Impairing the Obligation of Con Tracts

ed, ct, sup, legislature, charter, co, court and rev

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There has been much discussion of the doc trine of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, of which a con siderable part has been based upon an as sumed inconsistency in the decisions of the United States supreme court in its treatment of the decisions of the state courts. This has led to difference of opinion as to the princi ple upon which the case was based. It is believed, however, that most, if not all, of this supposed inconsistency disappears under Careful analysis of the decisions of the su preme court here cited. For general discus sions the subject„ see White, "Gelpcke v.

Dubuque"; J. B. Thayer in 4 Harv. L. Rev. 311, and in 2 Cas. Cons. L. 1547; 14 Am. L. Rev. 211; 23 id. 190; 9 id. 381; 8 Harv. L. Rev. 328 ; Wambaugh, Study of Cases 78, 315 ; W. F. Dodd in 4 Ill. L. Rev. 155, 327; 5 L. R A. (N. S.) 860; 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1081.

One of the first applications of the doc trine of the impairthent of contracts was to the charter of a corporation in the Dart mouth College Case ; 4 Wheat 518, 4 L. Ed. 629; which held that the charter was a con tract the obligation of which could not after wards be impaired by the legislature with out the corporation's consent. Since then charters of incorporation which are granted for the private benefit or purposes of the corporation have always been held to be con tracts between the legislature and the cor poration, having for their consideration or liability the duties which the corporation as sumes by accepting them ; Cooley, Const. Lim. 279; Moraw. Priv. Corp. 1044; Hare, Am. Const. L. 421, 527 ; Hamilton Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258, 13 Sup. Ct. 90, 36 L. Ed. 963; and the doctrine is settled that charters of private corpora tions were within the constitutional guar anty ; The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 51, 18 L. Ed. 137; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 514, 7 L. Ed. 939; Piqua Branch of State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. (U. S.) 369, 14 L. Ed. 977.

To guard against the danger which the growth of great corporations, under the pro tection of this principle, has developed, the new constitutions of many of the states for bid the granting of corporate powers except subject to amendment and repeal. Provi sions of this sort have become so general that the effect of the doctrine that a state cannot pass an act impairing the obligation of a contract has been largely modified. The de cisions of the supreme court of the United States have also worked further modifica tions. The first was in the famous Charles

River Bridge Case in 1837, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420, 9 L. Ed. 773, where the court held that when the legislature had chartered a bridge company with the right to take tolls there was no implied contract that they would not charter another company to build a bridge alongside of the first which would in effect destroy the profits of the first by competition. The next modification was in the Granger Cases in 1876 ; 94 U. S. 113 to 187, 24 L. Ed. 77 to 97; which held that the regulation by the legislature of the rates to be charged by railroads and elevators was not an im pairment of the obligation of a contract. See also Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 12 Sup. Ct. 400, 36 L. Ed. 176. This doctrine having been carried to great lengths In allowing the legislature to regu late the rates to be charged, the supreme court has now modified the doctrine by de daring that the power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and that a legislature, un der the pretence of regulating fares and freights, cannot require a railroad to carry persons and property without profit ; Coving ton & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 TT. S. 578, 593, 17 Sup. Ct. 198, 41 L. Ed. 560.

In most if not all of the states there is when a charter of incorporation is granted, a reserved power, eitlir in the constitution or charter, to revoke, alter or repeal, and there has been much controversy and con trariety of decision as to how far this saves a legislative amendment from conflict with the impairment clause as applied to corpora tions under the Dartmouth College Case and those following it. While the reserved pow er to amend charters is subject to reasonable limitation, it includes any amendment which does not defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant or vested rights; Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45, 29 Sup. Ct. 33, 53 L. Ed. 81; Polk v. Life Ass'n, 207 U. S. 310, 28 Sup. Ct. 65, 52 L. Ed. 222 ; Wright v. Ins. Co., 193 U. S. 657, 24 Sup. Ct. 549, 48 L. Ed. 832. Provisions of a general law of a state for the creation of a new corporation on the reorganization of a railroad by a pur chaser at a foreclosure sale, do not constitute a contract within the impairment clause; Grand Rapidg & I. R. Co. v. Osborn, 193 T.J. S. 17, 24 Sup. Ct. 310, 48 L. Ed. 598, where it was said that the question was concluded by People v. Cook, 148 U. S. 397, 13 Sup. Ct. 645, 37 L. Ed. 498.

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