On arriving at full age men are slut juris for all private purposes and also may vote and hold office except in cases especially otherwise provided for by law. See AGE.
A female at seven may be betrothed or given in marriage; at nine she is entitled to dower ; at twelve she may consent or dis agree to marriage; and, at common law, at seventeen she may act as executrix. At full age they may exercise all rights which be long to their sex. At common law the age of puberty was as above stated, fourteen for males and twelve for females, and this was taken from the civil law ; Inst. 1. 22; Bla. Com. 436. While this may have been fixed in the civil law with due regard to natural development in the climate where that law had its origin, the fact that it is not so in countries governed by the common law is recognized by statutes in many states chang ing the age of consent to marriage.
Considerable changes of the common law have taken place in many of the states. In New York and several other states an in fant is now deemed competent to be an ex ecutor; in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and other states, if an infant is named as ex ecutor in the will, administration with the will annexed will be granted during his minor ity, unless there shall be another executor who shall except, when the minor on arriv ing at full age may be admitted as joint executor ; Tyler, Inf. & Coy. 133.
As the services of an infant are held in law to belong to his parent, it is the gen eral rule that the infant cannot recover dam ages for their loss by reason of personal in jury during minority ; Clark Mile-End Spool Cotton Co. v. Shaffery, 58 N. J. L. 229, 33 Atl. 284; Farrar v. Wheeler, 145 Fed. 482, 75 C. C. A. 386 ; Comer v. Lumber Co., 59 W. Va. 688, 53 S. E. 8 Ann. Cas. 1105, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 552, and note, where the cases are collected at large. But where a child has been abandoned by his father at the age of nine years, he is emancipated and the father has lost the right to his services and millings; Swift & Co. v. Johnson, 138 Fed. 867, 71 C. C. A. 619, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1161; hence in a statutory action for a son's death for the sole benefit of the father, he could recover only .nominal damages.
As a general rule the law of the domicil of birth determines the age of majority; 2 Kent 233, where are also stated some quali fications of the rule. See Domien.
In general, an infant is not bound by his contracts, unless to supply him necessaries; Bacon, Abr. Infancy, etc. (I 3) ; 9 Viner, Abr. 391; 1 Comyias, Contr. 150, 151; Penrose v. Curren, 3 Rawle (Pa.) 351, 24 Am. Dec. 356; but see Vasse v. Smith, 6 Cra. (U. S.) 226, 3 L. Ed. 207 ; Horner v. Thwing, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 492 ; Vance v. Woid, 1 N. & McC. (S. C.) 197, 9 Am. Dec. 683 ; or unless, by some legislative provision, he is empowered to enter into a contract ; as, with the consent of his parent or guardian, to put himself ap prentice, or enlist in the service of the United States; Com. v. Murray, 4 Binn. (Pa.) 487, 5 Am. Dec. 412 ; McDonald v. Montague, 30 Vt. 357; but a contract of enlistment is not voidable like other contracts of an infant ; In re Morrissey, 137 U. S. 157, 11 Sup. Ct. 57, 34 L. Ed. 644. See ENLISTMENT. A dwell ing-house is not within the definition of nec essaries, so as to render an infant liable on a contract for its erection; Allen v. Larduer, 78 Hun 603, 29 N. Y. Supp. 213.
At common law, contracts for articles other than necessaries made by an infant, after full age might be ratified by him, and would then become In all respects binding. In England Lord Tenterden'e Act, II Geo. IV. c. 14, ˘ 6, required the ratification to be in writing. But now by the Infants' Relief Act, 1874, 87 & 38 Viet. c. 62, "All contracts entered Into by infants for the repayment of money lent, or to be lent, or for goods supplied, or to be supplied (other than contracts for necessaries), and all ac counts stated shall be absolutely void," and "no ac tion shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any promise made after full age to pay any debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratifi cation made after full age of any promise or con tratt made during infancy, whether there shall or shall not be any new consideration for such prom ise or ratification after full age." Contracts made with him are merely void able ; Holmes v. Rice, 45 Mich. 142, 7 N. W. 772 ; and may be enforced or avoided by him on his coming of age ; Vaughan v. Parr, 20 Ark. 600 ; New Hampshire Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Noyes, 32 N. H. 345 ; Peterson v. Laik, 24 Mo. 541, 69 Am. Dec. 441; Phipps v. Phipps, 39 Kan. 495, 18 Pac. 707; but must be avoided within a reasonable time ; Must ard v. Wohlford's Heirs, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 329, 76 Am. Dec. 209 ; Palmer v. Miller, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 399 ; Dolph v. Hand, 156 Pa. 91, 27 Atl. 114, 36 Am. St. Rep. 25. See Mette v. Feltgen, 148 Ill. 357, 36 N. E. 81. But to this general rule there may be an exception in case of contracts for necessaries ; because these are for his benefit. See NECESSARIES. Elrod v. Myers, 2 Head (Tenn.) 33; Sinklear v. Emert, 18 Ill. 63 ; Wilhelm v. Hardman, 13 Md.' 144; New Hampshire Mut. Fire Las. Co. v. Noyes, 32 N. H. 345 ; Merriam v. Cun ningham, . 11 Cush. (Mass.) 40; Sams v. Stockton, 14 B. Monr. (Ky.) 232 ; but an in fant is not liable upon a bill of exchange at the suit of an indorsee of the bill, although it was accepted for the price of necessaries ; [1891] 1 Q. B. 413 ; bills and notes of an in fant, whether negotiable or not, are voidable ; Fant v. Cathcart, 8 Ala. 725 ; State v. Plais ted, 43 N. H. 413 ; Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me. 517. The privilege of avoiding a Con tract on account of infancy is strictly per sonal to the infant, and no one can take ad vantage of it but himself ; Voorhees v. Wait, 15 N. J. L. 343 ; Smith v. Reid, 51 N. C. 494; Campbell v. Wilson, 23 Tex. 252, 76 Am. Dec. 67 ; Jones v. Butler, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 641; Alsworth v. Cordtz, 31 Miss. 32 ; Hooper v. Payne, 94 Ala. 223, 10 South. 431. See Bald win v. Rosier, 48 Fed. 810. When the con tract has been performed, and it is such as he would be compellable by law to perform, it will bind him; Co. Litt. 172 a. And all the acts of an infant which do not touch his in terest, but take effect from an authority which he has been trusted to execute, are binding; 3 Burr. 1794; Fonbl. Eq. b. 1, c. 2, § 5, note a The contracts of an infant, when not intrinsically illegal, are voidable, not void, and may be ratified by him upon arriving at maturity ; Kendrick v. Neisz, 17 Colo. 506, 30 Pac. 245 ; Holmes v. Rice, 45 Mich. 142, 7 N. W. 772 ; but not during his minority ; Lansing v. R. Co., 126 Mich. 663, 86 N. W. 147, 86 Am. St. Rep. 567; contra, Stafford v. Roof, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 626.