A limitation of • a legal estate to the un born children of an unborn person, i. e. a contingent remainder, is bad and not within the rule, on the ground that a possibility limited on a possibility is bad; 44 Ch. Div. 85. This rule applies to equitable as well as legal estates, but the technical doctrine would be limited to contingent remainders.
A vested interest is not subject to the rule, and therefore it does not affect rever sions and vested remainders and analogous equitable interests and interests in personal ty ; Gray, Perp. § 205. Whether contingent remainders are so has been the subject of much discussion involving the mooted ques tion of limiting a possibility upon a possi bility. That they are within the rule is con tended by many authorities; Gray, Perp. §§ 284-298, where it is earnestly contended that contingent remainders and all future inter ests should fall within the rule, which con clusion is also supported by Lewis, Perp. c. 16, Suppl. 97. See, also, 20 Ch. D. 562; 1 Jarm. Wills 255, 260; 2 id. 845; Wood v. Griffin, 46 N. H. 230 ; 60 L. T. 247; contra, Wms. R. P. 6th Am. ed. 274; 2 H. L. Cas. 186. See L. R. 43 Ch. D. The rule applies to personal property; Lewis, Perp. 613; Gray, Perp. § 315; and fu ture estates In personalty are treated just the same as in realty, and hence it would seem that there can be a life estate in per sonalty with a vested future interest, in stead of stating that all fpture estates in personalty must be executory devises ; 3 Chan. Div. 211. In case of chattels real, technically there could not be future vested interests. Equitable interests are affected by analogy to legal estates; those vested are not subject, and those not vested are subject to' the rule; id. §§ 322, 323.
An option to purchase land is an equitable interest and within the application of the rule; 20 Ch. Div. 562. In England, the practice was said to be to give an option for the lives of the present descendants of Queen Victoria, but as a general rule the option is only for 21 years, because of the difficulty of finding a life. The fact that the option is too remote to recover the lands may or may not affect the right to bring an action on the breach of the contract for damages. An ac
tion was allowed in [1906] 2 Ch. 532. Where land was conveyed to a corporation on their agreement to build a tunnel when called up on, specific performance was allowed against the corporation, and it was held that the rule did not apply ; [1910] 1 Chan. 12. For a criticism of these cases, see the articles in 51 Solicitor's Jour. 648, 669; 54 id. 471, 501.
An option on coal lands, to be accepted "at any future time whatsoever," is void as constituting a perpetuity, and equity will de cree its cancellation on a bill to remove a cloud from the title to the land; Barton v. Thaw, 41 C. C. Rep. (Pa.) 396, following L. R. 2 Ch. D. 257, 532 ; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352 (where an agreement to purchase land at any time before it other wise should be sold was held void as being within the rule against perpetuities); Starch er v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 373, 56 S. E. 524, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 913, 123 Am. St. Rep. 990, where an option made for one year, but to be extended from year to year, was held void for the same reason.
The rule against perpetuities does not af fect contracts unless they are such as create rights of property ; id. § 329 ; L. R. 43 Ch. D. 265. The rule is not applicable to a re sulting trust which arises on the failure of an estate granted for a particular use which has ceased; Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342, 17 Sup. Ct. 401, 41 L. Ed. 739 ; nor to a power to sell, upon the expiration of an es tate tail, and divide the proceeds among per sons then ascertainable; Barber v. R. Co., 166 U. S. 83, 17 Sup. Ct. 488, 41 L. Ed. 925.
The statutes against perpetuities were di rected at private trusts and accumulations and not at public, charitable, or eleemosy nary trusts or uses; Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174, 2 Sup. Ct. 336, 27 L. Ed. 401; Potter v. Chapin, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 639. The rule cannot be invoked to defeat a charitable use; White v. Keller, 68 Fed. 796, 15 C. C. A. 683; but a gift for the encourage ment of yacht-racing is not such a use and may therefore be void as a perpetuity ; [1895] 2 Ch. 657.