INTERLINEATION. Writing between two lines.
Interlineations are made either beYore ? or alter the execution of an instrument. Those made before should be noted previously to its execution ; those made after are made ei ther by the party in whose favor they are, or by strangers.
When made by the party himself, whether the interlineation be material or immaterial, they render the deed void ; Cutts v. U. S., 1 Gall. 71, Fed. Cas. No. 3,522 ; Hunt v. Gray, 35 N. J. L. 227, 10 Am. Rep. 232 ; un less made with the consent of the opposite party. See 11 Co. 27 a; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Mass. 307, 6 Am. Dec. 67 ; Jackson v. Malin, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 293; President and Direc tors of Cumberland Bank v. Hall, 6 N. J. L. 215. But see Wicke's Lessee v. Caulk, 5 H. & J. (Md.) 41; McMicken v. Beauchamp, 2 La. 290; 4 Bingh. 123; Arrison v. Harm stead, 2 Pa. 191. See Express Pub. Co. v. Aldine 'Press, 126 Pa. 347, 17 Atl. 608.
When the interlineation is made by a stranger to an instrument in the hands of the promisee, though without his knowledge, if it be immaterial, it will not vitiate the in strument, but if it be material, it will, in gen eral, avoid it ; 11 Co. 27 a; L. R. 10 Ex. 330 ; see Murray v. Peterson, 6 Wash. 418, 33 Pac. 969 ; otherwise if the instrument be not then in the possession of a party ; 6 East 309. If made while in the possession of an agent of the promisee, it avoids the instrument ; L. R. 10 Ex. 330 ; contra, Hunt v. Gray, 35 N. J. L. 227, 10 Am. Rep. 232. The insertion of the words "or order" without the consent of the maker constitutes a material alteration which avoids the note ; Taylor v. Moore (Tex.) 20 S. W. 53. An interlineation made in a bond, after its execution, by an agent of the obligee, without authority, will not in validate it, but is only an act of spoliation; White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Dakin, 86 Mich. 581, 49 N. W. 583, 13 L. R. A. 313.
The decisions vary as to the effect of in terlineations, when an instrument is put in evidence. In a late case the rule is stated thus: If the interlineation is in itself suspicious, as, if it appears to be contrary to the prob able meaning of the instrument as it stood before the insertion of the interlined words; or if it is in a handwriting different from the body of the instrument, or appears to have been written with different ink, in all such cases, if the court considers the inter lineation suspicious on its face, the presump tion will be that it was an unauthorized al teration after execution. On the other hand, if the interlineation appears in the same handwriting with the original instrument, and bears no evidence on its face of having been made subsequent to the execution of the instrument, and especially if it only makes clear what was the evident intention of the parties, the law will presume that it was made in good faith, and before execution ; Cox v. Palmer, 3 Fed. 16. See Zimmerman v. Camp, 155 Pa. 152, 25 Atl. 1086. Where in terlineations in a deed are in the handwrit ing of the officer who attested it officially, the presumption is that they were made at or before the execution of the instrument ; Bedgood v. McLain, 89 Ga. 793, 15 S. E. 670 ;
but it has been held that an alteration ap pearing on the face of a deed is presumed to have been made after its execution, and the burden is upon the party presenting it to ex plain the alteration ; Sisson v. Pearson, 44 Ill. App. 81.
If an instrument appears to have been al tered, it is incumbent on the party offering it to explain its appearance. Generally speaking, if nothing, appears to the contrary, the alteration will be presumed to be con temporaneous with the execution of the in strument ; but if there is ground of suspicion, the law presumes, nothing, but leaves the questions of the time when, the person by whom, and the intent with which it was done, to the jury, upon proofs to be adduced by the party offering the instrument ; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 564 ; Stillwell v. Patton, 108 Mo. 352, 18 S. W. 1075 ; Martin v. Kline, 157 Pa. 473, 27 Atl. 753 ; Houston v. Jordan, 82 Tex. 352, 18 S. W. 702. See De Long v. Sou cie, 45 Ill. App: 234. In cases of negotiable instruments, the holder is held to clearer proof than in cases of deeds; 2 Dan. Neg. Instr. § 1417. See Wilson v. Hayes, 40 Minn. 531, 42 N. W. 467, 4 L. R. A. 196, 12 Am. St. Rep. 754. In a carefully considered case, Beaman's Adm'rs v. Russell, 20 Vt. 205, 49 Am. Dec. 775, the court adopt what it calls the old common-law rule that an alteration of an instrument, if nothing appear to the contrary, should be presumed to have been made at the time of the execution. So, also, 1 Shepl. 386 ; Rankin v. Blackwell, 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 198 ; contra, Hills v. Barnes, 11 N. H. 395 ; Cochran v. Nebeker, 48 Ind. 459. It has been held, when a, place of payment was inserted, that it was a question for the jury, but that it lay on the plaintiff to ac count for the alteration, etc.; 6 C. & P. 273 ; Davis v. Carlisle, 6 Ala. 707 ; such an inser tion after delivery is a material alteration; Winter v. Pool, 100 Ala. 503, 14 South. 411; Gwin v. Anderson, 91 Ga. 827, 18 S. E. 43. But in Hayden v. Goodnow, 39 Conn. 164, it was held that the burden of proof of ac counting for an alteration is not necessarily on the party producing the instrument. See Sisson v. Pearson, 44 I11, App. 81.
In Neil v. Case, 25 Kan. 510, 37 Am. Rep. 259, it was held that a negotiable note offered in evidence, bearing on its face an apparent material alteration, is admissible in evidence, and the question as to the time of alteration is for the jury. The court said: If there is neither extrinsic nor intrinsic evidence as to when the alteration was made, it is to be presumed that it was made before or at the time of the execution. Perhaps there might be cases where the alteration is attended with such manifest circumstances of suspi cion that the court might refuse to allow the note to go to the jury without some explana etc. This title is fully treated in a note in 37 Am. Rep. 260. As to alteration of nego tiable instruments, see 7 Harv. Law Rev. 1. See ALTERATION; ERASURE.