The exception against death or injury hap pening while the insured was intoxicated, or in consequence thereof, prevents a recovery, without reference to the question whether the condition was the cause of the injury or not ; Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones, 94 Ala. 434, 10 South. 530; Shader v. A.ssur. Co., 66 N. Y. 441, 23 Am. Rep. 65 ; as, where the deceased, being under the Influence of liquor, was killed by a pistol shot while dining with a friend ; id. To be under the influence of intoxicating liquor within ,the meaning of such exception means to have drunk enough to disturb the action of the mental and physical faculties so that they are no longer in their normal condition; id.; the expression is equivalent to "intoxicated" ; Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones, 94 Ala. 434, 10 South. 530.
Where the death was caused by inadvert ently taking an overdose of opium which had been prescribed by a physician, it was held within the exception of any death caus ed wholly or in part by medical treatment for disease; Bayless v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 14 Blatchf. 143, Fed. Cas. No. 1,138.
The question frequently arises what is total disability for which the policy entitles the insured to claim indemnity. In an Eng lish case in which this question was much discussed, it was held that a solicitor who had sprained his ankle on horse ' back and was under the care of a surgeon for six weeks, unable to leave the house or trans act business which could not be attended to in the house, but could write letters, read law, and the like while lying on a couch, was not totally disabled; 5 H. & N. 546. This judgment was affirmed in Exchequer Cham ber. The provision in this and similar cases is usually for a weekly allowance in case of accident causing any bodily injury of so se rious a nature as wholly to disable the in sured from following his business. Under such a clause total disability to labor must be shown ; Rhodes v. Ins. Co., 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 'Ti; by it is meant disability from doing sub stantially all kinds of the plaintiff's accus tomed labor to some extent, and that the as sured must be deprived of the power to do to any extent substantially all the kinds of his usual labor ; 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 233 ; where the provision was for total disability there could be no recovery if the assured were able to do some parts of the accustomed work pertaining to his business or, if totally disabled in his own pursuit, he shcaild be able to engage in some other ; Lyon v. Assur. Co., 46 Ia. 631.
Where the provision was that the injured must be "wholly disabled to prevent him from the prosecution of any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation," it was held error to instruct the jury that the defendant was to pay the amount agreed, if by the accident the plaintiff had been dis abled in any way from prosecuting the busi ness in which he was engaged, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for such time as he was "rendered wholly unable to do his accustomed labor, that is, to do substantial ly all kinds of his accustomed labor to some extent ;" Saveland v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co., 67 Wis. 174, 30 N. W. 237, 58 Am. Rep. 863.
It has been held that the meaning of the word accident, as used in a policy, is for the jury, as it is also to determine whether there was exposure to unnecessary danger ; Travelers' Preferred Acc. Ass'n v. Stone, 50 Ill. App. 222 ; • or whether the total loss of three fingers and a part of another on the same hand, destruction of the thumb, and a cutting of the hand is a losi of the hand causing "immediate, continuous, and total disability" within the meaning of that clause in an accident insurance policy ; Lord v. Acc. Ass'n, 89 Wis. 19, 61 N. W. 293, 26 L. R. A. 741, 46 Am. St. Rep. 815; and see Sneck v. Ins. Co., 88 Hun 94, 34 N. Y. Supp. 545, where the plaintiff's hand was cut off a short distance above the knuckles, leaving nearly the whole palm and part of the second joint of the thumb, and it was held to be a loss of the entire hand within the meaning of the policy ; overruling Sneck v. Ins. Co., 81 Hun 331, 30 N. Y. Supp. 881. See REPRESENTA TION ; ACT OF GOD.
A provision in a policy that the medical adviser of the insurer may examine the body of the insured or attend any post mortem examination which may be held, only au thorizes examination of the body unburied and does not warrant exhumation and au topsy, nor does an exception of injuries of which there is no visible mark ; Wehle v. Ace. Ass'n, 11 Misc. 36, 31 N. Y. Supp. 865.
See, generally, Cook, L. & Ace. Ins.; Nib lack, Mut. Ben. & Ace. Insurance.
Casualty Insurance. A contract by which a person is indemnified against loss or age to property, occasioned by accident. The term is thus applied in contradistinction to accident insurance by the Massachusetts Su preme Court, in Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Merrill, 155 Mass. 404, 29 N. E. 529. The question was whether a foreign com pany licensed to do business in the state, but by statute restricted to one kind or class of business, was authorized to issue policies cov ering special classes of accidents, involving bodily injury and death. In this connection the court said: "The distinguishing feature of what is known in our legislation as 'acci dent insurance' is that it indemnifies against the effects of accidents resulting in bodily injury or death. Its field is not to insure against loss or .damage to property, although occasioned by accident. So far as that class of insurance has been developed, it has been with reference to boilers, plate glass, and perhaps to domestic animals and injuries to property by street cars, and is known as 'cas ualty insurance.' " The distinction is founded in reason and the terminology is well adapted to the sub ject. Its precision is in sharp contrast to the vagueness and want of definiteness which characterize the references of text writers and judges to the various forms of insurance which have come into use with the increase in number of perils to life and property.