For other cases in which irresistible im pulse is regarded as a defence, see Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 485, 99 Am. Dec. 634 ; Black burn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 580, 21 L. Ed. 236; but it is held that no impulse, however irresistible, is a defence, where there is a knowledge as to the particular act between right and wrong ; State v. Brandon, 53 N. C. 463 ; State v. Miller, 111 Mo. 542, 20 S. W. 243; Lovegrove v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 491, 21 S. W. 191; People v. Clendennin, 91 Cal. 35, 27 Pac. 418; Thomas State, 71 Miss. 345, 15 South. 237; Patterson v. State, 86 Ga. 70, 12 S. E. 174 ; Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106, 28 S. W. 312 ; Tayl. Med. Jur. 720; and that it was a crime morally, and punishable by the laws of the country ; State v. Alexander, 30 S. C. 74, 8 S. E. 440, 14 Am. St. Rep. 879; Williams v. State, 50 Ark. 511, 9 S. W. 5.
As a perfectly natural outgrowth of the doctrine of irresistible impulse, there is to be found in the American cases a tendency more noticeable in late years, to add an ad ditional qualification to the right and wrong test. These cases hold, not merely that the accused, to be considered accountable, must be able to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to the act in question, but must have sufficient mental power to con trol his impulses.
As the theory of irresistible impulses owes much of its development to the courts of Pennsylvania, so also has this correlative doctrine of the necessity of power to control it received great attention in that state. In Mosler's case, 4 Pa. 264, Gibson, C. J., said: "His insanity must be so great as entirely to destroy his perception of right and wrong; and it is not until that perception is thus de stroyed that he ceases to be responsible. It must amount to delusion or hallucination, controlling his will and making the commis sion of the act, in his apprehension, a duty of overruling necessity. The law is, that, whether the insanity be general or partial, the degree of it must be so great as to have controlled the will of its subject, and to have taken from him the freedom of moral ac tion." And this language is repeated in Ort wein's case, 76 Pa. 414, 18 Am. Rep. 420, by Agnew, C. J., who declares it to be the law of the state. The essential relation of power to such cases is thus put, in Haskell's case, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 491, by Brewster, J.: "A re view of all the authorities I have been able to examine satisfies me that the true test in all these cases lies in the word `power.' Has the defendant in a criminal case the power to distinguish right frpm wrong, and the power to adhere to the right and avoid the wrong? In these cases has the defendant, in addition to the capacities mentioned, the power to govern his mind, his body, and his estate? If he possess this power over his imagination he will be able to expel all delu sive images, and the like control over his will would subdue all homicidal and other monomania. . . . I use the word power
with reference to that control which human ity can expect from humanity." Other cases supporting this view are, Smith v. Cora., 1 Duv. (KY.) 224; Cora. v. Rogers, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458.
Other cases seem to hold that one men tally disordered, though knowing right and wrong, and that the act is forbidden and punishable, is criminally responsible whether he has power over his conduct or not; Walk er v. People, 26 Hun (N. Y.) 67; Flanagan v. People, 52 N. Y. 467, 11 Am. Rep. 731; People v. Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 238, 6 N. E. 584 ; Anderson v. State, 42 Ga. 9; Brinkley v. State, 58 Ga. 296 ; People v. Hoin, 62 Cal. 120, 45 Am. Rep. 651; State v. Murray, 11 Or. 413, 5 Pac. 55; State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 43 N. W. 62; State v. Pratt, Houst. Cr. Cas. (Del.) 249; State v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, 4 S. W. 931. Though a crime is com mitted through lack of sufficient will power to control the conduct, and under an irresist ible and uncontrollable impulse, the offender is responsible for the act ; State v. Miller, 111 Mo. 542, 20 S. W. 243. In discussing this class of cases Bishop considers that a doc trine that "our law punishes any man for what he does under a necessity which it is impossible for him to resist," would be an "unprecedented horror." He assumes that the cases which appear to hold it a:re to be explained upon the theory that the judges do not believe in the existence of an irresist ible or uncontrollable impulse. He him self does not assume to know whether as a fact there is, but as the experts assert it, he deems it to be the duty of a judge, where there is evidence tending to support the the ory, to submit it to the jury and cast the responsibility upon them. 1 Bish. N. Cr. L. § 383 b, 387.
To this remarkable diversity of views may be attributed, in some measure, no doubt, the actual diversity of results. To any one who has followed with some attention the course of criminal justice in trials where insanity has been pleaded in defence, it is obvious that, if some have been properly convicted, others have just as improperly been acquitted. It must be admitted, how ever, that the verdict in such cases is often determined less by the instructions of the court than by the views and feelings of the jury and the testimony of experts.