Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts which usually attend other facts sought to be proved; that which is not direct evi dence. For example, when a witness testi fies that a man was stabbed with a knife, and that a piece of the blade was found in the wound, and it is found to fit exactly with another part of the blade found in the pos session of the prisoner, the facts are direct ly attested, but they only prove circumstanc es; and hence this is called circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence is of two kinds, namely, certain and uncertain. It is certain when the conclusion in question necessarily follows: as, where a man had received a mortal wound, and it was found that the im pression of a bloody left hand had been made on the left arm of the deceased, it was cer tain some other person than the deceased must have made such mark ; 14 How. St. Tr. 1334. But it is uncertain whether the death was caused by suicide or by murder, and whether the mark of the bloody hand was made by the assassin, or by a friendly hand that came too late to the relief of the de ceased.
Circumstantial evidence warrants a convic tion in a criminal case, provided it is such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt of the offence charged to the defendant, but it must always rise to that degree of. convincing power which satisfies the mind beyond reasonable doubt of guilt. This can never be the case when the evidence, as produced, is entirely consistent with innocence in a given transaction; Hayes v. U. S., 169 Fed. 101, 94 C. C. A. 449. When the evidence can be reconciled either with the theory of innocence or of guilt, the. law requires that the defendant be given the benefit of the doubt and that the theory of innocence be adopted; Vernon v. U. S., 146 Fed. 121, 76 C. C. A. 547, citing People v. Ward, 105 Cal. 335, 38 Pac. 945; Asbach v. Ry. Co., 74 Ia. 248, 37 N. W. 182; Smith v. Bank, 99 Mass. 605, 97 Am. Dec. 59. It is not a question of the weakest link of a chain, but the weakest strand of a rope cable ; Ex parte Hayes, 6 Okl. Cr. 321, 118 Pac. 609.
While it has thus been contended that, in order to justify the inference of legal guilt from circumstantial evidence, the existence of the inculpatory facts must be absolutely incompatible with the innocence of the ac cused; Wills, Cir. Ev. 300; Stark. Ey. 160; 1
Grim. L. Mag. 234 ; State v. Miller, 9 Houst. (Del.) 564, 32 Atl. 137 ; other writers have held that' the distinction between this species of evidence and that which is direct is mere ly one of logic, and of no practical signifi cance; that all evidence is more or less cir cumstantial; all statements of witnesses, all conclusions of juries, are the results of in ference; or as it was expressed by Gibson, C. J., "the difference being only in degree;" Corn. .v. Harman, 4 Pa.. 269. See U. S. v. Gibert, 2 Sumn. 27, Fed. Cas. No. 15,204 ; Com. v. Harman, 4 Pa. 269; Whart. Cr. Ev. § 10. Even in its strictest sense, circumstan tial evidence is legal evidence, and when it is satisfactory beyond reasonable doubt, jury is bound to act upon it as if it were the most direct ; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 13 ; 3 Rice, Ev. 544. See CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENCE.
Circumstantial evidence is sometimes used as synonymous with presumptive evidence, but not with strict accuracy; for presump tive evidence is not necessarily and in all cases what is usually understood by circum stantial evidence. The latter is that evi dence which tends to prove a disputed fact by proof of other facts which have a legiti mate tendency, from the laws oT nature, the usual connection of things, and the ordinary transactions of business, etc., to lead the mind to a conclusion that the fact exists which is sought to be established. See 1 Stark. Ev. 478 ; Whart. Ev. 1, 2, 15.
A writer on this subject, already quoted, thus states the distinction : the word pre sumption, eth vi termini, imports an inference. from facts known, based upon previous ex perience of the ordinary connection between the two, and, the word itself implies a cer tain relation between fact and inference. Circumstances, however, generally but not necessarily lead to particular inferences ; for the facts may be indisputable, and yet their relation to the principal fact may be only.
apparent, not real; and even where the con nection is real, the deduction may be errone ous. Circumstantial and presumptive evi dence differ therefore as genus and species. Will, Cir. Ev. 17.