Parties to leases. All persons seized of lands or tenements may grant leases of them, unless they happen to be under some legal disability ; to determine the capaatY of parties to a lease the same rules are ap plied as in the case of other contracts. A lease by an infant is not valid, but he may ratify it on coming of age by receipt of rent, or the like; Smith v. Low, 1 Atk. 489, ap proved and followed as to boundaries in Brown v. Caldwell, 10 S. & R. (Pa.) 114, 13 Am. Dec. 660 ; Slator v. Trimble, 14 Ir. C. L. R. 342; it is not avoided by a lease to a third person on coming of age, but only by some notorious act, as ejectments, entry, or demand of possession ; Slater v. Brady, 14 Ir. C. L. R. 611; infancy of a lessee is no defence to an action of trover for conversion of the crops which under the lease were subject to a lien to secure the rent ; Baxter v. Bush, 29 Vt. 465, 70 Am. Dec. 429; but it is a defence to an action for use and occupa tion; Lempriere v. Lange, 12 Ch. D. 675 ; contra, Blake v. Concannon, Ir. 4 C. L. 323. As the lease is only voidable at the election of the lessor, the lessee cannot set up the disability of the lessor to defeat the lease or to be relieved from its covenants ; Field v. Herrick, 101 Ill. 110. See INFANT.
The common-law disability of a married woman would, of course, make a lease by her invalid. As to her power to lease her lands under modern statutes, those of the state which apply must be consulted. It has, however, been held that a lease by a married woman of her lands for the opera tion of gas and oil wells is not obnoxious to a statute forbidding her to encumber or con vey her lands without the joinder of her husband; Heal v. Oil Co., 150 Ind. 483, 50 N. E. 482; and in the same state it was held that a wife's parol lease of her land for the term of five years without the husband's concurrence 18 enforceable for the collection of rent from a lessee holding possession un der the lease ; Nash v. Berkmeir, 83 Ind. 536. See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Defence to an action for use and occupa tion on the ground of the mental unsound ness of the lessor requires proof, not only of lunacy, but that the other party knew and took advantage of it; Dane v. Kirkwall, 8 C. & P. 679. See INSANITY. Sa upon the ground that intoxication to an extreme ex tent results in mental incapacity, a lease may be held void when the lessor was induced to drink, or any fraud or circumvention was practiced; otherwise equity will not inter fere; Cooke v. Clayworth, 18 Ves. 12. See DRUNKENNESS.
It is essential to the validity of a lease that the lessor has, at the time he under takes to make the grant, possession of the premises ; otherwise, whatever be does will amount to nothing more than the assignment of a chose in action; Cro. Car. 109; Shep.
Touchst. 269. But possession is always pre sumed to follow the title unless there is a clearly marked adverse possession.
And although a lease may not be sufficient to authorize a lessee to demand possession for the want of a possessory title in his les sor, it will still operate by way of estoppel, and enure to his benefit if the lessor after wards comes into possession of the land be fore the expiration of the lease ; Bacon, Abr. Leases (I 4) ; Austin v. Ahearne, 61 N. Y. 6 ; Webb v. Austin, 7 M. & G. 701; McLennan v. Grant, 8 Wash. 603, 36 Pac. 682.
The power to lease will, of course, depend upon the extent of the lessor's estate in the premises ; and if he has but an estate for life, his lease can only be coextensive there with ; when for a term of years, its com mencement as well as its termination must be ascertained, for certainty in these' re spects is of the essence of a term of years. But although this term may not at first ap pear to be certain, it may be rendered so by reference to some fact or event ; id certum est quod certum reddi potest. Thus, if a lease be made to a man for so many years as he hai in the manor of Dale, and he hap pens to have a term of two years in that manor, the lease will be good for that period; Co. Litt. 45 b; Thurber v. Dwyer, 10 R. L 355.
Renewals. When leases provide for the renewal of the term, it implies an additional term equal to the first and upon the same terms, including the rent, but not the cove nant to renew ; Kollock v. Scribner, 98 Wis. 104, 73 N. W. 776 (overruling an earlier case) ; and where a renewal lease was ex ecuted, pursuant to the covenant, it was said to be a new grant and its covenants were to be read as if it were the first incep tion of the relation between the parties ; Phelps v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 61 Hun 521, 16 N. Y. Supp. 321; but where there was a new lease executed, expressly declared to be a re newal of the former one, it was held to be a mere continuance of the old term, for the preservation and protection of rights acquired therein; Newhoff v. Mayo, 48 N. J. Eq. 619, 23 Atl. 265, 27 Am. St. Rep. 455. There is a distinction between a stipulation to re new a lease for an additional term and one to extend it, as the former requires a new lease and the latter does not; Tilleny v. Knoblauch, 73 Minn. 108, 75 N. W. 1039 ; Orton v. Noonan, 27 Wis. 272.
Character of the Term. A lease at a monthly rental for so long as the lessee shall wish to live there creates a tenancy for life, and not one at will, at sufferance, or from month to month ; Thompson v. Baxter, 107 Minn. 122, 119 N. W. 797, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 575, and note in which many similar cases are collected.