JOINT TO RT F EASO RS. Wrongdoers; two or more who commit a tort.
When several persons join in an offence or injury, they may generally be Sued joint ly, or tiny number less than the whole may be sued, or each one may be sued separate ly; Williams v. Sheldon, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 654. Each is liable for himself, because the entire damages sustained were occasioned by each, each sanctioning the acts of the others, so that by suing one alone, he is not charged beyond his just proportion. Any number less than the whole may be sued, because each is answerable for his companion's acts. This a joint action may be brought against several for an assault and battery, or for composing and publishing a libel; 2 Sound. 117 a; Bacon, Abr. Actions in General (C) ; Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyl. (Vt.) 129, 4 Am. Dec. 728.
But to this rule that for a joint injury a joint action may be brought, there is an exception, namely, that no joint action can be maintained for a joint slander; this ex ception seems to proceed upon the ground that each man's slander is his own, and it cannot by any means be considered that of another. Although this exception appears to be fully established, yet it is difficult to see the reason of it; when one of several trespassers gives the blow, he is considered as acting for the others, and, if they acted jointly, they may be jointly sued; why not consider the speaker, when acting in concert with others, as the actor for the whole in uttering the words? The blow is no more that of the person who did not give it than the words are the words of him who only united with the other in an agreement that they should be spoken. In either case, upon principle, the maxim, qui tacit per alium facit per se, ought to have its force. Such however, is not the law.
Where a person is injured by a joint tort and accepts satisfaction from one of the wrongdoers, he cannot sue the other ; Spurr v. R. Co., 56 N. J. L. 346, 28 Atl. 582.
A railroad company may be sued jointly with the servant whose negligence caused the injury, although it was not independent ly at fault ; Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Houchins, 121 Ky. 526, 89 S. W. 530, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 375, 123 Am. St. Rep. 205.
A covenant not to sue one of two joint tortfeasors does not operate as a release of the other from liability ; [1892] 2 Q. B. 511; nor does the dismissal of an action against one, with the execution, for a valuable con sideration, of an agreement not to sue him, release the Other ; City of Chicago v. Bab
cock, 143 Ill. 358, 32 N. E. 271; nor does the fact that where property is jointly con verted by two persons, and one of those con verting accounts to the owner, who accepts part of the proceeds, remove the other's lia bility ; Horseley v. Moss, 5 Tex. Civ. 341, 23 S. W. 1115.
Where two or more parties act, for himself and independently of each other, in a manner which may be injurious to another, they :cannot be held jointly liable for the acts of each other ; Livesay v. Nat. Bank, 36 Colo. 520, 86 Pac. 102, 6 L. R. A. (N.. S.) 598, .118 Am. St. Rep. 120; Blaisdell T. Ste phens, 14 Nev. 17, 33 Am. Rep. 523 ;' Forbes v. Marsh, 15 Conn. 384 ; Larkins v. Eck wurzel, 42 Ala. 322, 94 "Am. Dec. 651; Miller v. Ditch Co., 87 Cal. 433, 25 Pac. 550, 22 Am. St. Rep. 254.
Where unlawful attachments were simul taneously sued out by different creditors act ing through the same attorney and levied by the same officer on the same property at the same time, but so that one constituted a prior lien on the personalty, and the other a prior lien on the realty attached, the creditors were held not joint wrongdoers, since neither was interested in the success of the other, and their actions, though si multaneous, were not for a common purpose; Miller v. Beck, 108 Ia. 575, 79 N. W. 344. But it has been held that where several cred itors sue out at different times separate writs of attachment against a common debt ' or and cause them to be simultaneously lev ied by the same officer, they will be regard ed, the levy being wrongful, as joint wrong doers, though they may have acted separate ly without concert; Sparkman v. Swift, 81 Ala. 231, 8 South. 160 ; Vose v. Woods, 26 Hun (N. Y.) 486. In Ellis v. Howard, 17 Vt. 330, it was held that where the attach ments are levied at the same time, by the same officer, and upon the same property, there is prima facie a joint trespass.
If the plaintiff allege that the concurrent negligence of both defendants caused his injury, he may join them in one action. T depends on the averments of his complaint, land if the state court so decides, he may join them even though the liability of one is statutory and the other rests on the com mon law ; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Dow ell, 229 U. S. 102, Sup. Ct. 684, 57 L. Ed. 1090.