A careful examination of these cases, hovt ever, seems to lead to the conclusion that the court has not intended to alter or seri ously modify the effect of the Laidley Case, but that where the court apparently treated the decision of the state court as impairing the obligation of the contract, it did, in fact, treat the laAt decision of the court of last resort as a construction of the statute, which made that, and not the decision itself, an impairment of the contract. This view is confirmed by the language of McKenna, J., who delivered the opinion of the court in the Muhlker Case, where in his preliminary statement, he says, "the case is therefore pre sented to us as to the effect of the deed . . . as constituting a contract, and the effect of the act of 1892 as an impairment of that contract." In the Sauer Case, Moody, J., who delivered the opinion of • the court, said that "when the court of appeals has once interpreted the contract existing be tween the land-owner and the city, that in terpretation becomes a part of the contract upon which one acquiring land may rely; and that any subsequent change of it to his injury' impairs the obligation of the con tract." Presumably, as the question before the court was whether the statute had im paired the obligation of the contract, he must be understood as meaning any subsequent change by statute as interpreted by the court. But it is not left to inference what was actu ally meant by the court, since Justice Moody expressly states the question as a complaint, "that the lailo which authorized the construc tion of the viaduct, as interpreted by the court of appeals of New York impaired the obligation of the contract " This view of the effect of the Muhlker and Sauer Cases, as not to be considered as in any way con flicting with the Laidley Case, is also the conclusion reached in an instructive note on the subject in 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 500.
The supreme court has quite uniformly in other cases, as in the Laidley Case, refused to allow a writ of error to the state court, to reverse its decision, as impairing the ob ligation of a contract, on the general ground that the decision was not the "law" of the state, within the constitutional prohibition ; Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 177, 18 L. Ed. 381; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 7 Sup. Ct. 916, 30 L. Ed. 1059 ; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Refining Co., 125 U. S. 18, 8 Sup. Ct. 741, 31 L. Ed. 607; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 16 Sup. Ct. 80, 40 L. Ed. 91; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207, 16 Sup. Ct. 1023, 41 L: Ed. 132 ; Weber v. Rogan, 188 U. S. 10, 23, Sup. Ct. 263, 47 L. Ed. 363. In most if not all of the cases cited, the ground of dismiss ing the writ of error was that the decision did not of itself give jurisdiction, but only its construction of a state statute, as was also the case in Consumers' Co. v. Hatch, 224 U. S. 148, 32 Sup. Ct. 465, 56 L. Ed. 703. This construction of the term "laws" agrees with that of Story, J., in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 1, 10 L. Ed. 865, where he was considering the meaning of the term in sec tion 34 of the Judiciary Act. In a dissent ing opinion in Kuhn v. Coal Co., 215 U. S.
349, 371, 30 Sup. Ct. 140, 54 L. Ed. 228, Holmes, J., says : "Whether Swift v. Tyson can be reconciled with Gelpeke v. Dubuque, I do not care to inquire. I assume both cases to represent settled doctrines, whether reconciled or not." Numerous decisions confirm the view above expressed as to the precise effect of the rule of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, as understood by the supreme court, but only a few can be here referred to. It was said that the ment clause cannot be invoked against what is merely a change of decision in the state court, but only by reason of a statute enacted subsequently to the alleged contract which has been upheld or effect given to it by the state court; National Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Brahan, 193 U. S. 635, 24 Sup. Ct. 532, 48 L. Ed. 823. It is "definitely settled that the contract can only be . by some subsequent statute of the state which has been upheld or effect given it by the state court." McCullough v. Vir ginia, 172 U. S. 102, 116, 19 Sup. Ct. 134, 43 L. Ed. 382, citing the prior cases. "If the judgment of the state court gives no effect to the subsequent law of the state, and the state court decides the case upon grounds in-, dependent of that law," there is no federal case of Impairment of contract ; id.
"In order to come within the provision of the constitution of the United States, which declares that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, not only must the obligation of a contract have been impaired, but It must have been im paired by a law of the state. The prohibi tion is aimed at the legislative power of the state, and not at the decisions of its courts, or the acts of administrative, or executive boards or officers, or the doings of corpora tions or individuals;" New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Refining Co., 125 U. S. 18, 8 Sup. Ct. 741, 31 L. Ed. 607, per Gray, J., quoted with approval in Gulf. & S. I. R. Co. v. Hewes, 183 U. S. 66, 22 Sup. Ct. 26, 46 L. Ed. 86.
The law, as declared by a decision of the supreme court, when not a construction of a statute, does not enter into contracts made thereafter, and the subsequent reversal of the decision does not, therefore, impair the obligation of contracts; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 7 Sup. Ct.,: 916, 30 L. Ed. 1059 ; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 16 Sup. Ct. 80, 40 L. Ed. 91. See 2 Hare, Am. Const. L. 726.
"The constitutional inhibition applies only to the legislative enactments of the state and not to judicial decisions or the acts of state tribunals, or officers under statutes in force at the time of the making of the contract, the obligation of which is alleged to have been impaired." Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 273, 16 Sup. Ct. 1051, 41 L. Ed. 157; nor is there federal jurisdiction on this ground when the validity of the statute, under which the contract was made, is admitted and the only question is as to its construction by the state court ; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 16 Sup. Ct. 80, 40 L. Ed. 91, both of which cases are approved in Weber v. Rogan, 188 U. S. 10, 23 Sup. Ct. 263, 47 L. Ed. 363.