HANDWRITING. Anything written by a person. The manner in which a person writes, including the formation of the char acters, the separation of the words, and oth er features distinguishing the written matter, as a mechanical result, from the writing of other persons.
That branch of the law of evidence which treats of handwriting is largely concerned with the determination of the genuineness or falsity of signatures. As to what constitutes a writing, generally, see that title, and, as to writing as required by the statutes of wills, see WILL.
With respect to proof of handwriting, a signature by a person unable to write, or, as it has been held, by one who can write, may be by mark, which is proved as the hand writing would be in case of a written signa ture. See Mean. The law pf evidence as to handwriting applies also where it is in a disguised hand; 4 Esp. 117; Cora. v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711; Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn. 55; or when a cipher is used ; Com. v. Nefus, 135 Mass. 533.
One's own testimony is not the best evi dence on this subject, and the writer need not be called; 2 Camp. 508 ; Ainsworth v. Greenlee, 8 N. C. 190 ; Lefferts v. State, 49 N. J. L. 26, 6 Atl. 521. See Cheritree v. Rog gen, 67 Barb. (N. Y.) 124. Whether it is evi dence at all is a question confused by the general disqualification of parties who were naturally in most cases those to whom the question would arise, and it has been of late assumed by many writers that since the statutes allowing parties to be witnesses they may be such, for this as well as any other purpose. See Hess v. State, 5 Ohio 5, 22 Am. Dec. 767; with note citing cases.
The handwriting of attesting witnesses to an instrument more than thirty years old need not be proved; Stark, Ev. Sharsw. ed. 521; so also of unattested documents taken from proper depositaries; 7 East 279 ; Good win v. Jack, 62 Me. 414. The extrajudicial admissions of a party as to his handwriting are evidence to prove the same, though not of a very satisfactory nature ; Whart. Ev. 705.
The rule in Steph. Dig. Evid. art. 31, was adopted in Redding v. Redding's Estate, 69 Vt. 500, 38 Atl. 230, as follows: One is deemed to be acquainted with the handwrit ing of another person when (1) he has seen him write, though but once and then only his name; or (2) when he has received let ters or other documents purporting to be written by that person in answer to letters or other documents written by the witness or under his authority and addressed to him; or (3) when he has seen letters or other documents purporting to be that person's handwriting, and has afterward personally communicated with him concerning their contents, or has acted upon them as his, he knowing thereof and acquiescing therein ; or (4) when the witness has so adopted them into business transactions as to induce a reasonable presumption and belief of genuineness; or (5) when, in the ofdinary course of business, documents purporting to be written or signed by that person have been habitually submitted to the witness.
That it is enough if the witness has seen the party write only once, see Pepper v. Barnett, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 405 ; Hideout v. Newton, 17 N. H. 71; Cora. v. Nefus, 135 Mass. 533 ; McNair v. Cora., 26 Pa. 388; Massey v. Bank, 104 Ill. 327; Riggs v. Powell, 142 Ill. 453, 32 N. E. 482; Worth v. McCon nell, 42 Mich. 473, 4 N. W. 198 ; 8 C. & P. 380. But it is held that "it is not enough that he (the witness) had seen the person write but once, and then under circumstanc es showing that the attention of the witness was not specially directed to the peculiarities of the penmanship"; U. S. v. Crow, 1 Bond 51, Fed. Cas. No. 14,895; People v. Corey, 148 N. Y. 476, 42 N. Es 1066.
Any person who has seen one write and has acquired a standard in his own mind of the general character of the writing is com petent to testify as to his belief of the genu ineness of a writing ; Succession of Morvant, 45 La. Ann. 207, 12 South. 349. Merely see ing the party write his surname once was held insufficient to warrant testifying to the full signature; 2 Stark. 164; but seeing the surname written several times was sufficient; Mood. & M. 39. See, Brachmann v. Hall, 1 Disney (Ohio) 539; Smith v. Walton, 8 Gill (Md.) 77. It is sufficient although the witness never saw the person write before the date of the papei• in question ; Keith v. Lothrop, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 453; or although he had not seen him write for many years before the trial; Edelen v. Gough, 8 Gill (Md.) 87 (three years) ; Maslin v. Thomas, 8 Gill (Md.) 18 (six years) ; 8 Scott 384 (ten years) ; 25 How. St. Tr. 71 (nineteen years) ; Willson v. Betts, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 201 (sixtY three years) ; but not that he has seen writ ing that is done with reference to his testi fying at the trial either at or before it ; Reese v. Reese, 90 Pa. 89, 35 Am. Rep. 634; Whit more v. Corey, 16 N. J. L. 267 ; with this ex ception the circumstances under which the witness has seen the party write affect his credit, not his competency ; Jones, Ey. § 559; Hammond v. Varian, 54 N. Y. 398; McNair v. Com., 26 Pa. 388; Corn. v. Nefus, 135 Mass. 533. Where the witness had seen an alleged testator write twice thirty-two years before, when the witness was then ten years old, and once twenty-three years before trial, he was undoubtedly within the rule. It is not possible to fix any arbitrary limit of time within which the witness must have seen the writing done ; much must always depend on his intelligence, his habit of observation of such matters, the apparent strength and con fidence of his memory, etc., which must be passed upon in the first instance by the trial judge ; Wilson v. Van Leer, 127 Pa. 371, 17 Atl. 1097, 14 Am. St. Rep. 854.