A jury cannot disregard an overwhelming mass of evidence of insanity on the part of the accused and convict him on a legal pre sumption of sanity ; State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 142 Pac. 641, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 545.
Side by side with this doctrine of the criminal law which makes persons, who from a medical point of view are considered insane, responsible for their criminal acts is another equally well authorized, viz.: that a kind and degree of insanity which would not excuse a person for a criminal act may render him legally incompetent for ths management of himself or his affairs ; Bellingham's case, 5 C. & P. 168. This implies that the mind of an insane person acts more clearly and deliberately, and with a sounder view of its relations to others, when about to commit a great crime than when buying or sell ing a piece of property. It is scarcely necessary to add that no ground for this distinction can be found in our knowledge of mental disease. On ths con trary, we know that the same person who destroys his neighbor, under the delusion that he has been disturbing his peace or defaming his character, may, at the very time, dispose of his property with as correct an estimate of its value and as clear an insight into the consequences of the act as he ever had. If a person is incompetent Co manage proper ty, it is because he has lost some portion of his mental power ; and this fact cannot be justly ig nored in deciding upon his responsibility for crim inal acts. Insanity once admitted, it is within the reach of no moftal comprehension to know exactly how far it may have affected the quality of his acts. To say that, possibly, it may have had no effect at all, is not enough: it should be proved by the par ty who affirms it. See Maudsley, Responsibility in Mental Disease 111.
By the French penal code there can be no crime nor offence if the accused were in a state of mad ness at the time of the act. Art. 64. The same pro vision was introduced into Livingston's Code and into the Revised Statutes of New York, vol. 2, 697. The law of Arkansas provides that a lunatic or insane person without lucid intervals shall not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor with which he may be charged ; Rev. Stat. 236. In New York, however, in spite of this clear and positive provision of law, the courts have always acted upon the doctrines of the common law, and instructed the jury respecting the tests of that kind of insanity which annuls criminal responsibility ; Freeman v.
People, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 27, 47 Am. Dec. 216. In this case, the court declared that the insanity mention ed in the statute means only insanity in reference to the criminal act, and therefore its qualities must be defined.
Civil The general principle governing the civil incapacity of a person of an unsound mind is that any civil act is in valid if the actor was at the time laboring under such mental defect as to render him incapable of performing the act in question, rationally and without detriment to any per son affected thereby.
The rule as to contracts is that insanity is such a defect as precludes rational assent, with respect to the nature of the contract, whether marriage, partnership; sale, or the like.
A judicial ascertainment of the insanity of a person is said to deprive him of con tractual capacity, as a matter of law, and subsequent contracts are void ; 4 Co. 123 b; Bac. Abr. Idiots and Lunatics (F.); Carter v. Beckwith, 128 N. Y. 312, 28 N. E. 582 ; Leon ard v. Leonard, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 280; Im hoff v. Witmer's Adm'r, 31 Pa. 243 ; but when no conservator was appointed and there was no appearance of incapacity, a Purchase was held valid; McCormick v. Lit tler, 85 Ill. 62, 28 Am. Rep. 610. See also 5 B. & C. 170; Sawyer v. Lufkin, 56 Me. 308; Richardson v. Strong, 35 N. C. 106, 55 Am. Dec. 430.
Such incapacity is not retroactive; Knox v. Knox, 30 S. C. 377, 9 S. E. 353; prior acts are not void but voidable; Jackson v. Gu maer, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 552; but the condition is conclusively presumed td continue, after the finding, until it is superseded; In re Otis, 101 N. Y. 580, 5 N. E. 571; People v. Tax Com'rs, 100 N. Y. 215, 3 N. E. 85; but see McCleary v. Barcalow, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 481; Reese v. Reese, 89 Ga. 645, 15 S. E. 846. A deed or mortgage executed by such person during the period of lunacy, as found, is voidable, the presumption being against validity, but subject to be overcome by proof of sanity ; Hughes v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. 446, 5 L. R. A. 637, 15 Am. St. Rep. 386; and see Mott v. Mott, 49 N. J. Eq. 192, 22 Atl. 997; 1 Gr. Ey. § 556. The fact that one who assigns a leasehold inter est is found to be a lunatic a few months later is only prima facie evidence of his in competency at the time of his assignment; Sbarbero v. Miller, 72 N. J. Eq. 248, 65 Atl. 472.