It was not intended by the XIVth Amend ment to impose on the states, when exercis ing their power of taxation, any more rigid or stricter curb than that imposed on the federal government, in the exercise of a similar power by the Vth Amendment. French v. Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324, 329, 21 sup. Ct. 625, 45 L. Ed. 879. And in another case the court said: "It by no means follows that a -long and consistent construction put upon the Vth Amendment relating to public improvements within the District of Colum bia is to be deemed overruled by a decision concerning the operation of the XIVth Amendment as controlling state legislation." Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371, 384, 21 Sup. Ct. 616, 45 L. Ed. 900.
The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, protected by the XIVth Amendment, are those arising out of the na ture and essential character of the federai government, and granted or secured by the constitution; and due process of law and the equal protection of the laws are secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not sub ject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 382, 14 Sup, Ct. 570, 38 L. Ed. 485; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 535, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 28 L. Ed. 232 ; due process of law in the XIVth Amendment re fers to that law of the land in each state which derives its authority from the inher ent and reserved powers of the state ex erted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the basis of all our civil and political insti tutions; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 10 Sup. Ct. 930, 34 L. Ed. 519. It implies con formity with the natural and inherent prin ciples of justice and forbids the taking of One's property without compensation, and requires that no one shall be condemned in person or property without opportunity to be heard; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780; the proceedings need not be in a court of justice, but accord ing to the forms thereof ; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. Ed. 616. The proceedings must be appropriate to the case and just to the parties affbcted, and pursued in the ordinary manner and adapted to the end to be attained, with opportunity to be heard, when necessary, for the just protec tion of rights.; Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, 23 Sup. Ct. 20, 47 L. Ed. 70. See edito rial notes on What is Due Process of Law in 24 L. Ed. 436; 42 L. Ed. 865. Appropriate
regulation of property is not deprivation of due process of law ; Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521, 24 L. Ed. 734.
In of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 235, 4 L. Ed. 559, Johnson, J., says: "As to the words from Magna Carta incor porated in the constitution of Maryland, aft er volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the good sense of man kind has at settled down to thisil that they were intended to secure the in dividual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice." "Due process of law undoubtedly means, in. the due course of legal -proceedings, ac cording to those rules and forms which have been established for the protection of pri vate rights ;" • Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 209, 62 Am. Dec. 160; but not necessarily judicial proceedings ; it may include sum mary proceedings, if not arbitrary or un equal, as for collection of taxes ; McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37, 24 L. Ed. 335 ; nor is the right .of appeal essential ; where a statute has fixed the time and place of meet ing of any board or tribunal, no special no tice to parties interested is required ; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 23 Sup. Ct. 390. 47 L. Ed. 563.
Law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice is due process; and when secured by the law of the state, the constitutional requirement is satisfied ; Leep er v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 11 Sup. Ct. 577, 35 L. Ed. 225. The phrase as used in the constitution does not "mean a statute passed for the purpose of working the wrong. That construction would render the restriction ab solutely nugatory, and turn this part of the constitution into mere nonsense. The peop/d would be made to say to the two houses: 'You shall be vested with the legislative pow er of the state, but no one shall be disfran chised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges of a citizen, unless you pass a stat ute for that purpose. In other words, you shall not do the wrong unless you chose to do it ;' " per Bronson, J., in Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 140, 40 Am. Dec. 274. "The meaning of these words is that no man shall be deprived of his property without being heard In his own defence." Kinney v. Bever ly, 2 Hen. & M. (Va.) 318, 336.