NANT RIOHT TO CONVEY.
Covenants of seisin. See COVENANT OF SEISIN. • Covenants to stand seized, etc. See COVE NANT TO STAND SEIZED TO USES.
Transitive covenants those personal covenants the duty of performing which passes over to the representatives of the covenantor.
Covenants of warranty. See COVENANT OF WARRANTY.
Covenants are subject to the same rules as other contracts in regard to the qualifica tions of parties, the assent required, and the nature of 'the purpose for which the contract is entered into. See PARTIES ; CONTRACTS. No peculiar words are needed to raise an express covenant ; Midgett v. Brooks, 34 N. C. 145, 55 Am. Dec. 405; 5 Q. B. 683; 3 Ex. 237, per Parke, B.; and by statute in Ala bama, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Texas, the words grant, bargain, and sell, in conveyances in fee, unless specially restricted, amount to covenants that the grantor was seized in fee, freed from incumbrances done or suffered by him, and for quiet enjoyment against his acts ; 4 Kent 473 ; Gratz's Lessee v. Ewalt, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 95; Dickson v. Desire's Adm'r, 23 Mo. 151, 66 Am. Dec. 661; Chambers' Adm'r v. Smith's Adm'r, 23 Mo. 174 ; Griffin v. Reynolds, 17 Ala. 198; Prettyman v. Wil key, 19 Ill. 235 ; Davis v. Tarwater, 15 Ark. 289; but do not imply any general warranty of title in Alabama, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina ; 4 Kent 474; Winston v. Vaughan, 22 Ark. 72, 76 Am. Dec. 418 ; Rick ets v. Dickens, 5 N. C. 343, 4 Am. Dec. 555 ; Roebuck v. Duprey, 2 Ala. 535. In Iowa, by the statute of 1843, the same rule was au thorized, and upon this it was held that all covenants were express; Brown v. Tomlin son, 2 G. Greene (Ia.) 525; but no such pro visions are to be found in the revised code of 1884. In Ohio the statute of 1795 was almost exactly copied from the Pennsylvania statute, but was repealed in 1824 and re enacted in substance, and entirely repealed in 1831, and the latest Revised Statutes (1884), like those of Iowa, are silent on the subject. The Wisconsin statute, providing that no covenant shall be implied, makes an exception in the case of the short form of conveyance provided by statute, and declares that such a deed shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, etc.; Rev. Stat. 1878. In Tennessee there is no statutory provision as to implied covenants, but a statutory short form of conveyance was held to authorize the broadest construction of the granting words unless their effect was specially lim ited by the instrument itself ; Daly v. Willis,
5 Lea (Tenn.) 100. In California and North and South Dakota the same rule substantial ly is prescribed by statute in the first-named state, the implied covenants do not run with the land ; Lawrence v. Montgomery, 37 Cal. 183. In Georgia a covenant of 'general war ranty Is held to Include covenants of a right to convey, quiet enjoyment, and freedom from incumbrances; Burk v. Burk, 64 Ga.
632. See generally on this subject, Rawie, Coy. § 286.
Describing lands in a deed as bounded on a street of a certain description raises a covenant that the street shall be of that de scription; Loring v. Otis, 7 Gray (Mass.) 563 ; and that the purchaser shall have the use thereof ; MoalO v. Mayor, etc.; of Balti more, 5 Md. 314, 61 Am. Dec. 276; Green wood v. R. R., 23 N. H. 261; which binds sub sequent purchasers from the grantor ; Thom as v. Poole, 7 Gray (Mass.) 83.
In New York it is provided by statute that no covenants can be implied in any convey ance of real estate; 4 gent 469; but this provision does not extend to leases for years; Tone v. Brace, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 566; Mack v. Patcbin, 42 N. Y. 174, 1 Am. Rep. 506.
The New York statute has been enacted In Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, and no covenants for title seem to be implied in states other than those above named. In some cases where the cove nants relate to lands, the rights and liabili ties of the covenantor, or covenantee, or both, pass to the assignee of the thing to which the covenant relates. In such cases the covenant is said to run with the land. If rights pass the benefit is said to run; if lia bilities, the burden. Only real covenants run with the land, and these only when the cove nant has entered into the consideration for which the land, or some interest therein to which the covenant is annexed, passed be tween the covenantor and the covenantee; 2 Sugd. Vend. 468, 484; 2 M. & K. 535; Morse v. Aldrich, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 449; Hurd v. Curtis, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 464; Van Rens selaer v. Bonesteel, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 366; Lyon v. Parker, 45 Me. 474; see 1 Washb. R. P. 526; ,and they die with the estate to which they are annexed ; Lewis v. Cook, 35 N. C. 193 ; but an estoppel to deny passage of title is said to be sufficient ; Trull v. Eastman, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 124, 37 Am. Dec. 126; and the passage of mere possession, or defeasible estate without possession, enables the cove nant to run ; Dickson v. Desire's Adm'r, 23 Mo. 151, 66 Am. Dec. 661; Chambers' Adm'r v. Smith's Adm'r, 23 Mo. 174.