It is not a public use to provide for fenc ing a large tract of land subject to floods which carried 'off the fences ; Scullietown Fence Co. v. McAllister, 12 Bush (Ky.) 312 ; or to acquire swamp land and build docks, warehouses, factories, etc. ; In re Eureka Basin Warehouse & Mfg. Co., 96 N. Y. 42 ; or to settle private controversies concerning title by transferring the land of one to an other ; Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 304, 1 L. Ed. 391; Lessee of Pickering v. Rut ty, 1 S. & R. (Pa.) 511. The latter cases arose under legislation to settle titles and adjust controversies in Pennsylvania under the Con necticut grant.
It is settled that the legislature cannot au thorize the taking of property for a private use, but the decisions conflict as to the case of private ways, or roads laid out under stat utes existing in many states. By many courts they are held unconstitutional as being a private use ; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 140, 40 Am. Dec. 274 ; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Ia. 540 ; Richards v. Wolf, 82 Ia. 358, 47 N. W. 1044, 31 Am. St. Rep. 501; Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 455, 13 Am. Rep. 399 ; Dickey v. Tennison, 27 Mo. 373 ; Crear v. Crossly, 40 Ill. 175; but in others such roads are held to be a public use, and the word private is construed as a word of • classification • and not technical or describing the use ; Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 241, 91 Am. Dec. 577 ; Mon terey County v. Cushing, 83 Cal. 507, 23 Pac. 700 ; In re Hickman, 4 Herring. (Del.) 580 ; Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Shaver va Starrett, 4 Ohio St. 494 ; Denham v. County Com'rs of Bristol, 108 Mass. 202 ; Appeal of Waddell, 84 Pa. 90 ; In re Killbuck Private Road, 77 Pa. 39; Perrin v. Farr, 22 N. J. L. 356.
The doctrine as to taking under this pow er for the assistance of private enterprise is thus stated: "The power of eminent domain cannot be constitutionally employed to en able individuals to cultiftte their land or carry on their business to better advantage even if the prosperity of the community will be enhanced by their success ; but when the public welfare depends upon an undertaking which cannot succeed without taking rightg in private land, the courts will allow such taking, especially if it is sanctioned by usage contemporary with the adoption of the con stitution." Nichols, Em. Dom. 274; People v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 4 Am. Rep. 400 ; Citizens' Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 655, 22 L. Ed. 455; Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. 127, 11 Am. Rep. 185.
"The taking by a state of the private prop erty of one person without the owner's con sent for the private use of another is not due process of law and is a violation of the fourteenth article of amendment of the con stitution of the United States." An act au thorizing a board of transportation to re quire a railroad corporation to grant to pri vate persons a location on the right of way of a railroad for the purpose of erecting a third elevator is invalid ; Missouri Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403, 17 Sup. Ct. 130, 41 L. Ed. 489. The prohibition is against taking without due process of law. So at the same term the court say: "There is no spe cific prohibition of the Federal Constitution which acts upon the states with regard to their taking private property for any but a public use ;" Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 17 Sup. Ct. 56, 41 L. Ed. 369.
What is a public use, for which private property may be taken by due process of law, depends upon the particular facts and cir cumstances connected, with the particular subject-matter. See notes on this subject in which the cases are collected ; 91 Am. Dec. 585.
What may be taken. Every kind of prop erty may be taken under this power. It "is attribute of sovereignty, and whatever exists in any form, whether tangible or intangible, may be subjected to the exercise of its pow er, and may be seized and appropriated to public• uses when necessity demands it." Lewis, Em. Dom. § 262; Metropolitan City Ry. Co. v. Ry. Co., 87 Ill. 317, 324 ; Alabama & F. R. Co. v. Kenney, 39 Ala. 307; New York, H. & N. R. Co. v. R. Co., 36 Conn. 196; Water Works Co. of Indianapolis v. Burk hart, 41 Ind. 364.; Eastern R. Co. v. Rail road, 111 Mass. 125, 15 Am. Rep. 13. The general rule to be gathered from all the au thorities, considered together, is, that a leg islative grant of power to condemn property, expressed in general terms, confers on the grantee power to take all kinds of property except property already devoted to public use and necessary for the exercise of such use ; 27 Cent. L. J. 207 ; it makes no differ ence whether corporeal property, as laud, or incorporeal, as a franchise, is to be affected; Bloodgood .v. R. Co., 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 51; Bonaparte v. R. Co., 1 Baldw. C. C. 205, Fed. Cas. No. 1,617 ; U. S. v. Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 668, 16 Sup. Ct. 427, 40 L. Ed. 576 ; see Lai isville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Chappell, Rice (S. C.) 383 ; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19, 35 Am. Dec. 466; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. R. Co., 17 Conn. 454, 44 Am. Dec. 556; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420, 9 L. Ed. 773 ; State v. Dawson, 3 Hill (S. C.) 109 ; Lexington & 0. R. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana (Ky.) 289, 33 Am. Dec. 497 ; Pocantico Water Works Co. v. Bird, 130 N. Y. 249, 29 N. E. 246 ; Turner v. Nye, 154 Mass. 579, 28 N. E. 1048, 14 L. R. A. 487; Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry. Co. v. Telegraph" Cable Co., 68 Miss. 806, 10 South. 74 ; Spring Valley Water Works Co. v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 28 Pac. 681.