INFANT. One who is not of full age. In England and this country one under the age of twenty-one years. Co. Litt. 171. Under the common law full age was attained at twenty-one, and under the civil law at twen ty-five ; 1 Bla. Com. 463. This period is arbitrary and is fixed by 'statute. In the United States the common-law period has been generally adopted. In Louisiana and Texas the age of majority was twenty-one years as well under the early Spanish laws as under the common law ; Means v. Robin son, 7 Tex. 502.
But he is reputed to be twenty-one years old, or of full age, the first instant of the last day of the twenty-first year next before the anniversary of his birth; because, ac cording to the civil computation of time, which differs from the natural computation, the last day having commenced, it is con sidered as ended. Savigny, Dr. Rom. § 182; Wells v. Wells, 6 Ind. 447. Accordingly, a man is held entitled to vote on the day be fore the twenty-first anniversary of his birth ; State v. Clarke, 3 Harring. (Del.) 557; Hamlin v. Stevenson, 4 Dana (Ky.) 597. See AGE.
If, for example, a person were born at any hour of the first day of January, 1810 (even a few min utes before twelve o'clock of the night of that day), he would be of full age at the first instant of the thirty-first of December, 1830, although nearly for ty-eight hours before he had actually attained the full age of twenty-one years, according to years, days, hours, and minutes, because there is In this case no fraction of a day; 1 Sid. 162; 1 Kehl. 689; 1 Salk. 44, 625; Raym. 1094; 1 Bla. Cora. 463, 464; 1 Lilly, Reg. 57; I lorayns, Dig. Enfant (A) ; SavIg np, Dr. Rom. §§ 383, 384; 2 Kent 233. See ARE; FRACTION OF A DAY.
A curious case occurred In England of a young lady who was horn after the house-clock bad struck while the parish clock was striking, and before St. Paul's had begun to strike, twelve, on /he night of the fourth and fifth of January, 1805; the question was whether she was born on the fourth or fifth of January. Coventry gives It as hie opinion that
she was born on the fourth because the house-clock does not regulate anything but domestic affairs, that the parochial clock is much better evidence, and that a metropolitan clock ought to be received with "implicit acquiescence." Coventry, Ey. 182. It is conceived that this can only be prima facie; because If the facts were otherwise, and the paro chial and metropolitan clocks should both have been wrong, they would undoubtedly have had no effect In ascertaining the age of the child.
The sex makes no difference at common law; a woman is, therefore, an infant un til she has attained the age of twenty-one years ; Co. Litt. 161. It is otherwise, how ever, in some of the United States ; Steven son v. Westfall, 18 Ill. 209 ; Develin v. Riggs bee, 4 Ind. 464. In Idaho, act 1864, females come of age at the age of eighteen. The same rule exists in Vermont, Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas, Nebraska, Mary land, Missouri, Arkansas, California, 'Colo rado, Oregon, Nevada, and Washington; see 2 Kent 233 note ; Stevenson v. Westfall, 18 Ill. 209 ; Dent v. Cock, 65 Ga. 400 ; Spar hawk v. Buell's Adm'r, 9 Vt. 41; Cogel v. Raph, 24 Minn. 194; Parker v. Starr, 21 Neb. 680, 33 N. W. 424; Jackson v. Allen, 4 Colo. 263.
Before at full age, an infant may do many acts. A male at fourteen is of dis cretion, and may consent to marry ; and at that age he may disagree to and annul a marriage he may before that time have con tracted; he may then choose a guardian, and if his discretion be proved, may, at common law, make a will of his personal estate ; he may act as executor at the age of seventeen years; he may incur a liability in equity if he actually represented himself to be of full age and the party dealing with him was mis led; Pollock, Contr. 81; he cannot be ad judicated a bankrupt in the absence of an express representation to the creditor that he was of full age; id. 82.