As to the second method it is not neces sary that the witness has seen the party write, as such personal acquaintance may be acquired by having seen papers purport ing to be genuine and which have been ac knowledged to be such by the writer ; Berg v. Peterson, 49 Minn. 420, 52 N. W. 37 ; Stod dard v. Hill, 38 S. C. 385, 17 S. E. 138; Wil liams v. Deen, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 575, 24 S. W. 536; Hammond v. Varian, 54 N. Y. 398; Ca barga v. Seeger, 17 Pa. 514 ; Pierce v. De Long, 45 Ill. App. 462; but this is not always sufficient ; McKeone v. Barnes, 108 Mass. 344. The witness is qualified, as such, by knowl edge derived from correspondence, including letters received from a person in answer to those written and addressed to him; Chaffee v. Taylor, 3 Allen (Mass.) 598; Pearson v: McDaniel, 62 Ga. 100; McKonkey v. Gaylord, 46 N. C. 94; Thomas v. State, 103 Ind. 419, 2 N. E. 808; Southern Exp. Co. v. Thornton, 41 Miss. 216; Violet v. Rose, 39 Neb. 660, 58 N. W. 216; Campbell v. Iron Co., 83 Ala. 351, 3 South. 369; Clark v. Freeman, 25 Pa. 133; Empire Mfg. Co. of Grand Rapids v. Stuart, 46 Mich. 482, 9 N. W. 527; Cunningham v. Bank, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 557; 5 A. & E. 740 ; but the mere receipt of letters is insufficient to prove that they were written by the per son purporting to sign them; White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Gordon, 124 Ind. 495, 24 N. E. 1053, 19 Am. St. Rep. 109; ther6 must be a ratification or recognition ; Cunningham v. Bank, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 557; Nunes v. Perry, 113 Mass. 274 ; Guyette v. Town of Bolton, 46 Vt. 228; Putnam v. Wadley, 40 Ill. 346; Sartor v. Bolinger, 59 Tex. 411; contra, 2 C. & K. 744; 2 C. & P. 21; but such knowledge may be gained in the ordinary course of business, as by seeing documents written by the person ; Cody v. Conly, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 313; Armstrong v. Fargo, 8 Hun (N. Y.) 175 ; Ennor v. Hodson, 28 Ill. App. 445 ; and only seeing letters addressed to strangers purporting to be those of the person in ques tion; Nunes v. Perry, 113 Mass. 275; Phila delphia & W. C. R. Co. v. Hickman, 28 Pa. 318.. Such knowledge may be that of a clerk who sees correspondence or documents; Rog ers v. Ritter, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 317, 20 L. Ed. 417 ; President, etc., of Amherst Bank v. Root•, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 522; 5 C. & P. 213 ; Reyburn v. Belotti, 10 Mo. 597; a clerk in a bank; Snell v. Bray, 56 Wis. 156, 14 N. W. 14 ; Johnson v. State, 35 Ala. 370; a servant who has taken his master's letters to the post ; 5 A. & E. 740 ; or a public officer who has seen many official documents filed in his of fice, signed by a justice, may prove his sig nature; Sill v. Reese, 47 Cal. 294; President, etc., of Amherst Bank v. Root, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 522; Rogers v. Ritter, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 317, 20 L. Ed. 417. The weight of the testimony will depend on the means of knowl edge; U. S. v. Gleason, 37 Fed. 331. The witness must have an opinion ; Fash v. Blake, 38 Ill. 363 ; and may give it if the handwriting is disguised ; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 301, 51 Am. Dec. 711; Burn ham v. Ayer, 36 N. H. 182; but positive knowledge or certainty is not necessary ; 8 Ves. 474; Egan v. Murray, 80 Ia. 180, 45 N. W. 563; Magee v. Osborn, 32 N. Y. 669 ; State v. Minton, 116 Mo. 605, 22 S. W. 808 ; he need not swear to belief, an opinion is suffi cient; Clark v. Freeman, 25 Pa. 133; Fash v. Blake, 38 Ill. 363. A witness has been permitted to testify that the signature was like the writing of the party whose signature it is alleged to be; 4 Esp. 37. An opinion of a witness cannot be based in part upon knowledge of and familiarity with the legal attainments, the style and composition of the alleged writer of the instrument in ques tion ; Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U. S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct. 474, 45 L. Ed. 663.
The witness in such cases need not be an expert; Moons' Adm'r v. Crowder, 72 Ala. 79 ; Williams v. Deen, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 575, 24 S. W. 536; or familiar with the person's handwriting generally if he is so with the signature; Com. v. Williams, 105 Mass. 62; as, e. g. he may prove the signature of a firm, when Unacquainted with the handwrit ing of any partner ; where he testifies that in his opinion, the handwriting was the same as that of many notes he had presented the firm, and which had been by them ; Gordon v. Price, 32 N. C. 385.
A signature upon an ancient writing may be proved by a witness who has become fa-1 miller with it by the inspection of other au-. thentic ancient documents on which the same signature appeared ; McCreary v. Coggeshall, 74 S. C. 42, 53 S. E. 978, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 433, 7 Ann. Cas. 693; Sill v. Reese, 47 Cal. 294; U. S. v. Ortiz, 176 U. S. 422, 20 Sup. Ct. 466, 44 L. Ed. 529; Sweigart v. Richards, 8 Pa. 436. If a witness says that he knows a party's handwriting, he is prima facie com petent to testify with respect to it and, if not cross-examined, his knowledge is taken to be admitted; Whittier v. Gould, 8 Watts (Pa.) 485; Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490, 28 Am. Dec. 317 ; Goodhue v. Bartlbtt, 5 McLean 186, Fed. Cas. No. 5,538; contra, Pate v. People, 3 Gilman (111.) 644 ; Mc Cracken v. West, 17 Ohio 16; he may be cross-examined as to the extent of his knowl edge; Herrick v. Swomley, 56 Md. 439; which goes to the weight of his testimony ;1 Moons' Adm'r v. Crowder, 72 Ala. 79. But if want of knowledge appear ; Guyette v. Town of Bolton, 46 Vt. 228; Arthur v. Ar thur, 38 Kan. 691, 17 Pac. 187; Allen v. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 367; or his testimony is insufficient ; Mapes v. Leal's Heirs, 27 Tex. 345 ; Cook v. Smith, 30 N. J. L. 387; 3 V. & B.
