COMMERCE. The various agreements which have for their object facilitating the exchange of the products of the earth or the industry of man, with an intent to realize a profit. Pardessus, Dr. Com. n, 1. Any recip rocal agreements between two persons, by which one delivers to the other a thing, which the latter accepts, and for which be pays a consideration : if the consideration be money, it is called a sale; if any other thing than money, it is called exchange or barter. Domat, Dr. Pub. liv. 1, tit. 7, s. 1, n. 2.
"Commerce among the several states com prehends traffic, intercourse, trade, naviga tion, communication, the transit of persons and the transmission of messages by tele graph-indeed, every species of commercial intercourse among the several states, but not to that commerce 'completely internal, which is carried on between man and man, in a state, or between different parts of the same state, and which does not extend to or affect other states.' " Harlan, J., in Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161, 177, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 764.
It has been frequently said by the Supreme Court that commerce includes intercourse, though usually the term is qualified as "com mercial intercourse"; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat (U. S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23; U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325 ; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 280, 23 L. Ed. 347 ; Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Telegraph Co., 96 U. S. 1, 9, 24 L. Ed. 708; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 702, 26 L. Ed. 238 (where the phrase is "intercourse and traffic"); Addy ston Pipe '& Steel Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211, 241, 20 Sup. Ct. 96, 44 L. Ed. 136; Lindsay & P. Co. v. Mullen, 176 U. S. 126, 20•Sup. Ct. 325, 44 L. Ed. 400; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 470, 14 Sup. Ct. 1125, 38 L. Ed. 1047; Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 346, 23 Sup. Ct.. 321, 47 L. Ed. 492. The first expression of this was by Marshall, C. J., in 'Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23; quoted by Fuller, C. J., in U. S. v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325; and characterized by White, J., as a "luminous definition" in Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436, 48 L. Ed.
679, to the effect that commerce is something more than traffic ; "it is intercourse ; it de scribes the commercial intercourse between nations and parts of nations in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse." Thig has been practically, if not literally, quoted in all the cases cited. There is nothing in the decisions to define or limit so broad a term as intercourse, except the word com mercial, usually attached to it. As it is hardly likely that the courts intended to say that commerce is intercourse in the sense in which it is defined "communication between persons or places" ; Cent. Diet. ; it is probable that the word was not intended to be used to express more than such intercourse as is con nected with traffic and transportation with foreign countries or between the states.
"The word 'commerce' is undoubtedly, in its usual sense, a larger word than 'trade,' in its usual sense. Sometimes 'commerce' is used to embrace less than 'trade' and some times 'trade' is used to embrace as much as 'commerce.' They are . . . in this stat ute (Sherman Act) synonymous;" U. S. v. Patterson, 55 Fed. 605, 639.
"The term •commerce' comprehends more than a mere exchange of goods; it embraces commercial intercourse in all its branches, including transportation of passengers and property by common carriers, whether car ried on by water or by land;" In re Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 46, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44; the "movement of persons as well as of property;" Hoke v. U. S., 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 906.
"Transportation of passengers and freight from one state to another, or through more than one state to another, or through more than one state, whether by lund or water, is commerce within the meaning of" the commerce clause, "and the words of the grant comprehend every species of commer cial 'intercourse, and the power is complete in Itself, and may be exercised to its utmost extent without limitations other than such as are prescribed in the Constitution ;" Sweatt v. R. Co., 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 339, 350, Fed. Cas. No. 13,684.