In Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143, 23 L. Ed. 855, the court (Davis, J.) said that "the right of a party to maintain assumpsit on a promise not under seal made to another for his benefit, although much controverted, is now the prevailing rule in this country." In Second Nat. Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123, 25 L. Ed. 75, it was held that while the common-law rule is that' a stranger cannot sue upon it, "tnere are confessedly many ex ceptions to it." In Pennsylvania the general rule is recognized; but it is held that where money or property is placed by one in the possession of another, to be paid or delivered to a third person, the latter has a right of action, being regarded as a party to the con sideration on which the undertaking rests ; Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76, 13 Atl. 184 ; so, also, Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts '(Pa.) 182, 31 Am. Dec. 458. And a promise to one to pay a debt due by him to another is valid; Hind v. Holdship, 2 Watts (Pa.) 104, 26 Am. Dec. 107. In some jurisdictions, even includ ing courts adhering to the general common law rule, a third person has a right to en force a trust created for his benefit by an other person ; Union P. R. Co. v. Durant, 95 U. S. 576, 24 L. Ed. 391; Street v. McConnell, 16 Ill. 125 ; Bay v. Williams, 112 111. 91, 1 N. E. 340, 54 Am. Rep. 209; Chace v. Chapin, 130 Mass. 128 ; Pruitt v. Pruitt, 91 Ind. 595. But see Crandall v. Payne, 154 Ill. 627, 39 N. E. 601, where it was held that when a contract of sale of land from A to B recited that part of the purchase money was "going to C," the latter could not sue B.
See for a general discussion of the subject, Southern Express Co. v. R. Co., 29 Am. L. Reg. 0. S. 596 ; 4 N. J. L. J. 197, 229 ; 8 Harv. L. Rev. 93 ; Harriman, Contr.
Construction and interpretation in refer ence to contracts. The intention of the par ties is the pole-star of construction; but their intention must be found expressed in the con tract and be consistent with rules of law. The court will not make a new contract for the parties, nor will words be forced from their real signification.
The subject matter of the contract and the situation of the parties are to be fully con sidered with regard to the sense in which language is used.
The legality of the contract is presumed and is favored by construction.
Words are to be taken, if possible, in their ordinary and common sense.
The whole contract is to be considered with relation to the meaning of any of its parts.
The contract will be supported rather than defeated : ut res nusgis raleat gum pee-eat.
All parts will be construed, if possible, so as to have effect.
Construction is generally against the gran tor—contra proferentent—except in the case of the sovereign. This rule of construction is not of great importance, except in the analogous case of penal statutes ; for the law favors and supposes innocence.
Construction is against claims or contracts which are in themselves against common right or common law.
Neither bad English nor bad Latin in validates a contract ("which perhaps a class ical critic may think no unnecessary cau tion") ; 2 Bla. Coln. 379; 6 Co. 59. See