Statutes providing for the revocation of licenses of physicians of bad moral character by state boards have been questioned as be ing ex post facto, but the case of People v. Hawker, 152 N. Y. 234, 46 N. E. 607, affirmed Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189, 18 Sup. Ct. 573, 42 L. Ed. 1002, is said to have set tled that they are not.; People v.. Reetz, 127 Mich. 87, 86 N. W. 396, affirmed Reetz v, Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 23 Sup. Ct. 390, 47 L. Ed. 563 ; Meffert v. Board of Medical Reg istration, 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 811, affirmed Meffert v. Packer, 195 U. S. 625, 25 Sup. Ct. 790, 49 L. Ed. 350. See POLICE Po WEIL Where an provided that one who has been convicted of crime shall no longer en gage in the practice of medicine, it was held not to be an additional punishment for past, offences or ex post facto, but that it sim ply prescribed the qualifications for the posi tion and the appropriate evidence of such qualification ; Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189, 18 Sup. Ct. 573, 42 L. Ed. pin.
Corporations cannot pass ex post facto by laws ; People v. Fire Dept., 31 Mich. 458.
Laws wider the following circumstances are to be considered ex post facto laws with in the words and intent of the prohibition: 1. Every law that makes an action done be fore the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action. 2. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed. 3. Every law that changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punish ment than the law annexed to the crime when committed (though it would be otherwise of a lqw mitigating the punishment ; 3 Story, Const. 212). 4. Every law that alters the le gal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender ; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 390, 1 L. Ed. 648. This con struction, it is said, "has been accepted and followed as correct by the courts ever since" ; Cooley, Const. Lim. 325 ; its substance re mains unchanged ; Com. v. Kalck, 239 Pa. 533, 87 AU. 61. See People v. McNulty, 93 Cal. 427, 26 Pac. 597, 29 Pac. 61; Com. v. Graves, 155 Mass. 163, 29 N. E. 579, 16 L.' R. A. 256.
This classification has been generally adopted as accurate and complete, but is not entirely so. Thus a law has been decided to be ex post facto which was intended to pun ish a criminal act, prosecution as to which was already barred by a statute of limita tions ; Moore v. State, 43 N. J. L. 203, 39 Am. Rep. 558 ; but an act which reduces a pun. ishment is not ex post facto as to crimes com mitted prior to its enactment ; People v. Hayes, 140 N. Y. 484, 35 N. E. 951, 23 L. It. A. 830, 37 Am. St. Rep. 572 ; State v. Kent, 65 N. C. 411; Dolan v. Thomas, 12 Allen (Mass.) 421; Mclnturf v. State, 20 Tex. App.
335. The statement under the fourth head also requires modification. Convictions un der changes in the rules of evidence have been held not unconstitutional ; Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 Am. Rep. 492 ; Jac quins v. Com., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 279 ; State v. Williams, 14 Rich. (S. C.) 281.; Mrous v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 597, 21 S. W. 764, 37 Am. St. Rep. 834; Maguiar v. Henry, 84 Ky. 1, 4 Am. St. Rep. 182 ; Robinson v. State, 84 hid. 452; Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 18 Sup. Ct. 922, 43 L. Ed. 204 ; though it seems to be settled that a law requiring a less degree of evidence cannot be applied to a. previous offence. But changes in the forms, in the manner of passing sentence, or the qualifications of jurors, do not fall with in the prohibition ; Cora. v. Phillips, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 28; Lybarger v.. State, 2 Wash. 552, 27 Pac. 449, 1029 ; In re Wright, 3 Wyo.. 478, 27 Pac. 565, 13 L. R. A. 748, 31 Am. St. Rep. 94 ;. City Council of Anderson v. O'Donnell, 29 S. C..355, 7 S. E. 523, 1 L. R. A. 632, 13 Am. St. Rep. 728; nor will a provision re ducing the number of peremptory challenges on a prosecution for a capital offence, though applied to cases where the offence was com mitted before the change was made ; Mathis v. State, 31 Fla. 291, 12 South. 681; South v. State, 86 Ala. 617, 6 South. 52; nor an amendment which confers jurisdiction in a criminal cause upon a division of the su preme court less in numbers and different in personnel from the court as organized wheli the crimp was committed ; Duncan v. Mis souri, 152 U. S. 377, 14 Sup. Ct. 570, 38 L. Ed. 485. A change of criminal procedure applied to the trial of crimes committed before it took effect is not ex post facto, unless it af fects some substantial right to which the accused was entitled when the alleged of fence was committed ; State v. Carter, 33 La. Ann. 1214 ; Kring v, Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 2 Sup. Ct. 443, 27 L. Ed. 506.
Statutes regulating procedure, if they leave untouched all the substantial protections with which existing law surrounds the per son accused of crime, are not within the con stitutional inhibition ; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. Ct. 570, 38 L, Ed. 485 ; Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 18 Sup. Ct. 922, 43 L. Ed. 204. A statute admitting evidence of a particular kind in a criminal case upon an issue of fact, which was not admissible under the rules of evidence at the time the offence was committed, is not em post facto; Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 18 Sup. Ct. 922, 43 L. Ed. 204 ; though in his classification of ex post facto laws Mr. Justice Chase, in Calder v. Bull, 3 Da11. (U. S.) 386, 1 L. Ed. 648, includes every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and re quires less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence in order to convict the offender.