deuce, see Gaunt v. State, 50 N. S. L. 491, 14 Atl. 600.
There are rules prescribing the limits and regulating the use of .these different instru ments of evidence, appropriate to each class.
In its nature, evidence is direct, or pre sumptive, or circumstantial.
Direct evidence is that means of proof which tends to show the existence of a fact in question, without the intervention of the Proof of any other fact.
It is that evidence which, if believed, es tablishes the truth of a fact in issue, and does not arise from any presumption. Evi dence is direct and positive when the very facts in dispute are sworn to by those who have the actual knowledge of them by means of their senses. 1 Stark. Ev. 19 ; Tayl. Ev. 84. In one sense, there is but little direct or positive proof, or such proof as is acquir ed by means of one's own sense; all other evidence is presumptive ; but, in common ac ceptation, direct and positive evidence is that which is communicated by one who has actual knowledge of the fact.
Extrinsic evidence is external evidence, or that which is not contained in the body of an agreement; contract, and the like.
It is a general rule that extrinsic evidence cannot be admitted to contradict, explain, vary, or change the terms of a contract or of a will, except in a latent ambiguity; or to rebut a resulting trust ; Mann v. Mann, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 1, 7 Am. Dec. 416; Spald ing v. Huntington, 1 Day (Conn.) 8. Ex cepting where evidence is admissible to vary a written contract on the ground that it does not represent the actual contract between the parties. See Wigram, Extrinsic Evi dence; 14 L. R. A. 459, note.
Presumptive evidence is that which shows the existence of one fact, by proof of the existence of another or others, from which the first may be inferred ; because the fact or facts shown have a legitimate tendency to lead the mind to the conclusion that the fact exists which is sought to be proved.
Presumptive evidence has been divided into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact.
Presumptions of law, adopted from mo tives of public policy, are those which arise in certain cases by force of the rules of law, directing an inference to be drawn from proof of the existence of a particular fact or facts. They may be conclusive or in conclusive.
Conclusive presumptions are those which admit of no averment or proof to the con trary. Thus, the records of a court, except in some proceeding to amend them, are con clusive evidence of the matter there record ed, being presumed to be rightly made up.
Inconclusive or disputable presumptions of law are those where a fact is presumed of mankind, or from policy, or from proof of the existence of certain other facts, until something is offered to show the contrary. Thus, the law presumes a man to be sane until the contrary appears, and to be inno cent of the commission of a crime until he is proved to be guilty. So, the existence of a person, or of a particular state of things, being shown, the law presumes the person or state of things to continue until something is offered to conflict with the presumption. See Best, Presumption, ch. ii.
But the presumption of life may be rebut ted by another presumption. Where a party has been absent from his place of residence for the term of seven years, without having been heard of, this raises a presumption of his death, until it is encountered by some ev idence showing that he is actually alive, or was so within that period.
Presumptions of fact are not the subjeCt of fixed rules, but are merely natural pre sumptions, such as appear, from common experience, to arise from the particular cir cumstances of any case. Some of these are "founded upon a knowledge of the human character, and of the motives, passions, and feelings by which the mind is usually influ enced." 1 Stark. Ev. 27.
They may be said to be the conclusions drawn by the mind from the natural con nection of the circumstances disclosed in each case, or, in other words, from circum stantial evidence.