The full significance of the clause "law of the land" is said by Ruffin, C. J., to be that statutes which would deprive a citizen of the rights of person or property without a reg ular trial according to the course and usage of the common law would not be the law of the land ; Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N. C. 15, 25 Am. Dec. 677. Mr. Webster's explanation of the meaning of these phrases in the Dart mouth College Case, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 L. Ed. 629, is: "By the of the land is more clearly intended the general law, a law which hears before it condemns; which pro ceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection of the general rules which govern society. Every thing which may pass under the form of an enactment is not, therefore, to be considered the law of the land.", General Principles. The adoption of the XIVth Amendment completed the circle of prothction against violations of the provision of Magna Carta, which guaranteed to the citizen his life, liberty and property against interference except by the "law of the land," which phrase was coupled in the Petition of Right with due process of law. The latter phrase was then used for the first time, but the two are generally treated as meaning the same. This security is provided as against the United States by the XIVth and Vth Amendments and as against the states by the XIVth Amendment; Davidson v. New Orleans, U. S. 97, 101, 24 L. Ed. 616, which declined to attempt its precise def inition ; Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405, 418, 9 Sup. Ct. 763, 33 L. Ed. 193; the su preme court has frequently declared in gen eral terms its appreciation of the value of this constitutional guaranty; Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 235, 244, 4 L. Ed. 559; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 370, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. •366, 389, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780. The meaning of the phrase is discussed generally in Kennard v.
Louisiana, 92 U. S. 480, 23 L. Ed. 478 ; Da vidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. Ed. 616; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265,'2 Sup. Ct. 569, 27 L. Ed. 552 ; Hagar v. Reclama tion District No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 4 Sup. Ct. 663, 28 L. Ed. 569 ; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U, S. 512, 6 Sup. Ct. 110, 29 L. Ed. 463 ; Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405, 9 Sup. Ct. 763, 33 L. Ed. 193 ; Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314, 13 Sup. Ct. 105, 36 L. Ed. 986. It does not refer to any gen eral system of law, but must be construed with reference to the historical developments of the law in each state ; Walker v. Sau vinet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. Ed. 678 ; Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U. S. 480, 23 L. Ed. 478; and it means achording to the system of law in each state and not any general one; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 93, 23 L. Ed. 678 ; Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U. S. 480, 23 L. Ed. 478 ; Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. Ed. 989; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 28 L. Ed. 232 ; In re Converse, 137 U. S. 624, 11 Sup. Ct. 191, 34 L. Ed. 796 ; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 11 Sup. Ct. 577, 35 L.' Ed. 225 ; McNulty v. California, 149 U. S. 645, 13 Sup. Ct. 959, 37 L. Ed. 882 ; but see Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378.
The prohibition applies to all instrumen talities of a state; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 17 Sup. Ct. 581, 41 L. Ed. 979 ; it is sufficient if the legislation is general, in its operation and enforceable by usual methods adapted to the case ; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 9 Sup. Ct. 231, 32 L. Ed. 623. What is due process of law in a particular state is regulated by the law of the state ; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. Ed. 678; although a state cannot make due process of law of anything which it chooses to declare such by its own legis lation ; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S.
97, 24 L. Ed. 616.
Due process of law means such acts of government as settled maxims of law and custom sanction and permit ; Ex parte Ah Fook, 49 Cal. 402; in the regular course of administration according to the prescribed forms ; Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 11 Am. Rep. 559 ; according to the law of the land ; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 93, 23 L. Ed. 678 ; Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U. S. 480, 23 L. Ed. 478 ; and with respect to taxation, as to which the question is so frequently rais ed, it has been said that the assessment of taxes is necessarily summary and need not be by judicial proceeding; so a levy by a collector under a state law is valid ; Da vidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. 5: 97, 24 L. Ed. 616 ; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251, where the subject is fully treated ; and taxation for railroad aid bonds.; Talcott v. Pine Grove, 1 Flipp. 120, 'Fed. Cas. No. 13,735 ; the clause has reference to the modes of ascertaining right% not to the objects and purposes of ft statute ; id.
Legislation is not open to, the charge of depriving one of his rights without due pro cess of law, if it be general in its operation upon the subject to which it relates and is enforceable by usual methods adapted to the nature of the case ; Dent v. West Vir ginia, 129 U. S. 114, 9 Sup. Ct. 231; 32 L. Ed. 623. As was said by Field, J., in Bar temeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 129, 21 L. Ed. 929: "No one has ever pretended, that I am aware of, that the XIVth Amendment interferes in any respect with the police power of the state." In that case it was held that the right to sell liquor, as far as it exists, is not a right growing out of citi zenship of the United States.
Tice Distinction Between the Two Amend ments. While the language of the Vth and XIVth Amendments is the same, yet as they were engrafted upon the Constitution at dif ferent times and under widely different cir cumstances, it may be that questions may arise in which different constructions and ap plications of their provisions may be proper; French v. Pay. Co., 181 U. S. 324, 328, 21 Sup. Ct. 625, 45 L. Ed. 879; citing Slaugh ter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. Ed. 394; then quoting from Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. Ed.' 616 as fol lows: "It is not a little remarkable that while this provision has been in the Con stitution of the United States, as a restraint upon the authority of the federal government for nearly a century, and while during all that time, the manner in which the powers of that government have been exercised has been watched with jealousy, and subjected to the most rigid criticism in all fts branch es, this special limitation upon its powers has rarely been invoked in the judicial forum or the more enlarged theatre of public discussion. But while. it has been a part of the Constitution, as a restraint upon the power of the states, only a very few years, the docket of this court is crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that state courts and state legislatures have de prived their own citizens of life, liberty or property without due process of law. There is here abundant evidence that there exists some strange misconception of the scope of this provision as found in the XIVth Amend ment." The court then stated that it would "proceed in the present case on the assump tion that the legal import of the phrase due process of law is the same in both amend ments." See Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 11 Sup. Ct. 825, 35 L. Ed. 419; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660, 10 Sup. Ct. 324, 33 L. Ed. 772; Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 14 Sup. Ct. 1114, 38 L. Ed. 1031.