Powers of Partners

firm, am, partner, bind, ed, rep, pa and dec

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Appearance. In an action against part ners, one may enter or authorize an appear ance for the rest; 7 Term 207; Bennett v. Stickney, 17 Vt. 531; McCullough v. Guetner, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 214; Wheatley v. Tutt, 4 Kan. 205 ; contra, L. R. 8 Q. B. 398; Critchfield v. Porter, 3 Ohio 519; see Pars. (Jas.) Partn. § 119; 10 App. Cas. 680; but not after dissolution of the firm; Haslet v. Street, .2 McCord (S. C.) 311, 13 Am. Dec. 724. Nor can one partner bind his co-part ners personally and individually by entering an appearance for them when they are not within the jurisdiction, nor served with pro cess; Phelps v. Brewer, 9 thigh. (Mass.) 390, 57 Am. Dec. 56. A partner cannot authorize an appearance for a co-partner, not subject to the jurisdiction of the court, or if the firm has been dissolved ; Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160, 23 L. Ed. 271; but a solicitor instruct ed by "'a managing partner may enter an ap pearance for all partners; [1896] 1 Q. B. 386.

Arbitration. As a general rule, one part ner cannot bind the firm by submitting any of its affairs to arbitration, whether by deed or parol; 3 Kent 49; 3 C. & B. 742; Backus v. Coyne, 35 Mich. 5; Walker v. Bean, 34 Minn. 427, 26 N. W. 232 ; Fancher v. Fur nace Co., 80 Ala. 481, 2 South. 268 ; Buchan an v. Curry, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 137, 10 Am. Dec. 200; Karthaus v. Ferrer, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 222, 7 L. Ed. 121. The reason given being that such a power is unnecessary for car rying on the business in the ordinary way ; Lind. Part., 2d Am. ed. *129, *272. But the acting partner may be bound; Buchanan v. Curry, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 137, 10 Am. Dec. 200. And, the general rule is perhaps some what relaxed; Pars. Partn. § 121. It is held that one partner may bind the firm by submission to arbitration, by an agreement not under seal; Gay v. Waltman, 89 Pa. 453; but apparently only so as to bind firm as sets ; Gay v. Waltman, 89 Pa. 453.

Assignments. The right of a partner to dispose of the property of the firm extends to the assignment of at least a portion of it as security antecedent debts, as well as for debts thereafter to be contracted ; Story, Part. § 101; Harrison v. 5 Cra. (U. S.) 289, 3 L. Ed. 104; Keck v. Fisher, 58 Mo. 532 ; Dana v. Lull, 17 Vt. 394. Al though the authorities differ, the better opin ion seems to be that one partner cannot, without the knowledge or consent of his co partners, assign all the property of the firm to a trustee for the benefit of creditors; Hook v. Stone, 34 Mo. 329; trunklin v. Kim ball, 50 Ala. 251; Brooks v. Sullivan, 32 Wis. 444 ; Mayer v. Bernstein, 69 Miss. 17, 12

South:257 ; unless the co-partner is absent, or is incapable of giving his assent or dis sent; Hill v. Postley, 90 Va. 200, 17 S. E. 946; Williams v. Frost, 27 Minn. 255, 6 N. W. 793; but not against the assent, or with out the consent, of the co-partner, if the latter is present and capable of acting; Fox v. Curtis, 176 Pa. 52, 34 Atl. 952. A surviv ing partner has power to make an assign ment for the benefit of the firm's creditors; Riley v. Carter, 76 Md. 581, 25 Atl. 667, 19 L. R. A. 489, 35 Am. St. Rep. 443.

Bills of ewchange and promissory notes. A partner may draw, accept, and indorse bills and notes in the name and for the use of the firm, for purposes within the scope of its business ; 7 Term 210; Blodgett v. Weed, 119 Mass. 215 ; Zuel v. Bowen, 78 Ill. 234 ; First N. Bk. v. Freeman, 47 Mich. 408, 11 N. W. 219; Ketcham N. Bk. v. Hagen, 164 N. Y. 446, 58 N. E. 523 ; Pettyjohn v. Bank, 101 Va. 111, 43 S. E. 203. A restric tion of this power by agreement between the partners does not affect third persons un less they have notice; Lagan v. Cragin, 27 La. Ann. 352 ; Faler v. Jordan, 44 Miss. 283. This power cannot be exercised after disso lution of the firm; Carleton v. Jenness, 42 Mich. 110, 3 N. W. 284; Curry v. White, 51 Cal. 531; but its exercise may bind the firm if such dissolution be without proper notice ; Stimson v. Whitney, 130 Mass. 591; or when the other party subsequently assents thereto ; Norton v. Oil Can Co., 98 Ga.. 468, 25 S. D. 501.

The doctrine is generally limited to part nerships in trade and commerce, and does not apply to other partnerships, unless it is the common usage of such business so to bind the firm, or it is necessary for the due transaction thereof ; Dowling v. Bank, 145 L. S. 512, 12 Sup. Ct. 928, 36 L. Ed. 795. Non-trading partners, such as farmers; Ulery v. Ginrich, 57 Ill. 531; lawyers; Smith, v. Sloan, 37 Wis. 285, 19 Am. Rep. 757; physi cians; Crosthwait v. Ross, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 23, 34 Am. Dec. 613; cannot usually bind the firm by such instruments. Parties deal ing with non-trading partnerships' are put on inquiry ; Pooley v. Whitmore, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 629, 27 Am. Rep. 733; Benedict v. Thompson, 33 La. Ann. 196; the doctrine of general agency does not apply; Pease v. Cole, 53 Conn. 53, 22 Atl. 681, 55 Am. Rep. 53.

A bill or note made by one partner in the name of the firm is prima facie for part nership purposes ; Carder v. Cameron, 31 Mich. 373, 18 Am. Rep. 192 ; Hogg v. Orgill, 34 Pa. 344 ; Faler v. Jordan, 44 Miss. 283.

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