JUDGE. A public officer lawfully ap pointed to decide litigated questions accord ing to law.
An officer so named in his commission, who presides in some court.
In its most extensive sense the 'term In cludes all officers appointed to decide liti gated questions while acting in that capaci ty, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who ,are judges of the facts. Com. v. Dallas, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 229, 1 L. Ed. 812; Respublica v. Dallas, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 300. In ordinary legal use, however, the term is limited to the sense of the sec ond of the definitions here given; People v. Wilson, 15 Ill. 388; unless it may be that the case of a justice or commissioner acting judicially is to be considered an extension of this meaning. See 3 Cush. (Mass.) 584.
It, is not an unusual use of language in statutes to put the judge for the court, and to make provisions for him to execute that which can only be executed, in court. In re United States, 194 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. 629, 48 L. Ed. 931.
. By the common law every court, while en gaged in the exercise of its lawful functions, has the authority to preserve order, decency, and silence in its presence, and may appre hend and punish the offender without exam ination or proof ; but if the offence be cora mitted out of court the party is entitled to notice and a hearing in his defence ; People v. Turner, 1 Cal. 152; Redman v. State, 28 Ind. 205. A judge must be in court during a trial ; see 10 Am. L. Rev. 50. See CONTEMPT.
An assault on a judge sitting in court is not only punishable as a contempt, but in dictable, as a crime against public justice, and more aggravated than an ordinary as sault, or even than an assault committed upon another person in a court; 2 Bish. N. Cr. L. § 250'; this principle comes from the common law and was, as early as 25 Edw. 3,'embodied in a statute, under which such an offence was punishable by the loss of the right hand, forfeiture of lands and goods, and perpetual imprisonment. In Neagle's Case, 135 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 658, 34 L. Ed. 55, it was held that "an assault upon a judge of a court of the United States, while in dis charge of his official duties, is a breach of the peace of the United States, as distin guished from the peace of the State in which the assault takes place." In this case the petitioner was a United States deputy mar shal, appointed for the express purpose of guarding Mr. Justice Field against a threat ened attack, which took place, and a. killing by the deputy in such defence was held by the court to have been caused by a just ap prehension that an attack would result in the death of the justice, and was justifiable a judgment of the circuit court, dis charging him from the custody of the sheriff, by whom he was held under process of the state court, was affirmed.
So any insult, disrespect, or insolence to a judge is punishable ; 2 Bish. N. Cr. L. § 250 On this subject, it was said by Hol royd, J.: "In the case of an insult to (the judge) himself, it is not on his own account that he commits; for that is a consideration which should never enter his mind. . . . It is his duty to support the dignity of his station, and uphold the law, so that in his presence at least, it' shall not 'be infringed." 4 B. & Ald. 329, 339.
Within this principle it was held to be a contempt to write a letter to a judge, libel ling or abusing him in regard to one of his decisions ; In re Pryor, 18 Kan. 72, 26 Am. Rep. 747 ; or when a judge of an inferior tribunal refuses obedience to process from a superior one; Patchin v. City of Brooklyn, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 664; 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 516; Gorham v. Luckett, 6 B. Monr. (Ky.) 638; State v. Noel, T. U. P. Charlt. (Ga.) 43 ; Ex parte Carnochan, id. 315.
It has been held that abusing a judge out of court, with reference to expressions made by him on a trial, was a contempt ; Com. v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408 ; but in another case it was held that newspaper articles in regard to the conduct of a judge during a trial, and charging him with being an abet tor of a person against whom an indictment for murder was pending, could not be visited as a contempt; Ex parte Hickey, 4 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 751. In the federal courts, and in many states, the subject is regulated by stat ute ; U. S. R. S. § 725 ; U. S. v. R. Co., 16 Fed. 853 ; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 505, 22 L. Ed. 205 ; People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, 16 Am. Rep. 528; In re Oldham, 89 N. C. 23, 45 Am. Rep. 673 ; Foster v. Com., 8 W. & S. (Pa.) 77; . Cheadle v. State, 110 Ind. 301, 11 N. E. 426, 59 Am. Rep. 199. The ques tion whether a contempt can be committed otherwise than in court cannot be said to be settled, but Bishop is of the opinion that the English and better American doctrines recog nize such contempts, yet, under limitations easily defined ; 2 Bish. N. Cr. L. § 258. In all such cases the offence is against the state, not the judge ; id. § 269 ; Haight v. Lucia, 36 Wis. 355 ; Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196.