The act was directed against trusts for accumulation. ouch a trust which violates the rule against perpetuities is wholly void, but one which is good within the rule might violate the Thelluson Act and be void for the excess; Gray, Perp. § 687. The act pro hibits accumulations other than during four distinct periods, the language being: "For any longer term than the life or lives of any such grantor or grantors, settler or set tlers; or the term of twenty-one years from the death of any such grantor, settler, de visor, or testator; or during the minority or respective minorities of any person or per sons who shall be living, or en ventre as mere at the time of the death of such gran tor, devisor, or testator ; or during the mi nority or respective minorities only of any person or persons who, under the uses or trusts of the deed, surrender, will, or other assurances directing such accumulations, would, for the time being, if of full age, be entitled unto the rents, issues and profits, or the interest, dividends, or annual produce so directed to be accumulated." And only on of these periods can be taken; 16 Sim. 391; 25 Ch. D. 729. In Pennsylvania there is a statute of the same kind, Act 1853, Apr. 18, § 9, the text of which will be found in Gray, Perp. Appx. B. In Alabama accumulations are prohibited for more than ten years, or to the termination of minority in case of a minor in being at the date of conveyance or death of the testator.
The legislation on the subject of perpetui ties has been classified as of three kinds: 1. A general provision that perpetuities shall not be allowed. 2. A short and simple stat ute declaring or modifying the law. 3. An elaborate scheme to be substituted for the common law.
The first class consists mainly of consti tutional provisions in Arkansas, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Ver mont. A similar provision existed formerly in Florida, but was omitted in the last con stitution. The second class includes Georgia, Iowa, and Kentucky, with statutes prop erly declaratory of the common law ; and Alabama, Connecticut, North and South Da kota, the District of Columbia, Idaho, In diana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, where the common-law rule is somewhat modified. The third class em braces the states which have followed, in the main, the New York statute, providing against, (1) remoteness of interests in land; (2) accumulation of land and profits there from ; (3) the same as to pergonal property. Michigan and Minnesota have followed the first and second parts of the New York sys tem, and Indiana substantially the whole of it. The prohibition of this legislation is against a restraint upon the power of alien ation for more than two lives in being at the creation of the estate. But in Indiana,
California, and Dakota, where the New York system to a large extent was followed, the restraint was not confined to two existing lives. In Wisconsin, where the New York statute was first followed exactly, in 1887, the period was extended to two lives in be ing and twenty-one years thereafter. See Gray, Perp. Appx. B. & C.; 1 Stims. Am. Stat. L. § 1440. The rule affects both legal and equitable interests and real and per sonal estate; it is not of feudal origin, but the outgrowth of necessities of modern times; and while strictly applied, regard is had rather to substance than form ; Gray, Perp. §§ 202, 203.
Under the common-law rule there is no limit to the number of lives that can be taken ; 11 Ves. 146.
A trust for as long a period under the statute as is possible is legal at common-law and is limited for the lives of the annuitants and 21 years after the last survivor's death; Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U. S. 321, 29 Sup. Ct. 106, 53 L. Ed. 202, where there were forty annuitants (lives) in being.
The limitations of an estate pur (utter vie cannot be too remote; 3 P. Wms. 262. Gift to support animals during their lives and the life of the survivor was held good with in the rule; 41 Ch. Div. 552. For the pur poses of the rule men and women are deem ed capable of having issue as long as they live; 1 Cox 324. A condition subsequent in a conveyance giving a right of re-entry for condition broken is subject to the rule when attached to fee or the grantor's entire interest; [1899] 2 Ch. 540. In the United States, these rights of re-entry are not sub ject to the rule, on the ground that they are old common law rights. By statute some states provide that no condition can be im posed to continue in effect for more than a specified time, usually from twenty to thirty years.
A testatrix gave an estate to a trustee to accumulate the income until her youngest living grandchild should reach 21, and then to pay over annually to her grandchildren. The gift was held bad on the ground that payment need not be made until one year after the fund accrues, which would be 22 years from the creation of the interest; Fos dick v. Fosdick, 6 Allen (Mass.) 41.
Powers are within the rule and generally are prevented from being too remote, be cause they can last only during the continu ance of the trust and generally some one is found within the rule who has an absolute vested interest, and then these powers of sale simply cease altogether or else they are considered as existing, but are destructible by the one having the absolute interest, and so are not too remote; Pultizer v. Living ston. 89 Me. 359, 36 Atl. 635.