NEXT OF ICIN. This term is used to signify the relations of a party, who has died intestate.
In general, no oue comes within this term who is not included in the provisions of the statutes of distribution; 3 Atk. 422, 761; 1 Ves. Sen. 84 ; Slosson v. Lynch, 28 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 417. The phrase means relation by blood; Keteltas v. Keteltas, 72 N. Y. 312, 28 Am. Rep. 155. It has been held, on other hand, that next of kin in a will means "nearest of kin ;" 10 Cl. & F. 215; Redmond v. Burroughs, 63 N. C. 242. A wife cannot, in general, claim as next of kin of her husband, nor a husband as next of kin of his wife ; Haraden v. Larrabee, 113 Mass. 430; Peterson v. Webb, 39 N. C. 56 ; 14 Ves. 372; Townsend v. Radcliffe, 44 Ill. 446 ; Appeal of Ivins. 106 Pa. 176, 51 Am. Rep. 516. But see Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Hinman, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 410; Steel v. Kurtz, 28 Ohio St. 192; French v. French, 84 Ia. 655, 51 N. W. 145, 15 L. R. A. 300. But when there are circumstances in a will which induce a belief of an intention to include them under this term, they will be so considered, though in the ordinary sense of the word they are not; Hovenden, Fr. 288, 289; 1 My. & K. 82 ; the same rule bolds as to the interpretation of statutes ; Lima E. L. & P. Co. v. Denbler, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 185 ; French v. French, 84 Ia. 655, 51 N. W. 145, 15 L. R. A. 300.
As to next of kin in the act of congress of March 3, 1891, see FRENCH. SPOLIATION CLAIMS.
In the construction of wills and settle ments, after a considerable conflict of opin ions, the established rule of interpretation in England is that next of kin when found in ulterior limitations must be understood to mean nearest of kin without regard to the statute of distribution ; 2 Jarm. Wills 108; Blagge v. Balch, 162 U. S. 464, 16 Sup. Ct. 853, 40 L. Ed. 1032. This rule was fol lowed in Swasey v. Jaques, 144 Mass. 135, 10 N. E. 758, 59 Am. Rep. 65; Redmond v. Bur roughs, 63 N. C. 242; but it was not ap
proved in Tillman v. Davis, 95 N. Y. 17, 47 Am. Rep. 1; Pinkham v. Blair, 57 N. H. 226.
Next of kin ordinarily have no standing in law or equity for the recovery of property alleged to belong to their decedent; Buch anan v. Buchanan, 75 N. J. Eq. 274, 71 Atl. 745, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454, 138 Am. St. Rep. 563, 20 Ang. Cas. 91, citing Ware v. Galveston City Co., 111 U. S. 170, 4 Sup. Ct. 337, 28 L. Ed. 393, and a large number of other cases ; otherwise, if there was collu sion between the personal representatives and the party against whom they have brought suit; Rowell v. Rowell, 122 Wis. 1, 99 N. W. 473; Trotter v. Life Ass'n, 9 S. D. 596, 70 N. W. 843, 62 Am. St. Rep. 887; Mc Lemore v. Min. Co., 121 Ky. 53, 88 S. W. 1062 ; Hubbard v. Urton, 67 Fed. 419a Many cases find an exception to that rule where there are no debts against the estate and nothing remains but to collect the assets and pay them over to the next of kin ; Bridgman v. It. Co., 58 Vt. 198, 2 Atl. 467; Walker v. Abercrombie, 61 Tex. 69; Hurt v. Fisher, 96 Tenn. 570, 35 S. W. 1085 ; Roberts v. singer, 134 Pa. 298, 19 Atl. 625, contra: Dav enport v. lirooks, 92 Ala. 627, 9 South. 153 ; Leainon v. McCubbin, 82 Ill. 263 ; also an exception to the rule has been made when the administrator refuses to sue; Matheny v. Ferguson, 55 W. Va. 656, 47 S. D. 886 ; Randel v. Dyett, 38 Hun (N. Y.) 347; but even in such case the rule was applied in L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 210. It seems that, if the administrator consents, the next of kin may sue; Anderson v. Goodwin, 125 Ga. 663, 54 S. E. 679. In Samuel v. Marshall, 3 Leigh (Va.) 567, a bill by the next of kin to set aside a fraudulent gift was sustained, but the property was decreed to the personal representatives.
See LEGACY; DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; KIN ; KINDRED.