In Missouri, after conviction of a capital offence and verdict set aside because of the admission of papers for comparison of hand writing merely, the legislature changed the law so as to admit such papers ; on a new trial, it was held merely a change of a rule of evidence, which could be applied in the trial of an offence committed before its enact ment ; Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 18 Sup. Ct. 922, 43 L. Ed. 204.
The supreme court of the United States has decided that a constitutional provision, requiring all grand and petit jurors to be qtalified electors, able to read and write, and enjoining on the legislature to provide by law for listing and drawing persons so qualified, but declaring that, until otherwise provided by law, all crimes should be tried as though no change had been made (Const. Miss. 1890), went into effect immediately on its adoption, so far as the qualifications of jurors were concerned; that one whb committed a crime after the adoption of the constitution, but before the legislature a new jury law, could be tried, after the passage of such a law, by a jury selected under its provisions ; and that, as the new law did not aggravate the crime previously committed, or inflict a greater punishment, or alter the rules of evi dence, its application to the trial of the ac cused did not make it an ex post facto law; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 16 Sup.
Ct. 904, 40 L. Ed. 1075. But where the consti tution of Utah provided for the trial in courts of general jurisdiction of criminal cas es not capital by a jury of eight, it was held en Post facto in its application to felonies committed before the territory became a state, because the constitution of the United States, gave the accused, at the time of the commission of the offence, the right to be tried by a jury of twelve persons, and made it unlawful to deprive him of his liberty ex cept by the unanimous verdict of such a jury; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343; 18 Sup. Ct. 620, 42 L. Ed. 1061.
For a review of the history of the en post facto clause of the constitution in connection with its adoption, and with its subsequent construction by the federal and state courts, see Bring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 2 Sup. Ct. 443, 27 L. Ed. 506.
See also In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 10 Sup. Ct. 384, 33 L. Ed. 835; Cooley, Const. LIM. ch. ix. ; Sto. Const. §§ 1345, 1373; Wade, Retro. L.; Pat. Fed. Eestr. ch. vi. ; Johnson, Ex Post Facto Laws ; Black, Const. Prohibi tions ; Pomeroy, Const. Law ; 4 L. Mag. & Rev., 4th 59 ; Savigny, Coml. Laws ; 22 Am. L. Rev. 523; Myer, Vested Rights; 3 L. R. A. 181, note ; 1 L. R. A. 632, note; Fisher, Evo lution of Const. ; RETROSPECTIVE.