CONTRACT (Lat. contractus, from con, with, and traho, to draw. Contractus ultro utroque obligatio est quam, arced ouuablania vocant. Fr. contrat).
An agreement between two or more par ties to do or not to do a particular thing. Taney, C. J., Charles River Bridge v. War ren Bridge, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420, 572, 9 L. Ed. 773. An agreement in which a party under takes to do or not to do a particular thing. Marshall, C. J., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 197, 4 L. Ed. 529. An agree ment between two or more parties for the doing or not doing of some specified thing. 1 Pars. Corn. 5.
It has been also defined as follows: A compact between two or More parties. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cra. (U. S.) 87, 136, 3 L. Ed. 162. An agreement or covenant between two or more persons, in which each party binds himSelf to do or forbear some act, and each acquires a right to what the other prom ises. Encyc. Amer. ; Webster. A contract or agree ment is where a promise is made on one side and assented to on the other ; or where two or more persons enter into an engagement with each othe1 by a promise on either side. '2 Steph. Corn. 108, 109. ' An agreement upon sufficient consideration to do or not to do a particular thing. 2 Bla. Com. 446; 2 Kent 449.
A. covenant or agreement between two parties with a lawful consideration or cause. West, bol. lib. 1, § 10; Cowell; Blount.
A deliberate engagement' between competent par ties upon a legal consideration to do or to abstain from doing some act. Story, Contr. § 1.
An agreement by which two parties reciprocally promise and engage, or one of thew singly Islamises and engages to the other, to give some particular thing or to do or abstain from doing some partic ular act. Pothier, Conts. Pt. I, o. 1, § 1; 36 Ch. D. 695.
A mutual promise upon lawful consideration or cause which' binds the parties to a performance. The writing which contains the agreement of par ties with the terms and conditions, and which serves as a proof of the obligation. The last is a distinct signification. Pierson v. Townsend, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 561.
A voluntary and lawful agreement by competent parties, for a good consideration, to do or not to do a specified thing. Robinson v. Magee, 9 Cal. 83, 70 Am. Dec. 638.
An agreement enforceable at law, made between two or more persons, by which rights are acquired by one or both to acts or forbearances on the part of the other. Anson, Contr. 9.
A learned writer has said, in discussing the prop er definition of contract, that "if we seek to build up a definition of the term 'contract' which shall In clude all things that have been called contracts and shall exclude all things that have been held not to be contracts, the task is evidently impossible. . . .
Any definition of contract therefore must be either arbitrary or inexact." Harriman, Contr. 4.
The consideration is not properly included in the definition of contract, because it does not seem to be essential to a contract, although it may be neces sary to its enforcement. See CONSIDERATION ; 1 Pars. Contr. 7..
Mr. Stephen, whose definition of contract is given above, thus criticizes the definition of Blackstone, which has been adopted by Chancellor Kent and other high authorities. First that the word agree ment itself requires definition as much as contract. Second, that the existence of a consideration, though essential to the validity of a parol contract, forms properly no part of the idea. Third, that the defini tion, takes no sufficient notice of the mutuality which properly distinguishes a contract from a promise. 2 Steph. Cam. 109.
The use of the word agreement (aggregatio men tium) seems to have the authority of the best writ ers in ancient and modern times (see above) as a part of the definition of contract. It is probably a translation of the civil-law conventio (con and venio), a coming together, to which (being derived from ad and grew) it seems nearly equivalent. We do not think the objection that it is a synonym (or nearly so) a valid one. Some word of the kind is necessary' as a basis of the definition. No two synonyms convey precisely the same idea. "Most of them have minute distinctions," says Reid. If two are entirely equivalent, it will soon be deter mined by accident which shall remain in use and which become obsolete. To one who has no knowl edge of a language, it is impossible to define any abstract idea. But to one who understands a lan guage, an abstraction is defined by a synonym prop erly qualified. By pointing out distinctions and the mutual relations between synonyms, the object of definition is answered. Hence we do not think Blackstone's definition open to the first objection. As to the idea of consideration, Mr. Stephen seems correct and to have the authority of some of the first legal minds of modern times. Consideration, how ever, may be necessary to enforce a contract, though not essential to the idea. Even in that class of con tracts (by specialty) in which no consideration is in fact required, one is said to be always presumed in law.—the form of the instrument being held to import a consideration. 2 Kent 450; n. But see CONSIDERATION, where the subject is more fully treated..