It has been held that death was not the result of accident within the meaning of the policy where it was occasioned by epilepsy ; Tennant v. Ins. Co., 31 Fed. 322 ; sunstroke ; 3 El. & El. 478 ; rupture caused by jumping from a train where nothing unforeseen hap pened from the time the insured left the platform to the time he alighted on the ground ; Southard v. Assur. Co., 34 Conn. 574, Fed. Cas. No. 13,182 ; United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 755, 33 L. Ed. 60.
Where the insured was assassinated, there could be no recovery under a policy which excepted death or injury inflicted by design of himself or another ; Travellers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661, 8 Sup. Ct. 1360, 32 L. Ed. 308 ; Hutchcraft's Ex'r v. Ins. Co., 87 Ky. 300, 8 S. W. 570, 12 Am. St. Rep. 484; but where the death was the result of an accident, the fact that the negligence of the assured may have contributed to it is no defence in the absence of an express stip ulation in the policy to that effect ; Schneid er v. Ins. Co., 24 Wis. 28, 1 Am. Rep. 157 Providence Life Ins. & Inv. Co. of Chicago v. Martin, 32 Md. 310 ; Champlin v. Assur. Co., 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 71.
Accident policies usually cover the risk incident to a specific occupation, a substan tial change of which will, if it increase the .risk, render the policy void. Such a stip ulation is held to mean engaging in another employment as a usual business ; Provident Life Ins. Co. v. Fennell, 49 Ill. 180'; but it was not such a change for a school teacher while disengaged to be employed in building operations ; id.; or for one to engage in pitching hay while visiting his grandfather ; North American Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. 43, 8 Am. Rep. 212 ; or for a locomotive engineer to climb over the tender to apply the brakes on a car ; Provi dence Life Ins. Co. & Investment Co. of Chi cago v. Martin, 32 Md. 310. In all such cas es the question what is a substantial change of occupation is to be left to the jury ; Stone's Adm'rs v. Casualty Co., 34 N. J. L. 371.
The expression "voluntary exposure to un necessary danger," used in stating the ex ceptions to the liability of an insurance com pany upon an accident policy, refers only to dangers of a real and substantial character which the insured recognized, but to which he, nevertheless, purposely and consciously exposed himself, intending at the same time to assume all the risks of the situation. Vol untary riding upon the platform of a rapid ly moving railroad car is not, of itself and as a matter of law, a voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger and presents a question of fact for the jury. Where an accident in surance policy exempts the insurer from lia bility for injuries received while violating rules of a corporation, the question is for the jury as to whether the insured knew of a rule of the corporation which he is alleged to have violated, and_the court should charge that in order to bind insured, it must be one which the corporation enforced or used rea sonable effort to enforce:. Travellers' Ins.
Co. v. Randolph, 78 Fed. 754, 24 C. C. A. 305; opinion by Harlan, J., considering all the cases at length ; and see 7 Am. L. Rev. 590, where the question whether death from freezing while climbing Mount Blanc was or was not, a voluntary exposure to unnecessa ry danger was discussed with reference to a case in which the point was raised but not settled, the suit being compromised.
In an exception prohibiting exposure to obvious or unnecessary danger and requiring diligence on the part of the assured, there can be no recovery where death was caus ed by being struck by a railroad train while running along the tracks in front of it in the night-time for the purpose of getting on a train approaching in an opposite direc tion on a parallel track ; Tuttle v. Ins. Co., 134 Mass. 175, 45 Am. Rep. 316 ; nor where it was caused by falling from the plat form of a railroad car between eleven and twelve o'clock at night when the train was in motion ; Sawtelle v. Pass. Assur. Co., 15 Blatchf. 216, Fed. Cas. No. 12,392 ; or from unnecessarily passing on a dark and rainy night over a trestle known to be dangerous with two packages in his hands, although it was the usual route home of the assured and many others; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Jones, 80 Ga. 541, 7 S. E. 83, 12 Am. St. Rep. 270 ;1 or where a shop hand of a railway company went on the platform when the train was in motion to leave the train when it should stop to cross over by a switch to another track (the exception not being applicable to the exposure of railway employs in the per formance of their duty); Hull v. Acc. Ass'n, 41 Minn. 231, 42 N. W. 936 ; but where the insured by a voluntary act exposed himself to a hidden danger, the existence of which he had no reason to suspect, and thereby lost his life, his death was caused by accident and the company is liable ; Burkhard v. Ins. Co., 102 Pa. 262, 48 Am. Rep. 205; a clause prohibiting voluntary exposure to unnecessa ry danger does not prohibit one from walking or being on a railway bridge or road-bed; Traders' & Travelers' Acc. Co. v. Wagley, 74 Fed. 457, 20 C. C. A. 588 ; Lehman v. Indem nity Co., 7 App. Div. 424, 39 N. Y. Supp. 912 ; see also where a passenger is overcome by the heat of the car, or nausea, and goes upon the platform ; Marx v. Ins. Co., 39 Fed. 321; or getting from the platform at a depot up on the cars while in motion at a rate of speed less than that of a man walking ; Schneider v. Ins. Co., 24 Wis. 28; going to the rescue of a shipwrecked crew, although the policy prohibited the insured from engaging in the business of wrecking ; Tucker v. Ins. Co., 50 Hun 50, 4 N. Y. Supp. 505. Playing indoor baseball is not a voluntary exposure to dan ger ; Hunt v. Accident Ass'n, 146 Mich. 521. 109 N. W. 1042, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 938, 119 Am. St. Rep. 655, 10 Ann. Cas. 449.