A state statute penalizing shipments of liquor C. 0. D. and making the place of delivery the place of sale is invalid; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U. S. 129, 27 Sup. Ct. 606, 51 L. Ed, 987. Liquor is a recognized article of commerce and a state law denying the right to send it from one state to another is unconstitutional; Vance v. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, 18 Sup. Ct. 674, 42 L. Ed. 1100, followed in Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218, 29 Sup. Ct. 633, 53 L. Ed. 972; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Brewing Co., 223 U. S. 70, 32 Sup. Ct. 189, 56 L. Ed. 355; in both which cases it is also held that transportation is not com pleted until delivery to the consignee, and under the Wilson Act (q. v.) it is not subject to regulation under state laws until such de livery. See supra.
A burden imposed upon interstate com merce cannot be sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies to the people of all the states, including the enacting one; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 10 Sup. Ct. 862, 34 L. Ed. 455, where a statute re quiring inspection within twenty-four hours before slaughtering of all animals killed for food, was held unconstitutional.
While a state may confer power on an administrative agency to make reasonable regulations as to the place, time and man ner of the delivery of merchandise, any regu lation which directly burdens interstate com merce is a regulation thereof and unconstitu tional; McNeill v. R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. 722, 50 L. Ed. 1142, where the regu lation was an order requiring a railroad com pany to deliver cars from another state to the consignee on a private siding beyond its own right of way; but where congress aid the interstate commerce commission have not acted, the state may compel a rail road company to give equal switching facili ties to all customers, even if affecting cars to be used in interstate commerce; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Mills Co., 211 U. S. 612, 29 Sup. Ct. 214, 53 L. Ed. 352.
Other cases of invalid state action were: Assessment by a state for taxation of prop erty in original packages before incorpora tion into the mass of property; May v. New Orleans, 178 U. S. 496, 20 Sup. Ct. 976, 44 L. Ed. 1165; and taxation of tea imported from a foreign country, and stored in a government warehouse in the original un broken 'package; Siegfried v. Raymond, 190 424, 60 N. E. 868.
A state has no power to interfere with an interstate commerce train if thereby a di rect burden is imposed upon interstate com merce, as by a police regulation requiring the stoppage of a train at certain stations; Mississippi R. Com. v. R. Co., 203 U. S. 335, 27 Sup. Ct. 90, 51 L. Ed. 209; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 20 Sup. Ct. 722, 44 L. Ed. 868; or regula tions of master and servant, applicable to those actually engaged in the operation of interstate commerce after congress had act ed upon the subject ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 28 Sup. Ct. 121, 62 L. Ed. 230; Johnson v. Southern Co., 196 U. S. 1, 25 Sup. Ct. 158, 49 L. Ed. 363; Schlemmer v. R. Co., 205 U. S. 1, 27 Sup. Ct.. 407, 51 L. Ed. 681.
The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, have been reported since this title was prepared. It might be cited as an authority confirming almost every legal proposition above stated as established by the authorities, and the opinion of the court by Mr. Justice Hughes may be referred to as a thorough and ex haustive discussion of the whole subject of interstate commerce.
The special point decided arose out of the that, even admitting that the rates prescribed by the state were reasona ble, as a regulation of intrastate commerce, as applied to cities on the state's boundary or to places within competitive districts crossed by the state line, nevertheless the rates disturbed the relation previously exist ing between interstate and intrastate rates, thus imposing a direct burden upon inter state commerce and creating discriminations as against localities in other states. In re ply to this contention, it was held that the authority of the state to prescribe reasonable charges for intrastate transportation is state wide, unless limited by the exercise of the constitutional power of congress, which is not confined to a part of the state, but ex tends throughout its limits-to cities adja cent to its boundaries as well as to those in the interior ; and a restriction of the authori ty of the state must be by virtue of the ac tual exercise of the federal control and not by reason of a dormant federal power that has not been exerted.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION; CONSTITUTION OF UNITED STATES.