LEASE. A cbntract for the possession and profits of lands and tenements on the one side, and a recompense of rent or other income on the other. Bac. Abr. Lease in pr.; or it is a conveyance to a person for life, or years, or at will, in consideration of a re turn of rent or other recompense. This defi nition appears in the first edition of this work with the authorities as cited. It is also quoted with reference to Woodfall, L. & T. c. 1, sec. 1, as an accurate definition of the relation of landlord and tenant in Jack son v. Harsen, 7 Cow. 323, 17 Am. Dec. 517, and note.
A species of contract for the possession and profits of lands and tenements either for life or for a certain period of time, or during, the pleasure of the parties.
A conveyance by way of demise, always for a less term than the party conveying has in the premises. Tayl. Landl. & Ten. § 16 ; Craig v. Summers, 47 Minn. 189, 49 N. W. 742, 15 L. R. A. 236.
One of its essential properties is, that its duration must be for a shorter period than the duration of the interest of the lessor in the land ; for if he disposes of his entire in terest it becomes an assignment, and is not a lease. In other words, the granting of a lease always supposes that the grantor re serves to himself a reversion in the leased premises.
And a distinction is to be noted between a lease and a mere agreement for a lease. The whole question, however, resolves it self into one of construction, and an instru ment is to be considered either a lease or an agreement for a lease, according to what appears to be the intention of the parties; Burnett v. Scribner, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 621; 9 Ad. & E. 644; Rice v. Brown, 81 Me. 56, 16 Atl. 334 ; Medlin v. Steele, 75 N. C. 154; Bacon v. Bowdoin, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 401; v. Crocker, 13 Gray (Mass.) 226; St. Louis Brewing Ass'n v. Niederluecke, 102 Mo. App. 303, 76 S. W. 645 ; ,though, gen erally, if there are apt words of demise fol lowed by possession, the instrument will be held a lease ; Averill v. Taylor, 8 N. Y. 44; Kabley v. Gas Light Co., 102 Mass. 392 ; 4 Ad. & E. 225 ; otherwise, if a fuller lease is to be prepared and executed before the de mise is to take effect and possession to be given; Aiken v. Smith, 21 Vt. 172; People
v. 'Gillis, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 201; Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Stor. 325, Fed. Cas. No. 7,268 ; Buell v. Cook, 4 Conn. 238 ; Griffin v. Knisely, 75 Ill. 411; L. R. 2 Ex. Div. 355. See =Aar. But an agreement for a lease is sometimes held to constitute the relation of landlord and tenant, though a more formal instrument was in contemplation ; Coffee v. Smith, 109 La. 440, 33 §o. 554 ; particularly where it contains all the terms necessary to a valid lease ; Marcus v. Const. Co., 27 Misc. 784, 57 N. Y. Supp. 737; but where the agree ment concluded with the statement that the subject was to be covered by a regular lease, subject to approval by all parties it is not a binding contract; Boisseau v. Fuller, 96 Va. 45, 30 S. E. 457.
The party who leases is called the lessor, he to whom the lease is made the lessee, and the compensation or consideration of the lease is the rent. The words lease and de mise are frequently used to signify the es tate or interest conveyed; but they prop erly apply to the instrument of conveyance. When a lessee parts with the estate granted to him, reserving any portion thereof, how ever small, he makes an 1,1,1461-lease; Tayl. L. & T. § 16; Van Rensselaer's Ex'rs v. Gal lup, 5 Den. (N. Y.) 454; Davis v. Morris, 36 N. Y. 569 ; Collamer v. Kelley, 12 Ia. 319.
The estate created by a lease, when for years, is called a term (terminus), because its ,duration is limited and determined,—its commencement as well as its termination being ascertained by an express agreement of the parties. And this phrase signifies not only the limitation of time or period granted for the occupation of the premises, but includes also the estate or interest in the land that passes during such period. A term, however, is perfected only by the entry of the lessee ; for previous to this the estate remains in the lessor, the lessee having a mere right to enter, which right is called an interesse termini; 1 Washb. R. P. 292, 297; 5 Co. 123 b; Co. Litt. 46 b; 1 B. & Ald. 593.