172 ; it may be rejected. But see Krise v. Neason, 66 Pa. 253. A witness may testify as to handwriting who cannot read or write himself ; Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 105.
A witness may be asked if he would act upon the signature which he testifies to as genuine; Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U. S. 150, 13 Sup: Ct. 288, 37 L. Ed. 118; contra, Bank of Com. v. Mudgett, 44 N. Y. 514 ; his knowl edge cannot be tested by irrelevant papers; Bacon v. Williams, 13 Gray (Mass.) 525; 11 A. & E. 322 ; Rose v. Nat. Bank, 91 Mo. 399, 3 S. W. 876, 60 Am. Rep. 258 ; Massey v. Bank, 104 Ill. 327; Bank of Com. v. Mudgett, 44 N. Y. 514. But see 2 M. & R. 536; Page v. Homans, 14 Me. 478; Kirksey v. Kirk sey, 41 Ala. 626; 1 Whart. Ev. § 10. But he may refresh his memory by reference to papers from which his knowledge is de rived ; Nat. Bank of Chester County v. Arm strong, 66 Md. 113, 6 Att. 584, 59 Am. Rep. 156 ; McNair v. Com., 26 Pa. 388 ; Redfards v. Peggy, 6 Rand. (Va.) 316.
The third method of proving handwriting Is what is termed comparison. It is defined to be a mode of deducing evidence of the authenticity of a w.ritten instrument, by showing the likeness of the handwriting to that of another instrument proved to be that of the party whom it is sought to establish as the author of the instrument in question. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 578.
Another much cited definition is "when other witnesses have proved the paper to be the handwriting of a party, and then the • witness on the stand is desired to take the two papers in hand, compare them, and say whether or not they rae the same handwrit ing ; the witness collects all his knowledge from comparison only; he knows nothing of himself; he has not seen the party write nor held any correspondence with him ;" Com. v. Smith, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 571.
But more briefly, though with great pre cision, Starkie says: "By comparison is meant a comparison by the juxtaposition of two writings in order, by such comparison, to ascertain whether both were written by the same person." Stark. Ev. Mete. ed. pt. 4, 654.
Scarcely any title of the law, certainly none in the law of evidence, has given rise to more discussion in England and in this country and the "confusion, obscurity, and contradiction" which is to be observed in the cases quite justifies the criticism of Woodward, J., in Travis v. Brown, 43 Pa. 9, 82 Am. Dec. 540, that much of the difficulty of the subject has arisen from the failure of judges to observe the essential rule "that terms be first correctly defined and then al- ... ways used in the defined sense." A very pregnant cause of. the confusion was the failure to preserve the distinction between comparison properly defined and the use of admittedly genuine signatures merely to en able a witness to refresh the memory as to his ideal standard formed by previous knowl edge of the handwriting of the person whose signature was in issue. The latter process is in no sense a proper application of the term comparison as understood in the law of evidence, though Often so used by judges. It is true, as said by Patteson, J., in Doe v. Suckermore, 5 A. & E. 703 (and repeated in almost the same words by Judge Woodward in the case just cited), that all evidence of handwriting, except in the single instance where the witness saw the document written, is in its nature, comparison of hands. It is the belief which the witness entertains, up on comparing the writing in question with the exemplar in his mind derived from some previous knowledge. This language aptly ex presses the idea which was in the mind of its author, but it has been quoted time and again by judges who apparently did not have clearly in mind the distinction which it was intended to emphasize and has con tributed, perhaps, not a little to the contin ued misuse of the word comparison in this connection. Where a witness testifies from the comparison (used in what might be termed the colloquial sense referred to by Justice Patteson) of the writing in question with a mental standard derived from pre vious knowledge of the handwriting, he is simply stating his opinion, not in the sense of opinion evidence, but based upon his own knowledge. When a witness examines the writing in question and, placing it in juxta position with other writings proved to be genVine, having no previous knowledge, and testifies to his belief from the similitude, or want of it, it is properly and technically, evi dence by comparison of hands. This distinc tion is stated in some very early cases ; Peake, N. P. 20; 21 How. St. Tr. 810; Rex v. Tanyd, cited McNally, Ev. 409. It is in this latter technical sense that the phrase comparison of hands is here used and the cases properly relating to the subject apply to the two questions: (1) whether such comparison may be made by the jury, genu ine writings, otherwise irrelevant, being ad mitted for that purpose ; (2) whether it may be made by expert witnesses and their con clusions proved for the information of the jury.
Such evidence was admissible in the' Ro man law ; 1 Whart. Ev. § 711, citing De Prob. de Lit. Comp. L. 20, c. iv. 21; Nov. 49, cap. 2; and also under the Code Napoleon, by three sworn experts appointed by the court, or agreed upon, and the writings must be executed before a notary or admitted; Gen. Code Proc. pt. 1, 1. 2, tit. 10, s. 200. At common law the genuineness of a con tested writing could not be proved by com parison, by a witness, of such writing with other writings acknowledged to be genuine ;