MALICE. In Criminal Law. The doing a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse. 4 B. & C. 255 ; Com. v. York, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 104, 43 Am. Dec. 373 ; Zimmer man v. Whiteley, 134 Mich. 39, 95 N. W. 989. A wicked and mischievous purpose which characterizes the perpetration of an injurious act without lawful excuse. 4 B. & C. 255 ; Corn. v. York, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 104, 43 Am. Dec. 373.
A conscious violation of the law, to the prejudice of another. 9 Cl. & F. 32.
That state of mind which prompts a con scious violation of the law to the prejudice of another. 9 Cl. & F. 32.
In a legal sense malice is never understood to de note general malevolence or unkindness of heart, or enmity towards a particular individual, but it signifies rather the intent from which flows any unlawful and injurious act committed without legal justification. McGurn v. Brackett, 33 Me. 331; State v. Pierce, 7 Ala. 728; Dexter v. Spear, 4 Mas. 115, Fed. Cas. No. 3,867 ; 90 Ga. 95 : R. & R. 26, 465 ; 1 Mood. C. C. 93 ; Lovett v. State, 30 Fla. 142, 11 South. 550, 17 L. R. A. 705. It is not confined to the intention of doing an injury to any particular person, but extends to an evil design, a corrupt and wicked notion against some one at the time of com mitting the crime ; Bacon, Max. Reg. 15 ; 2 Chitty, Cr. Law 727 ; 3 id. 1104; Johnson v. State, 90 Ga. 441, 16 S. E. 92; U. S. v. Reed, 86 Fed. 308; Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 487, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 48 L. Ed. 754.
Any formed design of mischief may be called mal ice. Malice is a wicked, vindictive temper, regard less of social duty, and bent on mischief. There may be malice, in a legal sense, in homicide, where there is no actual intention of any mischief, but the killing is the natural consequence of a careless action ; Add. 156 ; Brooks v. Jones, 33 N. C. 261; 3 Cr. Law Mag. 216; Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 213, 16 L. Ed. 73.
"Malice as used in the books, means sometimes malevolence, sometimes absence of excuse, and sometimes absence of a motive for the public good.
If so 'slippery' a word, to borrow Lord Bowen's ad jective, were eliminated from legal arguments and opinions, only good would follow." J. B. Ames, in 18 Harv. L. Rev. 422, note.
Express malice exists when the party evinces an intention to commit the crime ; 3 Bulstr. 171.
Implied malice is that inferred by law from the facts proved ; Worley v. State, 11 I-Iumphr. (Tenn.) 172; Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 299; 1 East, Pl. Cr. 371. In cases of murder this distinction is of no practical value ; 2 Bish. N. Cr. L. § 675.
Malice is implied in every case of inten tional homicide ; and where the fact of kill ing is proved, all the circumstances of acci dent or necessity are to be satisfactorily es tablished by the accused, unless they arise out of the evidence produced against him to prove the homicide and the circumstances attending it. If there are, in fact, circum stances of justification, excuse, or palliation, such proof will naturally indicate them. But where the fact of killing is proved by satisfactory evidence, and there are no cir cumstances disclosed tending to show justifi cation or excuse, there is nothing to rebut the natural presumption of malice. It is material to the just understanding of this rule that it applies only to cases where the killing is proved and nothing further is shown; for if the circumstances disclosed tend to extenuate the act, the prisoner has the full benefit of such facts ; Corn. v. York, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373; Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray (Mass.) 463.
Malice in fact is synonymous with "ex press malice," as distinguished from implied malice ; Smith v. Rodecap, 5 Ind. App. 78, 31 N. E. 479 ; Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C. 270, 13 S. E. 775.
Malice in law is synonymous with implied malice ; Smith v. Rodecap, 5 Ind. App. 78, 31 N. E. 479, it is an act done wrongfully and wilfully, without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling or spite, or a desire to injure an other ; Tucker v. Cannon, 32 Neb. 444, 49 N. W. 435.