conclusive of its inten tion that the subject shall be free from all positive regulation, or that, until it positively interferes, such commerce may be left to be freely dealt with by the respective states," is to be determined in each case as it arises; Bowman v. Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 483, 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 1062, 31 L. Ed. 700.
In this class of cases have been included: Laws for the regulation of pilots ; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, etc., 12 How. (U. S.) 299, 13 L. Ed. 996; Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Jo Rife, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 450, 17 L. Ed. 805; In re McNiel, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 236, 20 L. Ed. 624 ; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572, 26 L. Ed. 234 ; quarantine and inspection laws and the policing of harbors ; Gibbons v. Og den, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 203, 6 L. Ed. 23; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 102, 9 L. Ed. 648; Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455, 6 Sup, Ct. 1114, 30 L. Ed. 237 ; the improvement of nav igable channels; Mobile County V. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. Ed. 238 ; Escanaba & L. M. Trausp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 2 Sup. Ct. 185, 27 L. Ed. 442 ; Huse v. Glo
ver, 119 U. S. 543, 7 Sup. Ct. 313, 30 L. Ed. 487 ; the regulation of wharfs, piers, and docks ; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 577, 22 L. Ed. 417; Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80, 24 L. Ed. 377; Northwestern Union Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423, 25 L. Ed. 688 ; Par kersburg & 0. R. Transp. Co. v. Parkers burg, 107 U. S. 691, 2 Sup. Ct. 732, 27 L. Ed. 584 ; Ouachita & M. R. Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444, 7 Sup. Ct. 907, 30 L. Ed. 976; the establishment of ferries ; Conway v. Taylor's Ex'r, 1 Black (U. S.) 603, 17 L. Ed. 191; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Ken tucky, 154 U. S. 211, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087, 38 L. Ed. 962: Marshall v. Grimes, 41 Miss. 27 ; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43; and dams Willson v. Marsh Co., 2 Pet. (U. S.) 245, 7 L. Ed. 412; Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257 ; Woodman v. Mfg. Co., 1 Biss. 546, Fed. Cas. No. 17,978; Carroll v. Campbell, 108 Mo. 550, 17 S. W. 884; acts giving a right of action against the owners of a vessel engaged in interstate traffic for the death of a passenger caused by the negligence of those in charge of the vessel; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 23 L. Ed. 819; forbid ding the sale of plumage, skin or body of any non-game bird, whether captured or killed within or without the state; In re Schwartz, 119 La. 290, 44 South. 20, 121 Am. St. Rep. 516; acts for preventing the spread of disease among plants and trees whether grown or sold within or without the state and transported and sold for plant ing within the state; Ex parte Hawley, 22 S. D. 23, 115 N. W. 93, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 138.
The state may authorize the building of dams and bridges over navigable waters, notwithstanding the fact that they may, to some extent, interfere with the navigation of the stream ; Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. (U. S.) 245, 7 L. Ed. 412; Cardwell v. Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 205, 5 Sup. Ct. 423, 28 L. Ed. 959; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459, 24 L. Ed. 525. If the stream is one over which the regulation of congress extends, the question arises whether the bridge will interfere with navigation or not ; it is not necessarily unlawful if properly built, and if the general traffic of the coun try will be benefited rather than injured by its construction. There are many cases in which a bridge may be vastly more im portant than the navigation of the stream which it crosses. It may be said that a state may authorize such constructions, provided they do not constitute a material obstruction to navigation ; and each case depends upon' its own particular facts. The decision of the state legislature is not conclusive; the final decision rests with the federal courts, who may cause the structure to be abated if it be found to obstruct unnecessarily the traffic on the stream; Cooley, Const. Lim. 738, 739, 740 ; Pennsylvania v. Bridge Co., 13 How. (U. S.) 518, 14 L. Ed. 249; see also COlumbus Ins. Co. v. Bridge Ass'n, 6 Mc Lean 70, Fed. Cas. No. 3,046 ; Columbus Ins. Co. v. Curtenius, 6 McLean 209, Fed. Cas. No. 3,045 ; Jolly v. Draw-Bridge Co., 6 McLean 237, Fed. Cas. No. 7,441; Board of Com'rs of St. Joseph County v. Pidge, 5 Ind. 13; Rhea v. R. Co., 50 Fed. 16; State v. Leighton, 83 Me. 419, 22 Atl. 380; Luxton v. Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525, 14 Sup. Ct. 891, 38 L. Ed. 808; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087, 38 L. Ed. 962. See BRIDGE. The state has also the power to regulate the speed and gen eral conduct of vessels navigating its waters, provided such regulations do not conflict with regulations prescribed by congress for foreign commerce, or commerce among the states ; Cooley, Const. Lim. 740 ; People v. Jenkins, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 469, 470.