Malice

act, motive, malicious, am, rep and torts

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It is a general rule that when a man com mits an act, unaccompanied by any circum stances justifying its commission, the law presumes he has acted with an intent to produce the consequences which have en sued. And therefore the intent to kill is conclusively inferred from the deliberate violent use of a deadly weapon ; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 305, 52 Am. Dec. 711. See 3 M. & S. 15 ; 1 R. & R. Cr. Cas. 207; 1 East, Pl. Cr. 223, 232, 340 ; 15 Viner, Abr. 506 ; Wilkins v. State, 98 Ala. 1, 13 South. 312.

In Torts. A malicious act is a wrongful act, intentionally done without cause or ex cuse. Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152.

A malevolent motive for action without reference to any hope of a remoter benefit to oneself to be accomplished by the intended harm to another. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N. E. 390, 2 L. R. A. 81, 12 Am. St. Rep. 560.

Malice "is improper and indirect motive ;" but a better definition is said to be, "A wish to injure the party, rather than to vindicate the law." Pollock, Torts 303.

The evil mind that is regardless of social duty and the rights of others. Graham v. Life Ass'n, 98 Tenn. 48, 37 S. W. 995.

In a libel. In connection with a privileged communication, malice is any and wicked motive which induces the writer to defame the other party. Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C. 270, 13 S. E. 775. See LIBEL.

In slander it is the absence of legal ex cuse ; Branstetter v. Dorrough, 81 Ind. 527. See SLANDER.

This term, as applied to torts, does not necessarily mean that which must proceed from a spiteful, malignant, or revengeful dispoSition, but a conduct injurious to an other, though proceeding from an ill-regu lated mind not sufficiently cautious before it occasions an injury to another ; Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 S. & R. (Pa.) 39.

Malice consists in one's wilful doing of an act or wilful neglect of an obligation which he knows is liable to injure another, re gardless of the consequences, and a malig nant spirit or a specific intention to hurt an individual is not an essential element ; U. S. v. Reed, 86 Fed. 308, per Brown, J. See

State v. Toney, 15 S. C. 409; 5 B. & A. 594; Davis v. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. W. 984.

It has been held that an act done in the xercise of a lawful right and without neg ligence may be unlawful if done with ex press malice ; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. San derson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 Atl. 453, 57 Am. Rep. 445 ; 7 H. L. Cas. 387 ; as persuading another to do, to the prejudice of a third person, something which he has a right to do, may give that third person a cause of action if the persuasion be malicious ; [1895] 2 Q. B. 21, but this decision was reversed by the house of lords ; [1898] A. C. 1; and the ma jority of the decisions tend to support the rule that an act in itself lawful is not con verted by a malicious motive into an unlaw ful act, so as to make the doer liable to a civil action ; id.; Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa. 308 ; Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N. Y. 39, 28 Am. Rep. 93; Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; and that no use of property which would be legal if due to a proper motive, can become illegal because it is prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious; [1895] A. C. 587; and see 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1. See LABOR UN IONS. An injunction will' not lie against one who, actuated by places on her land a large sign : "For sale. Best offer from colored family ;" Holbrook v. Morrison, 214 Mass. 209, 100 N. E. 1111, 44 L. It. A. (N. S.) 228, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 824. Pecuniary dishon esty is held malicious ; First Nat. Bank of lora v. Burkett, 101 Ill. 391, 40 Am. Rep. 209.

A corporation may be liable civilly for that class of torts in which a specific mali cious intention is an essential element ; U. S. v. John Kelso Co., 86 Fed. 306.

See FALSE IMPRISONMENT; LIBEL; MALI CIOUS PROSECUTION.

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